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. Par-exemple and . Dans-la, table ci-dessous, si VOUS choisissez la ligne du dessus et l'AUTRE JOUEUR choisi la colonne du milieu, en conséquence, les revenus seront ceux de la cellule à l'intersection entre la ligne et la colonne sélectionnées

L. Seule and . Combinaison, de deux choix sélectionnera une, et seulement une cellule, qui correspondra à votre revenu

. Dans-l-'exemple-précédent, vous pouvez observer votre paiement à la fin du jeu. Durant l'expérience, vous devrez attendre d'avoir pris toutes vos décisions pour connaitre vos paiements. Vous ne saurez donc pas ce qu