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The Provincial Administration & the
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By Okeyo Joseph Obosi
THE PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION AND THE DEMOCRATISATION OF DEVELOPMENT PROCESS IN KENYA

BY
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A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION.

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CHAPTER ONE

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Development, generally regarded as a positive change aimed at improving the lives of the majority of the population overtime, is a goal that each country aims at attaining. Developed countries have, compared to underdeveloped/developing countries; high literacy levels, better health care, better physical infrastructure, high income per capita, high economic growth, high Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Gross National Product (GNP), and greater respect for human rights. The developed countries continue pursuing its higher levels while the so-called under developed ones are pre-occupied with the search for policies that can enable them attain improved basic development levels.

The pursuit of development, therefore, of necessity involves making rational public choices at all phases of the projects to be undertaken, i.e., in terms of both initiation and execution. However, the most basic strategic problem encountered by most governments is whether to rely on political or administrative structures. Alternatively, what "mix" of structures would best promote development?

The post independence government of Kenya has all a long used the Provincial Administration in the maintenance of order and stability; legitimatising and consolidating the presence of the central authority throughout the nation; and executing national development plans at grassroots levels. Immediately after independence, the argument was that, a new state like Kenya needed to use the administrative arm of the government as a primary instrument for initiating and guiding the process of development. To the contrary, Hyden (1970), expressing doubt about the
governments' ability to guide development, observed that much of what might be labelled "development" occurs quite apart from government initiatives.

As a matter of fact, with the increased demand for services from the state by the citizens, the government began to tolerate the entry of other government institutions and other non-state actors into the development space, hence the democratisation of the development process. These non-state actors include Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), People's Organization (POs), commonly known as Community Based Organizations (CBOs) that include: various forms of co-operative and self-help groups. The CBOs and NGOs emerged as the providers of the last resort. All these non-state actors can collectively be referred to as the civil society.

It is therefore apparent that the "democratisation" of development process in Kenya has opened up avenues for the proliferation of other interested actors in development thus prompting the regime to seek appropriate pattern of accommodating various actors in the development process. These actors, amongst themselves, are bound to condition the performance of and/or participation by others. Under such circumstances, the government, of necessity, has to formulate proper organizational structure, administrative behaviour and institutional norms to make public organizations more productive and innovative.

1.1 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Kenya has since independence used the Provincial Administration to spearhead development. This means that the Provincial Administration has championed the local planning, co-ordination, interpretation and implementation of development projects and programmes. In other words, directly, or indirectly, the Provincial Administration remained a key player working with
technical ministries in the provision of services/facilities to serve the following needs: education, health, agriculture, water, and above all, security - covered under the maintenance of law and order.

However, since the late 1980s the involvement of others especially Civil Society actors, including NGOs, both local and foreign, CBOS such as "harambee" self-help projects and co-operative SACCOs groupings in the development process has increased, not only in numbers, but also in coverage. Their activities range from provision of education, agriculture, health, to clean water, and poverty alleviation. For instance, in the health sector, NGOs and the private sector provided about 40% of the country's health services (Republic of Kenya, 1994:231); one NGO operating in two divisions with a population of 240,000 provided over 80% of the total health and education, services within an eight - year period (Kanyinga 1995). "Harambee" funding of development projects has been between 3% and 11% of total public funding (Republic of Kenya, 1989:258-9). In terms of maintenance of law and order, the churches, village vigilante youths, community, and political party youths, too have had a significant contribution (Anangwe, 1995). There has generally been a marked shift in the development thinking and practices amongst policy makers and practitioners. More attention is consequently being given to NGOs and CBOs as alternatives, and at times considered better, compared to state actors.

The re-emergence of competitive multi-party politics in 1990s had negative consequences on the powers of the Provincial Administration. In fact, in opposition areas, members of the Provincial Administration were regarded with a lot of suspicion until 1998 when some form of political cooperation between the ruling political party, KANU, on the one hand and opposition political parties, NDP and FORD-K, on the other began and the hatred for PA in the respective
opposition parties' strongholds tended to soften but only to a limited extent. The suspicion made it extremely difficult for members of PA to mobilize the public to participate in hardly any project. This was because they (PA) were easily identified as agents or conduits of the ruling political party, KANU. In 1997, a further blow was dealt on the powers of the Provincial Administration following Inter-Parties Parliamentary Group (IPPG) consultative meetings, when it was decided that it would no longer be mandatory to seek PA's authority to hold a gathering, including "harambee" self-help meetings.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the emergence of the new actors and the impact on the developmental role of the Provincial Administration in Kenya. Put differently, has the Provincial Administration lost its dominance of the development process or has its role changed. The basic concern is to what extent has this taken place and what is the emerging form?

1.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

GENERAL OBJECTIVE

The broad objective of the study is to assess the developmental role of the Provincial Administration during the new era of political pluralism in Kenya.

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES
The study's specific objectives are as below:

1.2.1 To investigate the nature of relationship between people's popular participation in development activities and the Provincial Administration.

1.2.2 To assess the current development tasks of the Provincial Administration.

1.2.3 To examine the impact of the democratisation of the development process on the Provincial Administration in a given locality.
1.2.4 To investigate the impact of the emergence of the new actors, NGOs and POs, in the development space on popular participation.

1.3 JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY

This study may be justified on both academic grounds and good policy practice. On academic grounds, the study represents a modest attempt to understand the role of Provincial Administration in the development process in Kenya in the current multi-party setting. Scholars have written a lot on the administration of development in Kenya. For instance, Oyugi (1986) addressed the administration of development from the perspective of attempted decentralization. He had earlier discussed the administration of development from the perspective of popular participation in planning for rural development, in Leonard (1974). Other scholars include: Gertzel, (1970), with a focus on the inherited institutional role of Provincial Administration, Anangwe (1994) from the perspective of civil service, Barkan (1984 and 1994) from the public policy versus politics perspective, and Uma Lele (1979) from the perspective of nationally planned rural development strategies. However, these scholars have not addressed the role of Provincial Administration in the development process in the new context that has emerged recently and also a growing trend of similar roles being performed by other actors. The tendency in the earlier analysis has been to view the Provincial Administration as a necessary institution through which development should be channelled. It is precisely this position, which constitutes a point of departure for this study. The analysis would take a different line of investigation from the previous studies by treating Provincial Administration as a competitor/partner in the development process whose role can be re-defined, more so, during the era of pluralism that has given rise to several other actors in the local development arena.
Policy wise, the study is justified in the sense that beginning early 1980s, the role of state in the delivery of development faced many criticisms from a number of scholars. Specifically, these scholars focused their attention on the state's limitation in delivering development. Chazan (1988), attributing most of African countries' retarded economic growth to state woes, advocated for the revitalisation of non-state institutions as a condition for the resuscitation of both the political sphere and the economy. Kanyinga (1995) also argues against the predatory tendencies of the state at the micro-or local levels, thereby causing the spontaneous rise of popular initiatives either in resistance, to undermine or countermand these tendencies. Other scholars still have argued that the state should "roll back" from all development activities and instead confine itself to what it can do best, i.e. provision of "enabling" conditions for other non-state development actors. This is the view that has been taken by both bi-lateral and multi-lateral donors from Europe and USA, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) reflected in their conditionality for the provision of financial support to further the objectives of structural adjustment programmes.

In an apparent response to the need for structural changes, the state has from 1990s been increasingly focusing its efforts in the regulatory domains rather than actual provision of goods and services. There has also been a significant effort towards decentralisation and privatisation of the activities of the state. This could in part be attributed also to the growing demands for services and shortage of resources to meet the health, welfare, and educational programmes for the entire citizenry. These coupled with greater life expectancy, high levels of unemployment, changing family structures, increasing cost of service delivery and newer problems such as aids, and drugs related crimes, have all raised expectations about development benefits channelled through NGOs and CBOs (The Daily Nation, February 24 1999).
The major suggestion is that the focus on statism in the development process is no longer fashionable particularly among the donors, and it is therefore necessary to formulate policy preferences differently to address development agenda. Such a policy formulation should no doubt also take into account the fact that the recent emergence of political pluralism from early 1990s meant that the state became vulnerable to pressure and competition in the development process as the clamour for greater transparency and accountability increased among the general public as well and not just the donors. (Kanyinga 1995:70).

1.4 LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature review is intended to first provide some information on:

(a) The historical involvement of Provincial Administration in the development process in Kenya,
(b) The historical perspective on participation in the development process by non-state actors,
(c) How development is administered in sub-Sahara Africa.

Secondly, the review is to help identify some gaps in the information regarding the inter-play between the state and non-state actors in the development process.

1.4.1 ORIGINS OF PA AND THE EMERGENCE OF NON STATE ACTORS

In Kenya, the Provincial Administration comprises a bureaucratic hierarchy of Provincial Commissioners, District Officers, Chiefs and Assistant Chiefs. It originated from the colonial period when the British imperial power used it as a control mechanism of anti-colonial movements and parties, and also in the administration of development, especially, in the exercise of their power to mobilise and recruit the masses for public works i.e. roads construction. Even
after independence, Provincial Administration continued performing both the law and order maintenance function, and a development role that largely meant co-ordinating the work of various field agencies of the centre (ministries) (Wallis 1994). In brief, the co-ordination of the field agencies, Provincial Administration has been used by the Government of Kenya (GOK) to perform various roles in the development process comprising maintenance of law and order; project aggregation, articulation, and mobilization of demand for public goods and services (Anangwe 1994).

The intriguing issue of interest is not the participation of the Provincial Administration in the development process per se, but rather, its involvement vis a vis other actors for this is no doubt, one of the major determinants of the pace of development. The involvement of PA in Kenya's development process has earlier on sparked off controversy among some scholars. For instance, Hyden (1970) wondered whether development by public administration in Kenya would be more likely to result from state institutions (political vs. administrative) that are balanced, or from a situation of administrative dominance. He observed that most governments of developing countries exist in what are essentially heterogeneous entities, a situation which inhibits their capacity to simply direct society as if the latter were some passive homogeneous entity. In such circumstances, it is not strange to find certain development activities, not being precisely in conformity with the will or actions of governments and its administrative arm. In Kenya, the "Harambee" movement, NGOs activities including the churches and other voluntary organizations such as group savings and the co-operative movements, are good pointers to this.

In performing the "developmental functions", the Provincial Administration has over the years not been receptive to popular participation, a very crucial factor in any democratisation process. These state officials, according to Anangwe (1994) characteristically engage in missionary like
proselytising through "barazas" (public meetings) in order to get the rural people to accept certain development policies or programmes, failure of which coercion is adopted i.e. forced "harambee" (self-help) contributions to put up public utilities. Oyugi (1973) points out that in these "barazas" the rural folk are informed "of what is going to be done and not allowed to discuss what should be done". The Chiefs who head these "barazas" have their "good boys" as well as "bad boys" with the latter not "expected" to make any good contribution. How then can the "common man" (rural folk) participate in deciding or identifying his needs? In most cases the people who have felt excluded from the development process by the state actors notably the Provincial Administration, have found alternative forums in the Non-Governmental Organizations. These NGOs have therefore been increasingly gaining popularity as better alternatives to state actors in the development process. This could in part explain the ever-increasing number of non-state actors in the development process.

The opening up of the development space has not been confined to non-state institutions only, but has applied also to the state institutions as well. For instance, Anangwe (1994), while agreeing with Bienen's (1974) assertion that transmission of demands in Kenya has been performed by the Provincial Administration during Kenyatta's era, points out that during Moi's era, the mechanisms diversified to include the ruling party KANU, the wider civil service, the military and the related patron-client nexus. In this respect, his argument that in East Africa, development efforts comprise of many actors such as farmers, indigenous entrepreneurs, multinational "donor" agencies and Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) that have played various roles jointly or separately, is valid.

In his study of the "Changing Development Space in Kenya", Kanyinga (1995) found out that in all the five districts he studied (Kiambu, Nakuru, Siaya, Elgeyo - Marakwet and Taita Taveta), local development initiatives were reflected in self-help "harambee" projects, which were
followed, by co-operatives, self-help groups, formalized NGOs and the churches. The most frequently encountered self-help groups were women groups, which were basically a collectivity of women in a village or workplace. The groups share a common identity, and can be organized in form of pooled labour or participating in "Merry go round", but can also engage themselves in off-farm income generating activities. The proceeds are commonly aimed at enabling members purchase items for home improvements i.e. corrugated iron sheets, water tanks, loans etc, on a rotating basis. In 1991, Siaya and Kiambu districts had 11,434 and 1,147 of such groups respectively (Kanyinga, 1995). It should be noted that even though these women groups are required to register with the Ministry of Culture and Social Services not all are registered. Neither are all the registered ones operational. Likewise, it has been reported that of Kenya's 10,000 NGOs, only a paltry 1,000 are registered. The rest, although wallowing in millions of shillings of tax-exempt funds, operate without valid documentation (The Sunday Nation, 14 February, 1999).

The self-help "harambee" project groups have also been significant. For instance in Taita Taveta, a total of 50 "harambees" were recorded out of which 38% went to school bursaries/construction, 16% to women groups, 30% to churches and 4% to health centres (Kanyinga 1995:97).

Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) have really expanded their operations in the country. In Nakuru District alone, the number of registered NGOs shot up from 16 in 1988 to 38 in 1993. Kanyinga (1995) attributes this dramatic increase, which no doubt applies to other areas in the country, to increase in appreciation of the NGOs' methods of work and displeasure with the government's limited initiatives and administration of development projects. The rapid increase in numbers and activities of NGOs no doubt challenged the role of the government. This
prompted the latter to institute a centralized NGO information and co-ordination unit, with which all NGOs are now required to register, (Ndewga 1993). Several NGOs including church organisation had been branded "subversive" for their stand against the 1988 queue - voting method for the ruling party and the general elections whose repeal they campaigned for upon its introduction. The government therefore hoped to strictly monitor, co-ordinate, and control NGOs development activities and of their funds to "ensure their activities were compatible with national interests" (Ndewga 1993).

Although for a long time (until late 1980s) the relations between the state and the NGOs especially in development could be termed as cordial, this could not be said of the period beginning 1990. The relations could at best, be termed as that reflecting competition for legitimacy. To prove its suspicions and mistrust for NGOs, the government placed NGOs co-ordination portfolio under the department of Provincial Administration and internal security, in the Office of the President.

Whatever the position taken against NGOs by the government at different times, it is not possible to dismiss their developmental roles especially in the case of some international non-profit organizations such as Action-Aid which supports primary and vocational education, and the Undugu Society in Kenya which runs health clinics in Nairobi slums and a primary school for children (Fowler 1995). Despite the NGOs contributions in development, some of them have been engaged in dubious activities "... of 1000 NGOs valid agencies, the National Council of NGOs the statutory body regulating operations of NGO sector, hardly knows what 50% of them do ... at the moment, 40 disciplinary cases are pending at the Council. The accusations range from corruption to sexual harassment". (The Sunday Nation, February 14, 1999).
The churches have also paid a considerable attention to development in Kenya. The mainstream churches such as The Catholic, African Inland Church (AIC), The Church of the Province of Kenya (CPK) and the Salvation Army each has various development departments, and have actively been involved in various ways in social welfare organizations covering youth rehabilitation, relief and women's development. In Siaya, for instance, CPK, which is the most active church in the district, identifies with women groups and self-help "harambee" projects. It has had to "compete" in this area with donor organizations, i.e. Canadian state agency, CIDA, which provide about 600 women's groups in Boro Division with revolving loan funds, while IFAD provides funding for fertilizers and seeds to farmers' groups. The Ministry of Agriculture does the in-puts' distribution. (Kanyinga, 1995). Kanyinga further observed that, there existed cordial relations between CPK and opposition politicians, because of the former's general oppositional stance, particularly towards the Provincial Administration.

1.4.2 DISTRICT FOCUS POLICY

In apparent effort towards acknowledging the need to involve the masses in the development process, the government of Kenya in 1983, instituted a new strategy for rural development, the District Focus for Rural Development, DFRD, whose activities were to be co-ordinated by the District Development Committee, DDC, chaired by the District Commissioner, DC. This was the body responsible for implementation of the development. Adopted by the government as a decentralization strategy, the DFRD established local development institutions/committees at all levels from the district to the sub-location as channels of popular participation with Provincial Administration officers assuming very prominent roles in their running. The officers (Provincial Administration) were charged with chairing committee meetings at all levels, and District Executive Committee (DEC), comprising departmental heads, became the main decision making body.
By 1989, the DFRD had become so important in local development that the government bestowed upon it the portfolio of not only co-ordinating NGOs activities in the district but also screening them. In fact in the 1989/93 Development plan, the government was very explicit over this arguing that "...since NGOs have become increasingly involved in development activities, their efforts will be strengthened by DFRD, through which NGOs in collaboration with DDCs, community groups and local authorities will enhance the process of local participation in the development projects" (Republic of Kenya, 1989:260).

The DFRD, almost around the same time also inco-operated the "harambee" movement as one of the official local institutions. Kanyinga (1995) however argues that because DDCs lacked legal authority to enforce compliance from NGOs, the extent to which the NGOs could be integrated into DFRD remains debatable.

The institutionalisation of the "harambee" self-help projects, though commonly agreed among most scholars to have helped in making local communities supplement resources to match those provided by the state institutions, the mainstream churches, and private sector institutions, other scholars have had different interpretation of its benefits and effects. It has been argued that the "harambee" movement has been used by the state to tax peasants (Ngethe 1979). Other scholars have also argued that the movement created an avenue for sustenance of popular accountability (Barkan and Holmquist 1989). Oyugi (1995) sees the movement as a reflection of the state's reluctance to tax the rich, especially their non-salary incomes sufficiently to generate extra funds for the state provision of services. "More importantly, "harambee" has served to divert accountability or blame for lack of development from the state to the people themselves" (Oyugi 1995:133). Still, Barkan and Chege (1989), argue that whereas, the "harambee" has been used under the aegis of DFRD as a tool for decentralisation of state services, its real
significance, especially under Moi rule was to "transform it into an instrument of personal rule whereby local and regional leaders are expected to attend these expanded functions and to give generously as are cabinet ministers who come from other parts of the country" (Barkan and Chege 1989:437). In essence, Chege and Barkan contend that the "harambee" is no less than a tithe or quota whose donors intend to retain positions near the president's inner circle. They further see the introduction of DFRD strategy as a means of decentralizing Provincial Administration, a strategy which they, like Kanyinga (1995) argue was used by Moi to not only create his own networks and inner circles under patronage politics, but also to destroy the remnants of Kenyatta's networks. By the same token, Oyugi's (1986:14) comment on problems bedevilling the Provincial/District Development Committees would suffice, "... although the PCs and DCs are generally assumed to be responsible for co-ordinating the activities of government departments in their administrative areas, there is very little a PC or DC could do to activate the heads of technical departments who are reluctant to make use of these committees.... A further problem was the lack of effective functional leadership for the committees... these committees depend on their existence on the initiative and good will of the Provincial Administration".

It should be pointed out that the growing importance of the voluntary sector in service provision does not necessarily reflect a collapse of state provided services. Rather, the state continues to play an important role. The NGOs and POs only supplement state provided services thus forming a relationship that can be described as complex and conflictual - co-operation and competition i.e. between the state, the voluntary sector and donors. (Ole Therkildsen & Semboja 1995:45).
Despite the shortcomings of Provincial Administration, some people still maintain that it is the only panacea to development. Moi (1986) argues that as long as Provincial Administration is regarded as the effective operational link between the central government and the people, and as the effective representation of the functional authority of the government in every locality in the nation, its alternative is unlikely to emerge in the foreseeable future.

The above literature review is silent on the extent/degree of actual involvement of Provincial Administration either as supporters or opponents in the development process in relation to the activities of NGOs and CBOs in development. Secondly, and most important, the literature is not giving indications regarding the shape/form the co-ordination role of Provincial administration should take in the event of the emergence of many stakeholders (read actors) in the development process. Finally, the literature is silent on the co-ordination of development in areas that do not enjoy the services of DDC. For instance, Nairobi city, which has a myriad of NGOs and informal development actors, does not have a DDC. It equally lacks the bureaucratic link between the PC and the D.O. as there are no DCs.

1.5 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The study intends to adopt two mutually re-enforcing frameworks, viz, statism and public/political choice frameworks.

The study is essentially situated within state-society relation’s theory, which dates back to 1950s and 1960s and became more refined in late 1980s. In 1950s and 1960s, when modernization theory reigned, the state was seen as the motor-force with which the new independent African states could develop hence becoming modern, albeit with assistance from the developed west.
As argued by Gabriel Almond, state was seen as performing the tasks of "social integration" and adaptation. Other modernization theorists like James Coleman, Lucien Pye, Samuel Huntington, also saw the role of the state as basically of pattern maintenance. Precisely, the state was seen as the main agent of socio-economic change. Specifically, state actors saw their role as necessarily one of stepping in to promote socio-economic development by deliberately pushing the processes of social change.

Modernization theory came under strong criticisms emerging from strains of Third World nationalism combined with neo-Marxist thought, thus giving rise to the dependency perspective. The dependency theorists, be they structuralists like Colin Leys, Steve Langdon, Samir Amin, John Saul, or neo-Marxists like Walter Rodney, Immanuel Wallerstein, all tend to have converged on an argument that although the state was still the motor force behind development in the Third World, depending on various factors, especially international politics and economics; its actions or inactions lead to various ramifications in the development sphere. Modernization theorists saw the inter-state relations between the west and the periphery as resulting into development of the latter. Dependency theorists, saw the relationship as negative, i.e., responsible for under-development of the Third World.

It is the weakness exhibited by the two theories to recognize the impact of intra-state factors as opposed to essentially international economic factors, on differential dynamics of development being moulded by the Third World states - some effective and others not, that led to the springing up of a new theoretical perspective, statism, basically aimed at reviewing the role of the state in development. It gained more prominence from mid 1980s. Statism, is therefore, seen as capable of recognizing the process of mutually conditioning interactions that take place between the state and society.
Statism as propounded by Joel S. Migdal, Frances Hagopian, Vivienne Shue, Catherine Boone and Atul Kholi among others, address mainly three interrelated state-society themes: the capacities of states in low income societies to legitimise their domination and to pursue their socio-economic agendas; the roles of various social forces such as social classes and class factions, formal and informal civil associations, in the politics of these low-income settings; and the circumstances that may facilitate or prevent mutual empowerment of state and society.

The exponents of statism provided explanations to the political and economic deterioration of the early 1980s. They held that the state leaders were responsible for the mess, given that the state is viewed as a primary motor force through its structures notably PA behind socio-economic occurrences within it. Much attention was therefore concentrated on the state apparatus, its expansion, its uses and abuses of power, and its relations with both domestic groups and international economy. The state is therefore seen as an actor with interests, capacities, achievements, and frailties.

Statism theory acknowledges that the socio-economic consequences on the development of a locality are the result of political decisions of political/state leaders or their cronies. The political decisions are due to pressures from and interests of powerful actors, i.e. political allies. The pressures and interests in turn constitute demands on the state to be addressed by state authorities, depending on the choices at their disposal. The resultant action would more often than not be state choices in as much as they would be political choices. Put differently, those who control state power are in a position to take decisions of far-reaching socio-economic consequences, which though may at times reflect the interests and pressures of other powerful actors - at home or abroad, no doubt manifest the interests and ideologies of the state-authorities.
In essence, the patterns of a regime's/state's action or inaction, as well as the mode in which political demands are made, and their intensity, are thus likely to be as much a product of the political past as present socio-economic conditions.

This framework suits best our study. Kenya, like other African states, right from the immediate post-independence era, embarked on a series of "modernisation"/development programmes.

By the turn of the 1980s decade, it was neither fashionable nor logical for the state to dominate the development. The civil society emerged too strong an actor, and the state concomitantly became relatively feeble. The only way out was seen in the state "rolling back" from the development process and also opening up for the entry of the civil society in a competitive manner. The interactions between the state and the civil society became a key area of interest for study, especially with regard to the society/public being presented with many alternatives/options to choose from i.e. PA, NGOs, POs, individuals. This therefore posed a severe limitation for the statism theoretical framework hence the entry of public/political choice framework.

The political/public choice framework is indeed a continuation of statism. In fact some scholars treat it as a variant of statism. As advanced by Naomi Chazan et al (1988), political choice framework is developed from the economic theory of public/rational choice of public goods as advanced by Mueller, D.C. (1979). Public choice theory examines the provision of public goods. A public good is anything that is at least partly rival and/or non-excludable in the sense that addition of new beneficiaries neither increases nor reduces the value of the good to the original beneficiaries. For instance, development, e.g. construction of a public road, is a public good in the sense that it would benefit everyone including those who were either opposed to it as
a priority or were not even aware of its construction. Before the decision to construct the road in question, for instance, there were, certainly other options or choices, which might have been sidelined rationally.

In a state, public choices are indeed political choices for each is considered politically. For instance, the decision to construct a road in area A instead of area B or vice versa is influenced by the expected political output, i.e., support that the action could draw from the given area. The framework therefore underscores the state - society relationships in determining not only the pace but also the type of development. Essentially, governments are constrained by a variety of demographic, technological, ideological, global, historical, and social factors. Changing conditions define available options at any historical moment. It is within this range that decisions are made, not only by political leaders and state officials, but also by external actors and domestic social organisations. By looking at the interactions of social forces, economic activities, formal institutions, and prevalent values, we may better grasp the meaning and direction of the diverse patterns that have evolved in a given state's development space.

In our study, the political/public choice framework focuses on identifying the multiple factors at work in the development space. The main assumption is that the development space, like politics, is far broader than the formal state domain and the international system. As in statism, official institutions are, indeed, significant actors, but so, too are: individuals, social groups, traditional authority structures, trading networks, and multinational corporations. The study of interests, organizations, and capacities of these entities affords a better view of the processes by which they interrelate. Political processes encompass struggles over material and non-material resources, over identity and interests, over institutions and symbols.
The political choice theory is useful in explaining the development process in terms of state-society relations. It looks at the conditions and patterns of interaction that have emerged between state authorities, PA, on the one hand, and civil associations, such as NGOs, on the other hand. As Bratton (1994), argues, the state-society relations in Africa has gone through a process of mutual engagements and disengagements. At independence, the state empowered some institutional structures like co-operatives and PA, more to extend their authority and control in the countryside than as vehicles for improving livelihoods in the rural population which later chose to "disengage" themselves from the state agencies, plans and visions in favour of their own initiated private networks, CBOs. The state, faced with fiscal crisis, became unwilling to carry the costs of the failing rural projects, and consequently opting to disengage and virtually leave the rural population to fend for themselves. On realization of the reasons for the past failures, the state and the local population may open a dialogue and re-engage in a few other areas.

In our study, Bratton's argument sounds valid. In Kenya, from late 1980s, the government-sponsored projects stalled, with most people preferring to engage in CBOs and NGOs. The government then began to undertake public divestiture that has continued to date. It is also an illustration of how local communities and NGOs have funded some projects through cost-sharing. The argument is that there are open options in the development space for the state and the public to choose from, i.e., engagement, disengagement and even partial re-engagement, between state agencies and the existing plus social organizations. Any of these choices has to be made rationally on the basis of the prevailing circumstances. Chapters four and five have demonstrated how local population on each occasion and in various areas exhibit their respective choices in so far as development partners as well as delivery and recipient of goods and services are concerned in Migori, Nyamira, and Nairobi Districts of Kenya.
1.6 HYPOTHESES

The following four related hypotheses were formulated for the investigation and analysis.

1.6.1 The democratisation of the development process has significantly reduced the necessity of provincial administration in development activities.

1.6.2 The cooperation of the Provincial Administration directly influences effectiveness of civil society in its development agenda.

1.6.3 The level of involvement of the civil society in development activities is directly proportional to the level of popular participation in the development process.

1.7 OPERATIONALIZATION OF CONCEPTS

The following concepts will be used frequently in the text: Provincial Administration; Democratisation, Development Actors, Development, Civil Society; Local Authorities, Non Governmental Organisation (NGOs), People’s Organisations (POs), and Democratisation of the Development Process.

1.7.1 Provincial Administration

The Provincial Administration in the study is identified as the agency of the state/government in charge of executing government policies at the various units from the province downwards in the administrative hierarchy, i.e. Provinces, Districts, Divisions, Locations and Sub-locations. It comprises the Provincial Commissioners (PCs), District Commissioners (DCs), District Officers (DOs), Chiefs and Assistant Chiefs as heads of the respective units.
1.7.2 Democratisation

In this study, democratisation means higher levels of actual involvement of masses in the process of decision-making, planning and implementation to determine their needs in their localities.

1.7.3 Development

Development refers to the socio-economic and political changes, which most scholars (and perhaps the leaders too) would deem as desirable and which contribute to the well being of the bulk of population either nationally or locally over a long time (Anangwe 1994). These include improved standard of living/quality of life, provision of good housing, health facilities, reduction of income inequalities, alleviation of poverty, provision of employment and improvements of physical and social infrastructure.

1.7.4 Actors In Development

These are individuals, groups or parties that are involved in the transmission of development. It can be used interchangeably with agencies like Provincial Administration, Local Authorities, and Civil society including Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs), CBOs, and Cooperatives.

1.7.5 Civil Society

Civil society refers to the assemblage of People's Organization (PO's), sometimes called Community Based Organizations (CBOs), and Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs)
authority structures, social forms and collective activities operating outside the formal state framework and usually articulating interests vis-à-vis the state.

1.7.6 Local Authority

This refers to a sub-national body set up by statute to discharge certain duties and to exercise certain powers, including the power to tax. Such bodies in Kenya include County Councils for rural areas, Urban, Town, and Municipal Councils for the urban centres and the City Council.

1.7.7 Democratisation Of The Development Process

Democratisation of the development process means enhanced participation by the people in their government by opening up of the development space for the entry of other state institutions, local authorities and the civil society, including NGOs and POs.

1.7.8 Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs).

These refer to organisations formed on voluntary basis but operating with paid staff, either for the benefit of members, or to provide services to or on behalf of others. They can be international, national or religious nature (Semboja & Ole Therkildsen, 1995).

1.7.9 People's Organisations (POs)

These refer to groups formed on the basis of locality, kinship, gender, workplace, religion etc. Being small, they have no conventional bureaucracy. They engage in activities aimed at improving the livelihoods of members who control them. (Semboja & Ole Therkildsen, 1995). It can be used interchangeably with CBOs.
1.8 METHODOLOGY

1.8.1 Scope And Limit Of Study

This is a comparative study of the role of the Provincial Administration in the development process in both the rural setting, represented by Nyanza Province and the generally metropolitan, urban setting represented by Nairobi Province. The study intends to also assess the participation of Provincial Administration in the development process in opposition dominated areas represented by Nyatike and Muhuru Divisions of Migori District and Kibera Division of Nairobi Province, and the ruling political party, KANU dominated areas, herein represented by Nyamira and Ekerenyo Divisions of Nyamira District and Westlands Division of Nairobi Province.

The study also wishes to compare the participation of PA in a socio-economically heterogeneous urban setting i.e. those staying in posh areas like Karen and Kileleshwa localities and slum areas like Kibera, and the near socio-economically homogeneous rural setting i.e. Migori and Nyamira Districts.

Finally, the study investigates the co-ordination of development activities in the absence of a DDC and DCs in PA bureaucracy as in Nairobi compared to the rural setting with both institutions. The role of PA in development is analysed on the basis of similar activities undertaken by NGOs, and CBOs/POs.

1.8.2 Sampling

To arrive at a sample frame of six Divisions, a Multi-Stage Area sampling was employed. In the case of Nairobi, all the seven (7) constituencies were categorized into two: viz, opposition strongholds i.e. Langata, Embakasi, Starehe, Makadara, Dagoretti and Kasarani, and the ruling
party, KANU strongholds, herein represented by Westlands constituency. From the opposition strongholds, Langata (also known in administrative circles as Kibera) was randomly selected while Westlands was the obvious entrant for the other category, being the only one. The political classification was based on the 1997 general (parliamentary) election results.

In Nyanza Province, the 12 Districts were categorized into two: The Luo Districts comprising Siaya, Kisumu, Migori, Homa-Bay, Rachuonyo, Bondo, Nyando and Suba; and the non-Luo Districts comprising Kuria, Kisii Central, Kisii South and Nyamira. Suba is uniquely clustered as a "Luo District" due to the fact that its population basically behave socio-culturally and politically in a similar pattern like its Luo counter-parts. From each of the two categories of districts, Migori and Nyamira were respectively selected.

Nyamira District has four administrative divisions, namely; Ekerenyo, Manga, Nyamira and Borabu from which Nyamira and Ekerenyo were randomly selected at the next stage of sampling. Migori on the other hand has seven divisions including Nyatike, Muhuru, Karungu, Rongo, Uriri, Suba West and Suba East from which the first two were selected.

In the final analysis, a total of six administrative divisions were sampled for study. These included; Nyamira, Muhuru, Ekerenyo, Nyatike, Westlands and Kibera. A final multi-stage area sampling was then employed to select any two locations from each of the six divisions, thus giving a total of twelve locations. Each location was a basic sampling unit.

The stakeholders in the development process, i.e., NGOs, CBOs/POs, PA officials and the general public, in each location, were to be interviewed. The study covered in each location, representatives of 2 NGOs, and 2 CBOs/POs, 1 Councillor, and 1 PA official. One (1) member
from each organization, save for PA, whereby either a sub-chief and/or a chief was interviewed from each location giving a total of $12(2 + 2 + 1 + 1) = 72$ respondents. The study as a whole covered; Bonyamatuta Chache, Bosamaro, Bogichora, and Keera locations of Nyamira Division; South Kadem, Central Kadem, and West Kadem of Nyatike division; Kibera, Mugomoini, of Kibera Division; Parklands and Kangemi locations of Westlands Division; and East and South East locations in Muhuru Division.

1.8.3 Administration Of The Questionnaires And Interviews

Due to the diversity of the sample, high population density, and expanse of the areas of study, I engaged the services of 2 Research Assistants, one, a graduate and the other a High School teacher, each for Nairobi and Nyamira districts respectively. In Nairobi, I conducted all the oral non-structured interviews and also administered six (6) questionnaires. The Research assistant did the rest after I had trained him on the job on what I expected of him. The exercise took about two weeks. The interviews of key informants took longer, about six months due to the problem of obtaining appointments and busy schedules of most interviewees and my own official work commitments. I conducted all the interviews in Migori district. In Nyamira district, I conducted 80% of the oral non-structured interviews while the rest were done by my Research Assistant. I also administered 30% of the questionnaires while the remaining 70% were done by my Research Assistant 80% of which, in my presence and the rest him alone. The major problem here was the language barrier especially with the illiterate groups. The Research Assistant came in handy.

I conducted all the interviews, both oral and the questionnaires guided, in Migori District. I did not engage the services of a research assistant, partly due to the fact that I was familiar with the area and partly due to the sensitivity of handling the survey instruments. For instance, local
people become anxious when they see a fellow with a questionnaire to be answered more so from a local person. That was why I conducted most of the interviews informally, thus obtaining information from the respondents without them suspicious of my intentions.

1.8.4 Measurements

1.8.4.1 The democratisation of the development process

This refers to the opening up of the development space for other development actors. In the survey the following three indicators were used to measure this factor. First, the existence of POs (CBOs) such as self-help projects, women groups, and NGOs in the areas concerned. The activities of these non-state actors and their relations with the PA were also considered. Secondly, the public attendance of the development forums organized by non-state actors. Thirdly, whether those who attended the non-state actors’ development discussions forums also attended the chief’s/sub-Chief’s “barazas”.

1.8.4.2 Involvement of Provincial Administration in development.

Involvement of Provincial Administration in development refers to the actual participation, either negatively or positively, in development activities by the PA officials. Such participation comprises, control of public gatherings, mobilisation of the public, provisions of security, co-ordination of actors’ activities, among others. For this study, the indicator used to measure this was the attendance of the Chief’s/Sub-Chief’s “baraza” by the stakeholders. The argument is that the PA’s “barazas” are the most common local forum for addressing development by way of sensitising, mobilizing or communicating the government policies to
the public. When many people attend public barazas, it implies that the PA has a relatively large forum to discuss development and vice versa.

1.8.4.3 **The level of popular participation.**

This was determined in terms of how frequent an individual attended a Chief's/Sub-Chief's "baraza" and the problems associated with it. The second indicator was the type of development forums ever attended by the respondents, both the beneficiaries and stakeholders, from the areas concerned. There was finally the issue of whether there is a relationship between attendance of the Chief’s/Sub-Chief’s “barazas” and attendance of other developments forums.

1.8.5 **Data Sources And Analysis**

Both primary and secondary sources of data were used in the study. The secondary data was obtained from books, articles and research papers available at the University of Nairobi, CREDU, and the National Assembly Libraries. Other sources of valuable information were journals, magazines and newspapers; and government publications i.e. sessional papers, development plans and statistical abstracts. The primary data was collected through oral interviews and responses from the questionnaires administered to the sampled respondents.

The data collected was coded and analysed using both qualitative and quantitative (statistical tables and cross tabulations) techniques. The tools I used widely in both data presentation and analysis was basically Table Statistics (frequency tables).
CHAPTER TWO

2.0 HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION IN KENYA

2.1 THE COMPOSITION OF PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION

Provincial Administration in Kenya can generally be described as a system through which the central government ensures that its authority and services reach, and are accepted by the people in rural areas. Provincial Administration is structured in such a manner that it provides a representative of government's authority from the village level leading through a hierarchy of Sub-Chiefs, Chiefs, District Officers (DOs), Provincial Commissioners (PCs), and to the President himself. In this context, each of the officers is the president's personal representative within his/her area of jurisdiction. Each officer is responsible to his/her immediate in command in the administrative hierarchy. The Provincial Administration (PA), is therefore, in theoretical terms, the personalized form of the government whose greatest justification, according to Gertzel (1970), is to be found in its supposed obligation to be easily accessible, understanding and authoritative.

Presently, Provincial Administration is placed under the Office of the President with a Minister of State and a Permanent Secretary in charge. The docket for the two (Minister and Permanent Secretary) also covers internal security.

1 Although Provincial Administration was initially meant for rural areas only, currently, it covers even urban centres.
The bureaucratic arrangement, notwithstanding, the PC and the DC, more often than not have direct contact with the President.

2.2 THE ORIGINS AND GROWTH OF PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION

The origins of Provincial Administration in Kenya can be traced from 1895 when Kenya was declared a British East Africa Protectorate. Since then the PA has undergone several developments, which involved changes in both responsibilities and size. This development, which may be described as circumstantial rather than fundamentally systematic can be categorised into three phases, viz: The pre-independence (colonial period) which covers up to 1963; post independence beginning 1964 up to 1990, covering mostly the period of one party system (both de-jure and defacto); and post 1990 which basically encapsulates the competitive multi-party era.

2.2.1 Pre-Independence - Colonial Period

Before the constitution and consolidation of the territory that later came to be known as Kenya, no central government authority existed. Rather, each and every African society had its own system of government. It is therefore from this period that we can trace the origins and development of Provincial Administration through 1919 when the territory was declared a Kenya Colony and Protectorate through to the time of independence.
A commissioner headed the British East Africa Protectorate's administration until 1906 when the first Governor, Sir Charles Elliot, was appointed. Under the Commissioner, there were sub-commissioners and District Commissioners who established posts among the major concentration of population North and South of the advancing Uganda railway line, as it was known before 1919. The changes of the Head of Administrators title to Governor was prompted by the transfer of responsibility of running the protectorate from the London Foreign Office to Colonial Office in 1905.

With the increasing need to make the investment in the railway economically viable, the Governor, from 1906, invited white settlers into the Kenya Highlands, commonly referred to as the "White highlands" to practise plantation agriculture for export. The positive response, which the Governor received, led to the establishment of white settlement.

The District Commissioners acting through Tribal Police and Chiefs, Sub-chiefs and headmen, were responsible not only for law and order in the African areas and the collection of taxes but also to assist the settlers to recruit labour for their farms (Ndegwa 1971). The Chiefs and Sub-chiefs had an added role of conscripting able-bodied men from their localities for Her Majesty's army during the First World War.

Until after the Second World War, the government did not participate directly in the recruitment of the Chiefs and Sub-chiefs. It used the traditional authority arrangements it found in place though gradually, but steadily eroding its basic tenets, especially when and where they conflicted with the Europeans'/Governments' policies. This could be attributed to the fact that, the governments main concern during the period was to enhance agricultural production in the
white highlands for both food and export so as to sustain the war and not the governance of the territory per se.

The Provincial Administration grew in size and authority following the creation of four provinces and three extra provincial districts between 1926-39. The changes meant that PA units down the ladder from the provinces were also increased with concurrent increase in PA officials. During the administration of Governor Sir Evelyn Baring, coinciding the Emergency period, the Provincial Administration was deliberately expanded thus giving its personnel a dominant position over other government agencies as his agents in the field. Even the police were made subordinate to PA in matters concerning maintenance of law and order. This was made clearer by the following Governor’s policy statement.

“Government recognizes that the final responsibility for good government and preservation of order clearly lies with the Provincial and District Commissioners who represent the Governor in their areas. These officers are entitled to give general directions concerning the preservation of peace and order. In all such matters, the police force is subordinate to government” (GOK 1954).

In response to the emergency situation, the policy of closer administration was introduced. It was assumed that security would be more effective if officers were in closer touch with the people. District Officers (DOs) were posted to Divisions instead of touring from District Headquarters, and Divisional Headquarters were set up in order to be more in close touch with the people and to communicate with them better (Gertzel 1970). The number of officers at all levels was increased: Chiefs, Sub-chiefs, Headmen, Tribal Police and in 1956, District Assistants (DAs). There was a remarkable increase in both number of posts and expenditure.
For instance, in 1951, there were 184 administrative posts with an expenditure of 152,000 Pounds as compared to 370 posts costing 443,400 Pounds in 1962-63 (Gertzel 1970).

Besides maintenance of law and order, PA became closely involved in the development process as well. Emphasis was put on the role of PA in agricultural and overall economic development as the prime means of combating the Mau Mau threat. According to Gertzel (1970), the government believed that closer administration could facilitate development. Administrative officers were responsible for stimulating local initiative and for ensuring the co-ordination of development at the local level. The co-ordination of departmental activities also lay with it.

In mid-1950s the Ministry of African Affairs, in-charge of Provincial Administration, acquired additional functions including responsibility for African Courts, collection of Graduated Personal Taxes (GPT), and the conduct of elections. All these were vested on PA. In a nutshell, it can be argued that the pre-independence PA had, three major functions, namely: control, co-ordination and mobilization of the public for development. Generally, Kenya’s Provincial Administration had besides power, authority and influence, been as Gertzel (1970), argues, a powerful, sophisticated and centralised machine through which the Governor administered by direct rule (Gertzel 1970).

2.2.2 Post-Independence Era (1963-1990)

The year 1990 is considered in this study as a major turning point in the politics of Kenya, marking the re-emergence of competitive multi-party politics, and also the development of Provincial Administration. Developments before 1990 are analysed in three stages: Kenya
under the Majimbo constitution, Kenya as a de facto one party- state (1964-66) and (1969-82) and Kenya as a de-jure one party state (1982-90).

When Kenya attained independence under the Majimbo constitution, the previous colonial constitution was greatly changed particularly with regard to the operations of the PA. First, the Public Service Commission (PSC) continued appointing provincial administration officers though their responsibilities were decentralised to the regional levels. Secondly, the PC, was designated Civil Secretary and became the head of the civil service within the region, responsible to the Regional Authority for the co-ordination of regional policies, and also for central government decisions as they were conveyed to him through the Regional Authority. The central government therefore had no direct authority over the regional administrative officers, although the constitution provided for the establishment of co-ordinating machinery as it became necessary for the implementation of national policies within a region. The Regional structure was therefore cumbersome, and full of practical problems as it had a lot of constitutional conflicts.

Although the regionalism type of government provided by the constitution restricted central government activities in the regions, the central government still retained a substantial degree of control through manipulation of the PA. The then parent Ministry, Home Affairs, continued to have a much more direct communication link with Civil Secretaries of the regions and, on occasions with regional government agents, i.e, DCs and DAs. This followed the then Minister’s (Oginga Odinga) directive in July 1964 that Civil Secretaries should maintain close liaison with his ministry so that the central government could effectively discharge its responsibilities” (Gertzel 1966). A second circular directed that all civil servants down to the
level of District Assistants would continue to be held against the ministry’s establishment and would be seconded to the regions (Gertzel 1966).

In essence, the Civil Secretary performed dual roles. He became regarded as not only an agent of the central government in the field but also direct link with the regional authority. The dual role, in as much as it was against the constitutional provisions, enabled the central government throughout 1964 to frustrate attempts of complete decentralisation of the PA to the new Regional Authorities, thereby maintaining sufficient overall central government control of the administrative machine.

The independence constitution, dealt a heavy blow on both the power and the responsibility of PA, especially at regional levels. The DCs executive powers at Local Authorities were abolished. They only remained as nominated members to the councils. The collection of Graduated Personal Tax (GPT) was returned to the councils. In matters relating to security within a region, the police became a parallel force to PA. The final decision lay with the Regional Commissioner of Police who in turn was directly responsible to the Inspector- General of Police in Nairobi, without any reference to the Civil Secretary.

At the time Kenya proclaimed a Republic status on 12th December 1964, it was already a de-facto, one party state. KADU voluntarily disbanded and joined KANU in November 1964. Influenced by KADU’s dissolution, the government insisted that the party and the state remain separate; and that the civil service must remain independent of partisan politics. It was further decided that the PA, its structure remaining very much as it had been during the colonial period, should be the major agent of the state (Gertzel 1966).
The administrative machine at the time of the establishment of the republic was still much as it had been before May 1963. The immediate step taken by the Government was to transfer the control of Provincial Administration portfolio to the Office of the President (OP). The PA officers became the representatives of the President. Their extended role of being President’s personal representatives was now symbolised by the new emphasis upon official dress, and on uniformed service, and by such small things as the pennant with the lion rampant flying on the Provincial Commissioners cars².

Later in 1965, the responsibilities of PA officials were further enhanced by the key role assigned to the PA in the development machinery proposed by the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development. It was therefore the PA personnel rather than the party official who became the major link between the Executive and the people.

According to Gertzel (1966), the decision by the government at the end of 1964 to use PA rather than the party machine as its major link was prompted by three reasons: First, the constitutional basis of one-party state which made the role of PA in both party and the state, very fluid. Second, the nature of the central government’s relationship with PA during the short-lived episode of regionalism (May 1963 - December 1964); and finally, the organizational problems within KANU compared to the united and strong PA.

At the beginning of 1965, due to heavy work load of the Permanent Secretary (PS) in the OP, the post of Deputy Secretary was created; a Minister of State was also appointed to assist with certain of the presidential functions; PCs meetings were regularized to be held on a quarterly basis, always ending with a meeting with the President himself. Communications between PCs

and ministries, always a controversial matter, was sorted out on the basis of the former Chief Native Commissioners' circular of 1960, which provided for direct communication between them.\(^3\)

In the field, the PC responsible directly for the good government of his province was restored to the position of the head of administration of his province and recognised as the overall co-ordinator of governmental activities at that level. The DC also exercised similar responsibilities at the district level. At both levels, the apparatus and structure of administration was restored to its pre-1963 position. The Tribal Police (TP) were restored officially to their former role, a subordinate force under the direct authority of the PA, and in October 1965, TPs were renamed "Administration Police" (AP). The system of Location and Sub-location Chiefs was also retained, the Chiefs essentially performing the same role as they did in the past, responsible for law and order and the collection of taxes at the location level.

At the same time, a new method of appointing Chiefs was introduced. The applications for the positions were considered by a processing committee consisting of the DC, County Councillor for the location, KANU District Chairman, the Senator of the district and the constituency member of the House of Representatives. The best three candidates were then required to attend a public interview and the public vote for the person they prefer by lining up behind him. The DC then forwarded the winning candidate's name to the Office of the President for formal appointment.

\(^3\) Ibid
Following the re-organization of the judicial system over the preceding two years, which saw the appointment of full-time magistrates by the Judicial department, PA officers ceased to act as magistrate in Magistrate's Courts like their predecessors.

The PC, by virtue of his responsibility for peace and good governance in the province, became once more, the Chairman of the Provincial Security and Intelligence Committee (DCs at their levels as well), thus restoring the position of 1960. In the performance of their responsibility, the police were responsible to the executive, and therefore, within the province or the district, they were responsible to the agent of the executive, the Administration. In the event of any disagreement, the view of the PA prevails, although both may refer the disagreement to the supervisors in the capital.

2.2.2.1 Provincial Administration And Politics

The first year of Kenya as a de-facto one party state under the Republican constitution was spent largely on the re-organization of PA, which left it as strong as, if not stronger than during the colonial period. Politicians did not take the overarching strength of PA kindly, hence frequent clashes especially over representation of the people, something that was rather obscure during regionalism. In the debate (National Assembly) 1965, the MPs expressed their alleged maltreatment at the hands of PA, and the feeling that they were not being accorded the respect or attention due to them as true representatives of the people, PA officials themselves having been colonial employees. In response to politicians' attack on PA, the Head of the Civil Service issued a major policy statement in June 1965 outlining the task of the civil servant. "The functions of a civil servant...is to implement policies and programmes decided upon by the politicians, they are the agents of the Executive to implement, not to make policies. Nor was the
civil service isolated from the rest of the civil society, living in "colonial isolation". While PA officers therefore remained outside party politics, they were nonetheless committed to government policy and this was KANU policy as stated in the Manifesto and the Government Sessional Paper 10, on African Socialism, 1965.

In an attempt to make clearer, the relationship between the politicians and civil servants, President Kenyatta, at a function at Kenya Institute of Administration (KIA) in December 1965, stated that: "... the politician is the instrument through which the people make their voices heard in the legislative body of the country. The people choose him and he speaks for them in Parliament and elsewhere. But as a Member of Parliament (MP), he has some responsibility to accept and advance the decision of Parliament on national programmes. It is perfectly correct that he should advance the interests of his constituents and he has a legitimate right to know what is going on in his constituency... but as an MP and a responsible citizen of a democratic country, he should not attempt to use his position to bully civil servants into deviating from national programmes. It must be understood by everybody that civil servants are responsible to their ministers and cannot accept instructions from other politicians. PCs and DCs are responsible to me."

As the politicians versus Administrators "tug of war" continued, the Government could not have found a better opportunity to entrench even deeper or expand the role of PA, than in 1966 when an opposition party, Kenya Peoples Union (KPU), was formed by the then Vice President Oginga Odinga. The government felt threatened by KPU as several MPs resigned to join the party. In order not to loosen its grips on control and security of the state, it required the services

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4 East African Standard Newspapers 15/3/1965 p2
5 President Kenyatta's speech. KNA Handout No. 768.
of a department that could carry out its orders and implement its policies with not only effectiveness and precision, but also with vigour and zeal. Provincial Administration provided the best machinery to do this.

The Provincial Administration were accused in parliamentary debates of intimidating, harassing and even persuading opposition sympathisers in Ukwala and Machakos Districts, whichever works in containing them, an allegation denied by the then Minster of State in the President's Office. The government did not wish it be penetrated by the new opposition party and by extension hit the government by having its moles in its (PA) system by influencing the election of Chiefs and Sub-chiefs. The government swiftly and promptly moved in and changed the procedure at the beginning of 1968 such that suitable candidates could now only be nominated/proposed by the DC (but the final choice lay within his discretion) in consultation with local leaders to the PC for onward transmission to OP which normally accepted the recommendations of the PC and DC for appointment (Gertzel 1969). By doing this, the government completely sealed the possibility of opposition sympathisers being elected a sub-chief or a chief of any location.

The District Focus for Rural Development, (DFRD), the much touted development strategy, was launched by President Moi on 1st July 1983. With it, came a new role for the Provincial Administration. Under DFRD, the district was to be centre for development planning and implementation in the rural areas through its co-ordinating unit, the District Development Committee (DDC) that was chaired by the DC. A detailed account of DFRD is in the next

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chapter (3). The DOs, Chiefs, and Sub-Chiefs were also Chairmen of such units at their respective areas of jurisdiction.

The most significant change, in the government's bid to further strengthen the already powerful PA in the 1980s occurred in 1986. The post of Chief Secretary was abolished and in place three posts of Permanent Secretaries created in the office of the President, one of them being specifically for Provincial Administration and Internal Security, thus further re-affirming not only the confidence in but also the seriousness with which the state held the PA.

Although PA has been involved in elections even during de-facto one-party system as well as the short-lived bi-party systems, whereby the DC was the Returning Officer for all the elections, both the civic and parliamentary, they did this with a lot of vigour and fervour and it was alleged that a supposedly anti-establishment candidate, could hardly go through in the elections even by hook or crook. By 1988, the Provincial Administrators involvement in politics and party matters was so strong that it was hardly possible to stop regarding them as party stalwarts as opposed to civil servants. They even recruited members for KANU. In districts where internal divisions in KANU as a party were, the PA was liable to be drawn into the conflict as an unofficial mediator or arbitrator, thus compromising his position as a civil servant and him becoming more vulnerable to political attacks. It was not even unusual for a PA officer to chair a KANU meeting.

As an institution, PA was accused of all sorts of evils and misdeeds, i.e., rigging elections, arrogance, brutality, forced harambee contributions to meet the pre-set targets coupled with confiscation of property a portion of which, in most cases ended in the PA personnel kitty. Intimidation of adversaries or supposed political opponents, which usually ended in the victim's
incarcerations in the name of being a threat to either public security or peace, became the order of the day. Dissent was dealt with ruthlessly. Each PA officer's area of jurisdiction was like his personal fiefdom. It therefore was not a surprise that when the constitution was amended in 1990 to allow more parties, virtually every corner of the country rejoiced.

### 2.2.3 Post 1990 (Multi-Party Era)

With the scrapping of Section 2(a) of the then Kenya's constitution, opposition parties emerged. PA as an institution became the target of attack, with most opposition activists and sympathisers calling for its abolition. It was argued PA was worse than it was during the colonial times. Due to pressure from opposition then, with the support of donor agencies including Bretton Woods Institutions, Provincial Administrators' role as Returning Officers in the elections was scrapped. The Electoral Commission was to appoint a Returning Officer for each constituency. It should be noted that most of the opposition activists had been victims of the PA's intimidation, harassment, and more so election rigging mechanisms.

The PA continued performing the maintenance of law and order coupled with security under which the licensing of political meetings lay. The government, fearing loss of power, used PA to campaign for the ruling party, KANU. The Provincial Administration, knowing very well that their jobs were in jeopardy should opposition win the elections, did their best to frustrate opposition campaigns, at times even confining opposition activists in custody for alleged disturbance of peace and holding of illegal meetings.

The Provincial Administration between 1992-1997 faced a lot of challenges especially from members of the opposition. The PA had lost most of the respect and fear of the de-jure one party system era or even before amongst the citizenry. Instead they were now regarded with a
lot of scorn and hatred. Towards the end of 1997, Inter-Party Parliamentary Group (IPPG) meetings organized by sitting parliamentarians of the 7th parliament ended with a compromise which not only toned-down the rivalry between KANU and opposition MPs, but also dealt a further blow on the role of PA. Holding of rallies and gathering would no longer require licensing from the PA. Only the police would be notified, as a formality, to organize security. The Chief Authority Act was further diluted. The general elections of 1997 were therefore somewhat different from that of 1992. Members of the PA played much more reduced role in the electioneering process compared to the previous general elections.

After 1997 elections, a new development occurred that further impacted positively on the role of PA as an institution. Two opposition parties, National Development Party (NDP) and Forum for the Restoration of Democracy - Kenya (FORD-K) chose through their leaders, Raila Odinga and Wamalwa Kijana, respectively, to co-operate with KANU of President Moi. Though the "Co-operation" has been criticised from both within and outside the concerned political parties, in the actual sense, it has had far-reaching ramifications, at least in NDP, strongholds. According to the the District Commissioner for Migori District, the Chiefs barazas could once more attract members of the opposition; Chiefs and DOs are very co-operative; there is a remarkable joint participation in projects; and the DDCs once more are very active. Based on my field interviews, there was every indication that similar developments were witnessed elsewhere in the country. A detailed discussion on this is in chapters 4 and 5 with particular reference to Migori and Nyamira Districts. In essence, the PA is once more being accepted in the opposition areas in which they were at one time a bane. Such kind of governance bring into question, as to what went wrong where, how and why with the institution of PA and what its future is.
CHAPTER THREE

3.0 DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES AND PLANNING IN KENYA

3.1 MEANING OF DEVELOPMENT

There are various definitions of development. UNDP, which relates development to human development, defines it as a process of enlarging people's choices - not just choices among different detergents, television channels or car models but the choices that are created by expanding human capabilities and functioning - that people do and can do in their lives (Human Development Report, 1999). Todaro (1989:88) defines development as a multidimensional process involving major changes in social structure, popular attitudes, and national institutions as well as the acceleration of economic growth, reduction of inequality, and the eradication of absolute poverty. M.J. Balogun's (1998) defines development as having to do with "moving an organism, a household, a firm, a tribe, or a nation from one stage of existence to another-usually, to a preferred alternative- while at the same time maintaining its cherished values, norms and traditions". All these definition imply that development is transient and dynamic, and not static. It can therefore be manipulated so as to result into an increased or a reduced pace and worse still, it is destructible.

The pace of development in a regime, tribe, firm, or even a family is a function of the governance in place. At national level, the state is both a catalyst and a co-coordinator of any development, and subsequently responsible for it. The implementation of development priorities of a given state depends on what principles the state through its designated agencies such as PA adheres to. For instance, which department of the government oversees the implementation?
And what mechanisms are put in place to ensure that the goals are attained? These are what would determine the processes of development in a state.

3.2 DEVELOPMENT PLANNING

For the purposes of this study, we shall adopt Albert G Waterson's (1965) definition of development planning that "a country is considered to be engaged in development planning if its government makes a deliberate and continuing attempt to accelerate the rate of economic and social progress and alter institutional arrangements which were considered to block the attainment of development. Development planning, in this context can be seen to be crucial to a state for two reasons: first, the state may be in a position to make a "rational" decision based on available information to enable it formulate its policies. In this case, development is both a process and an activity. Secondly, the state can identify and allocate its scarce resources in the best way possible. It is in the latter instance that development planning becomes a major political tool for any given state, as Colin Leys (1970) contends that planning involves decision about who to give and who to deprive. Goran Hyden (1983) underscores three latent objectives of development planning in independent African states: First it allows the political leadership to fall back upon an authoritative document as a defense against the many pressures from clans for a resource allocation based on a different criteria. Secondly, it facilitates governance by timing future prospects in order to secure needed compliance in the present. Finally, it presents to outside donors a competent analysis of the national economy and suggests ways and means by which they can assist development.

At the time of independence, most third world countries had emphasized the causal relationship between planning and development. Most governments therefore tended to design their development plans in line with those of the wider international system, especially the United
Nations. At national level, the programmes could be given different names but still "fitted" within the bigger UN framework. Whereas the UN developed "Decades of Development Programmes" i.e. 1961-71, 1971-1981, and 1981-1991, most national governments, Kenya included, adopted 5 years development plans, with shorter annual plans being synchronized with the national budget.

In line with the UN development programmes, Kenya's programmes have periodically been addressing different themes, viz, 1950's (colonial government) addressed economic growth and investment, 1960s it was modernization as orchestrated by the efforts to improve health, education and institutional frameworks. In 1970s, the development themes addressed equitable distribution of resources, especially between rural and urban areas, under the banner, Integrated Rural Development. In the 1980s decade, the theme shifted to poverty and as 1990s theme was governance subsumed under sustainable development. These themes, in the Kenyan context, are discussed in detail in section 3-4. The development planning approaches were not the same at all times. They were different in the various Third World countries.

3.2.1 APPROACHES TO DEVELOPMENT PLANNING

The adoption of any development approach by a given state is mostly determined or influenced by the state preferences of hierarchy of relationships between those involved in the planning process. How the actors should for instance, relate to one another, on the one hand, and with the rest of the government agencies on the other. Most important is, who the actors should be and the relationship level. This relationship would determine or explain the direction of flow of information/decisions from one point to the other.
There are in broad terms, two approaches to development planning. First, the Top-down (Centralized) approach and secondly, the Bottom-Up (Decentralized) Approach. When a government decides to concentrate the planning organs and prerogatives at the headquarters/centre, which then convey decisional premises to the local units/peripheries, districts in the case of Kenya, it is engaged in a centralized planning involving a Top (centre) - Down (Districts) communication flow. A Bottom (District) - Up (centre) would be the case if it chooses to have planning organs decentralized to local units. According to Montgomery J. D. and Esman M. J., the decision to centralize or decentralize the process of development planning is a function of the state's consideration on how it intends to effect the plan and achieve the intended objectives, based on the following three concerns: First, equity i.e. a fair distribution of benefits and opportunities among respective clients. Second, efficiency i.e., the most favorable ratio of cost-output ranges of choices to that of administration costs. Third, stability, i.e. establishment and maintenance of means for peaceful accommodation of the adversaries' interests among affected parties by the administration of the programme.

3.2.1.1 **Top-Down Approach**

Top-Down Approach, according to Makokha (1985) is a process in decision making whereby the lower levels of the decision-making hierarchy including intended beneficiaries are only involved in the final phase with the criteria set by the upper levels of that hierarchy. In other words, they are virtually not free to make decisions outside the conditions set by the central government. This strategy has been characteristic of the Kenyan planning process for rural development since independence and indeed originating from the colonial planning and administrative style.
This approach, in as far as, development planning in Kenya is concerned; planning is regarded as a professionals' job. It is therefore the domain of experts, planners and administrators who "know and can decide" what is desirable for the people. The Provincial Administration personnel, under the 2nd National Development Planning, were to be trained so as to be not only development minded but also adequately informed about the country's development problems in order to seek solutions to them at local levels (GOK, 1970). In practical terms, the planning would be done at the central, Ministry of Economic Planning and National Development and then channeled down to Provincial and Development Committees. The reluctance by the former to cede this responsibility to the latter was made more explicit by the 1970-74 National Development Plan "... It is not the intention of the government that responsibility for planning co-ordination should be decentralized to the local level (GOK, 1970). The ministry would continue to co-ordinate and implement the plans through local development committees and the study of development problems and potential at provincial and district levels.

In an acknowledgement of the importance of the people's participation in the development process, not "planning", the government's plan also outlined how people's interest in the development effort could be stimulated. "Efforts will be made to ensure that the new plan is thoroughly understood, by the publication of a popular version of the plan and a country wide campaign to publicize and explain at all levels the meaning, content, and requirement of the plan. The campaign will be channeled through the radio and television, adult education classes, seminars, pamphlets etc (GOK, 1970). Such acknowledgement and guidelines, when carried out by the Provincial Administration through the "barazas", the forums are simply turned to platforms solely to issue government directives, instead of soliciting local people's views, by the government officials (Makokha's 1985).
Although there have been subsequent remarkable efforts to strengthen districts as the planning units (in Kenya) with the climax being in 1983 with the introduction of the District Focus for Rural Development, the central ministry still dominates the development planning co-ordination, implementation and the study of the problems at the local levels.

3.2.1.2 **Bottom-Up Approach**

The Bottom-Up Approach involves micro planning. Its main aspects include setting development model for each sector, setting up production targets; generation of specific projects and programmes; estimation of costs, and specification of policy framework and administrative means to carry out the programme based on the recommendations from the grassroots.

The Bottom-Up Approach implies a situation in planning strategies whereby the lower levels of decision-making set their objectives and priorities. In practical sense, this implies the decentralization of the planning co-ordination and implementation process to the local levels (districts and below). It is the contention of those who advocate for Bottom-Up Approach that planning be all-inclusive contrary to the belief that it should be the expert's domain. Whereas the experts could offer technical advise, it is the locals who know what they need and how they can achieve it, and must therefore be given the chance to identify them.

The Kenya Government having had unsuccessful experiences with Top-Down approach, at the local levels during implementation stages, steadily but gradually began to strengthen local level (district) planning strategy. Initially, the change of heart on the part of the government was based partly on the lessons learnt from the Special Rural Development Programme (SRDP) - and partly on the Recommendations of Ndegwa Report 1971. The government appointed and posted District Planning officers and District Development Offices.
Ideally, under the Bottom Up approach, development committees are set down to the lowest administrative unit, sub-location level, so as to allow maximum popular participation possible. The recommendations of the sub-location committee would be channeled to the District Development Committee through the Location and Divisional Development Committees where necessary amendments are made at each stage. At the district level, all recommendations from all over the district are consolidated into one document as District Development Plan. Usually the District Development Plans, where appropriate, and possible, are incorporated into the National Development Plan. The main concern here is not whether the plans are incorporated into the national one or implemented, but whether the process has involved either realistically or symbolically, the local people in the identification of their priorities.

3.3 POST INDEPENDENCE CONCEPTIONS OF DEVELOPMENT IN KENYA

This section attempts to examine how shifts in the development thinking of the international institutions, especially United Nations and the Breton Woods Institutions i.e. the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, influenced that of the Kenya Government. Of particular importance, is how the Kenya Government has tried to respond to the international institutions' development themes by not only conceiving it in the same line but also formulating national development policies that correspond to such conceptions i.e. Integrated Rural Development, Community Development, Sustainable Development, and Comprehensive Development
frameworks? The main concern is how such conceptions impacted on the role of PA in the administration of development as the main government machinery charged with that duty.

3.3.1 COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

Although we categorize Community Development as one of the Kenya's post-independence development policies, it should be pointed out that, at the international level, it became more popular from 1930s when it was used by Adolf Hitler to salvage Germany out of the Great Depression (1928-33). Former USA President Franklin Roosevelt also used the approach in his Tennessee Valley Authority 3As programme from 1936. It was further lent credence by English Economics theorist, Thomas Keynes who advocated for public expenditure and borrowing in order to boost production and subsequently induce communal savings and therefore investments, thereby easing the burden on the government.

According to Holdcraft (1978), the proponents of Community Development viewed it as a peaceful means for people to be mobilized to help themselves realize felt needs in the economic, social, and political spheres of their development. This policy was subsequently imported into Africa in general, and Kenya, in particular after the Second World War by the colonial regime in their effort to introduce development concerns in the colonies. In Kenya, for instance, a ministry of Community Development headed by an African was introduced in 1954. It was from here that the policy found its way into post-independent Kenya as a national policy.

Such efforts were not in any way different from the theme of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), popularly known as World Bank. The World
Bank was an initiative of the USA government after the Second World War to aid the reconstruction of the devastated world economies, especially Europe. It stressed economic growth, which according to the colonial regimes (Europeans - British and French) could be best interpreted and/or realized through Community Development.

Kenya, upon attainment of independence in 1963, adopted community development as a policy. This was in line with the UN's theme of "Modernization" for its development decade (1961-1971). Kenya therefore both reinforced and enhanced the activities of the community development workers, who had relied and would continue to rely on the Provincial Administration's efforts to be effective. This is the view supported by Belshaw and Chambers (1973) who stated that community development workers made innumerable attempts to involve local people in plan formulation, in community activities and in self-help projects. Most of the community development workers' meetings with the people were through the Chiefs or Sub-Chiefs barazas. Further, their activities were given authority by the Provincial Administration.

In the immediate post-independence period, most development scholars embraced modernization theory as the panacea to solving Africa's under-development problems implying that the traditional values would be replaced with modern values (Western) so that Africa upon successful application of the changes could be as developed as the Western world. It was therefore no surprise that as soon as Kenya attained its independence; it immediately embarked on the modernization track. It soon declared illiteracy/ignorance, poverty and disease as its national enemies that had to be eliminated. The community development effort was therefore geared towards construction of schools, food production, settlement of the landless and the construction of health centres and provision of social welfare.
amenities of modern life. Such efforts were lent credence by both the Sessional Paper no. 10 on African socialism by the ruling party, KANU, and by the National Development Plans, both the "Green" and the "red" 1966-70 and 1964-66, respectively. The assigning of PA an enhanced role in the co-ordination of all development objectives, rather inadvertently, caused emergence of some dysfunctions of community development strategy, what Goran Hyden (1983) termed in his study as the "economy of affection". Despite some positive contributions the economy of affection, its dysfunctions rendered community development both unsustainable and unfeasible, as a national development strategy/policy.

3.3.1.1 Economy of Affection

Economy of affection is a mode of production, which according to its proponent, Goran Hyden, has nothing to do with fond emotions per se. Rather, it denotes a network of support, communications, and interactions among structurally defined groups by blood, kin, community or other affinities, for example, religion. It links together in a systematic fashion a variety of discrete economic and social units, which in other regards may be autonomous. It tends to be ad hoc and informal rather than regular and formalized (Hyden 1983:8). The functional purposes of economy of affection can be categorized into three: First, basic survival where household whose ability to meet many regular obligations to its members would be impossible without the support mechanisms provided by the economy of affection. This may involve the exchange of cash in the form of a poor rural peasant receiving cash, goods such as food, clothing, and services such as labour and childcare from either a relative or a friend. The second category is social maintenance, which involves hospitality being offered to relatives and friends as well as the offer of companionship and the provision of loans. The final category is development, which covers such activities as farm purchases and farm development, promotion of small-scale
business, house construction, support of education, facilitation of migration and community development. Table 3.1 below shows a summary of some of the basic features of the economy of affection in Kenya.

Table 3.1: Summary Of Basic Features Of The Economy Of Affection Applied To Female-Headed Households In Kenya

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purpose of exchange</th>
<th>Units of exchange</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Basic Survival</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Basic needs food, shelter, etc.</td>
<td>Regular support, loans, credits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Emergencies, illness, Death, marriage problems, police harassments etc.</td>
<td>Loans to cover emergency payments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social Maintenance</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Kin relatives</td>
<td>Gifts, food, bride Wealth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Friends</td>
<td>Contributions to funerals, ceremonies and political party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Religious, cultural and political organizations</td>
<td>Loans, credit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Development</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Agriculture, purchase and Development of form or Cattle.</td>
<td>Loans, credit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Business</td>
<td>Payment of school Fees and related Expenses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Education</td>
<td>Fares, rent, payment bribes to get jobs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Migration</td>
<td>Loans for materials, or purchase of house</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) House construction</td>
<td>Regular payments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f) Community development</td>
<td>Equipment, food, gifts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Although Hyden's (1983) contention that economy of affection is customary to Africans is true, his spirited attempt to imply that the colonial regimes tried to uproot it only to be revived again after independence is not accurate. Rather, it was the colonial regimes, which entrenched the economy of affection in their colonies, largely through the Provincial Administration under the community development policy.

The colonial government abetted economy of affection by: First, recruiting their colonial regime's, collaborators and/or their friends and relatives into Provincial Administration initially, and later into the wider civil service when it was expanded. Secondly, by accessing the government employees' children, relatives to formal education directly initially, and later indirectly, for they were the groups, which not only remotely understood the value of education, but also could afford school fees. Thirdly, the colonial administration placed the few infrastructure developments including the social amenities, conveniently closer to their agents.

With such developments, the colonial administration only paved the way for economy of affection in the post-independence era in Kenya. Under the community development strategy, "harambee" self-help movement was encouraged whereby members of a local community could be called upon to pool their resources together to put up projects of their choice, which around this time, basically included schools, hospitals, cattle dips, polytechnics among others. These activities had to be sanctioned by the Provincial Administration. It should be noted that, resulting from the parallel development, practiced by the colonial regimes, some communities benefited from such services as education, employment, and infrastructure at the expense of
others that were marginalized. The communities that benefited under such arrangement not only sustained their dominance in any immediate post-independence era, but also formed a large portion of the local elites. For instance, whereas the "harambee" self help, projects could be successful among the affluent communities; it could not be in the marginalized ones due the differential income per capita nurtured by the colonial arrangements. The community development programmes therefore, can justifiably, be said, were not intended to, hence did not, affect the basic structural barriers of equity but rather advanced the "trickle- down" theory of economic development. In circumstances, we agree with the assertion that these programmes accepted the existing local power structure as given. In addition, community development workers usually aligned themselves with traditional elites (Alila 1998:70). These elites in rural areas were basically, local Chiefs, Sub-Chiefs and their henchmen. In essence, there was very little attention given to assuring that benefits from community development programmes accrued to the majority of rural people who, upon realizing this, did not for the most part respond positively to this approach.

As a whole, the programme was rendered ineffective politically because of basic conflicts that were too deep to be solved simply by the persuasive efforts of community development workers. The expected, reconciliation and common participation for the sake of development occurred as an exception rather than as a rule. It was therefore no surprise when the government next development strategy (from 1970) targeted the rural imbalances, under the banner, Integrated Rural Development.

3.3.2 INTEGRATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT
Integrated Rural Development (IRD) was a major concept of development in the rural areas in 1970s. This timing coincided with the period the United Nations (UN) declared rural development its main theme for the 1971-1981-development decade. An important assumption of IRD was that a critical minimum effort, essentially through intervention, was necessary to have a noticeable impact on target populations in a short time.

Other than the need to conform to the UN development theme, the Kenya government’s adoption of IRD can be attributed to its recognition that the majority of its population live in the rural areas, and that its prime assets are its people and land. The government’s intention and justification appeared more vivid in the 1970-74 national development plan. “Thus rural development comprises a key element in government action which will in this plan represent the basic development strategy. Such a strategy is based upon the fact that the land and the people are the prime assets of Kenya. The rural areas comprise well over 98 per cent of the land area of Kenya and contain more than 90% per cent of the population. As such, they contribute the greater part of the present and potential productivity of the nation” (GOK, 1970). The government, in this plan, believed that rural development would imply rising urbanization not in the major cities, but through growth of commercial activity in a large number of small trading centres. The plan designated rural growth centres as foci of trade, social services and communications, which serve surrounding farm areas and which could significantly alter the pattern of migration and provide more even development of the nation as a whole. This explains why the focus of the projects conceived under IRD was on small-scale farmers and attempted promotion of improvements in the quality of rural life and increases in off-farm opportunities.  

7 The author has paraphrased the statement of Alila, P.O. in Regional Development Dialogue 1988 p.72
The Government of Kenya also recognized the fact that in order to effectively carry out this plan and the strategy, it was important to streamline the field administration for development. The Ndegwa Commission on the civil service was set up and its findings and recommendations released in 1971. The commission acknowledged that accelerating the pace of development in the rural areas had been a major and increasing concern of the government since independence. The commission subsequently gave special importance to the problems of injecting new resources and greater rationality into the machinery of rural administration centred on the Provincial Administration.

According to the Ndegwa commission, rural development must also mean planned development implying that the process of planning, both plan making and plan implementing, had to be extended down to the level of the district and even into the division. It is then that the administration would come to grips with local realities – contrary to the situation when the machinery of planning extended only to the provincial level. In addition, the machinery of plan implementation - the apparatus of field officers of various ministries, together with the Provincial Administration – was not integrated within the context of National Development plan (Ndegwa 1971). It was against this background that the commission wished to have the Provincial Administration more equipped to provide the focus by having its structures and relationships with other branches of government at district level rationalized and defined. Relatedly, PA itself had to build up a more specialized, professional staff structure to enable it to perform the specialized tasks of development administration.
Notwithstanding the problems that riddled the then PA and its administration of development, the Ndegwa Commission proposed making the district an effective focus for rural development with specified responsibilities for both plan-making and plan-implementation with a substantial division of labour at that level. Indeed, this was a forerunner to the District Focus for Rural Development Strategy to be institutionalized in Kenya in 1980’s. The commission went ahead to make a recommendation that was to see the creation of a new post District Development Officer (DDO) within the administration, under the general authority of the DC but having specific responsibilities and some independent powers for the development aspects of the Administration’s work at the district level. Such an officer would have to be professionally trained for the work, and would also require another specialist, District Planning Officer (DPO), whose post was also to be created and be charged with plan formulation and the monitoring of progress of plan implementation under the DDO. The DDO was to take up most of the DC’s functions such as licensing and chairing land control boards. The DC was to be left only with security, intelligence, tax collection, and law and order maintenance functions (Ndegwa 1971).

The District Officer (DO) was to be responsible to DDO in development matters and to the DC on security intelligence, law and order maintenance only. The District Development Committee was to be chaired by the DDO and not the DC who was not even to be a member.

Had the recommendations of the commission been implemented to the letter, the DC could have remained with the responsibility for the general administration and welfare of their districts, rather ceremonial jobs. This was equivalent to chopping off presidential powers since the DC is his personal representative in the district. This, as expected, was not implemented. However, DDC was created and DDO posted as the secretary to the DDC whose Chairman remained the DC who also still maintained direct links with DOs in all matters at the divisional level. The district became the unit for planning for development. In the government’s 1970/71 fiscal year,
the District grant funds were started to supplement funds in the districts. The government further in the 3rd Development Plan 1974-79, introduced Rural Development Fund which now incorporated District Grant Fund, not only to assist the self help projects but also to relieve some hardships in the rural area i.e. through public work programmes. This was to be allocated equitably, geographically, and not demographically, implying that in practice, very little money was received in some districts while excess money was received in others since some districts had much lower population than others.

In effect, the PA officers remained stronger at the district level despite the attempt to curtail some of their powers. They remained in charge of both development and security related issues in the districts. They even continued to co-ordinate the special programme initiated under the Special Rural Development Programme (SRDP). The government continued to have both faith and confidence in the ability of the Provincial Administration to both steer and co-ordinate development in the country. It essentially dominated the planning, co-ordination and the implementation aspects of development through both District Planning and District Development Committees.

3.3.2.1 Special Rural Development Programme (SRDP)

SRDP was a brainchild of political leaders, administrators and research workers who met at a conference held in Kericho in September 1966, with a common aim of finding solutions to problems of effective utilization of Kenya’s human resources for full development. There is no doubt that this group had appreciated the problems associated with community development strategy, which were either inherited at independence or emerged thereafter.
The special programme was launched during the 1969/70 financial years, which coincided with the beginning of the new plan period. This plan was intended to tackle directly the problem of integrated development, which called for greater planning work, by the District and Provincial Development Committees. According to the Kenya’s 1970-74 National Development Plan the choice of the DDCs was based on the fact that the committees, composed of technical and administrative officers who “are fully familiar with local problems and potential, their lines of communication to the people and to other parts of the government are direct and efficient and their job is comprehensive (GOK, 1970). The Programme was an experiment and was intended to provide experience in the conception, design and execution of comprehensive rural development at the district level, and that the techniques and procedures would be extended to additional areas as rapidly as findings and funds permit. The projects started were expected to utilize existing resources of staff and finance as far as possible, and to seek external assistance to support what, in effect, would be a large-scale self-help effort.

On the basis of the survey of the fourteen areas covered in 1968, six divisions, i.e. Vihiga, Migori/Kuria, Kapenguria, N. Tetu, Mbere, and Kikoneni, Mwereni and Mkongani locations in Kakamega, S. Nyanza, W. Pokot, Nyeri, Embu and Kwale districts respectively, were selected for the first phase of the Programme while Central, Irianj, Northern, Northern, Kiharu, Yatta, S. Imenti and Wundanyi divisions. Busia, Kisii, Baringo, Nandi, Muranga, Machakos, Meru, and Taita Districts, respectively, were programmed for the second phase to be implemented during the subsequent financial years.

Donors were recruited to finance and provide technical assistance for these programmes, viz FAO/SIDA for Migori, USAID for Vihiga; the Dutch government for Kapenguria; GOK for Tetu; NORAD for Mbere and the British for Kwale, and the implementation began in the first
half of 1971 (Chambers 1973). Although the driving force behind the programme was at first the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development and then later, the Ministry of Finance and Planning, a small secretariat in the ministry developed a system of linkmen in ministries and worked through Provincial Planning Officers, the Provincial Administration, and the operational departments at central government, Province, District and Divisional levels. They were required to prepare and gain acceptance for plans and then to initiate implementation. Officers, of the Provincial Administration, known as Area Co-coordinators, one to each area, were specifically charged with co-coordinating, and expediting the programme (Chambers 1973).

The SRDP though started with a lot of pomp and subsequent high hopes of success, thereby bringing national development, was not very successful. In fact, the second phase did not even take off. The government never mentioned it again even during the third National Development Plan 1974-79. Alila (1998) analyses the IRD experience and reveals three basic shortcomings, which ran contrary to the envisaged sustainable development emanating from people's participation, hence its failure. First, the projects were based on inadequate knowledge of technical possibilities and small farm conditions. In particular, they exhibited little understanding of the local institutional environment by, for instance, ignoring local knowledge and indigenous organizations. Second, the administrators of the projects tended to regard rural communities as undifferentiated masses and therefore frequently ignored social structures and economic and political hierarchies. A major consequence was that the local elite became the main participants, and thereby reaped disproportionately larger benefits than the target poorest 40 per cent. Third, the increased scope of rural development activities meant that most could not be sustained simply because they exceeded the design, implementation, and evaluation capacities of central government and donor agencies (Alila 1998). Finally, we may add that
contrary to the earlier plan that the projects be initiated from the bottom, involving the masses from planning stages so that they could own the projects.

It was basically, lessons learnt from these shortcomings and especially on the role of popular participation in planning for development that made the government continue searching for the most effective strategy to achieve development. The piecemeal implementation of the 1971 Ndegwa Commission Report i.e. making districts the focus for development, the posting of DDOs and DPOs were steps in the direction of creating another development strategy.

3.3.3 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

According to Pearce and Watford (1993), any sustainable development agenda must be concerned with intergenerational equity - that is, with ensuring that future generations have the same capability to develop as the present generation. A development path is sustainable only if it ensures that the stock of overall capital assets remains constant or increases over time. These assets include manufactured capital (such as machines and roads), human capital (knowledge and skills), social capital (relationships and institutions), and environment matters because of its effect on both psychic and non-economic welfare, and its impact on production over the long term (World Bank 1999).

The term sustainable development which is currently identifiable with UNDP, is actually a brainchild of the World Bank which through its report “Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa”, usually associated the Berg (Elliot) Report 1981, wished to examine how economic growth could be enhanced using medium term and long term measures, basically
support from the international community. This followed an observation that between 1960-1979 per capita income in African countries grew by less than 1% whereas in the last decade (1970-79) 15 countries recorded negative growth. It added that the crisis was instigated by certain push factors such as inept administrative conditions, physical environment, institutional fragility, rapid population growth and historical circumstances. This report emphasized on the social capital hence the initial theme of sustainable development, which was in vogue through out 1980s. In order to achieve development (sustainable), according to the Breton Woods Institutions, the African countries had to implement Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) which sought to correct external financial balance of payment deficits, rising inflation, budget deficits, and the depletion of external reserves.

By the end of the decade of 1980s, African countries were still in crisis, despite the implementation of the SAPs, hence the need to shift the dimension of development thinking. The World Bank in its 1990 Development Report, entitled, Sub-Saharan African: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth, shifted its focus from social capital to human capital aspects of sustainable development, hence the popularity of the term sustainable human development from early 1990s. The report argued, “It is not sufficient for Africa governments to merely consolidate their programmes through their economies. They need to go beyond public finance, monetary policy and market, human capacity, institutional sustainability, governance, the role of their physical environment, population growth, economic distribution and development of technology (World Bank 1990). Critically analyzed, this report was built on the premise of creating enabling environment in order enhance economic productivity in the following three ways: First, there was need to invest in the citizenry in the context of how and where human labour is utilized for economic productivity. This people-oriented approach to development would equally provide a participatory perspective for the people in development. Second, that a greater
role be given to the physical environment and institutions to perpetuate a co-relation between how policy is formulated for purposes of agricultural development. Finally, that emphasis be put on homegrown technology that would stimulate local entrepreneurship and enhance the interrelationship of trade and movements of capital factors within various regions in specific politics.

Concisely, sustainable development implies an optimal balance between the cycle of production of goods and reproduction of human life, without causing and degrading available resources for the use of future generations. This is what SAPs contrary to its expectations i.e. accelerate development, failed to do and instead increased levels of dependency, which according to Alila (1998), was due to the focus on technological and economic issues, with little or no attention being paid to sociological issues or, more broadly, the human dimensions of development. This caused a mismatch between people's needs and services thus resulting in the wrong selection of beneficiaries, gender neutrality, and programmes, which are rarely sustainable. The cumulative result over the years has been that the government and donors have acquired low credibility in the eyes of the people, and thereby development initiative and support from the local population has been negated (Alila 1998). The World Bank report 1990 i.e. "From Crisis to Sustainable Growth" therefore wished to correct this malaise by introducing the human aspect to the development, which according to Alila (1998) refers to the extent to which development is people centred in terms of managing and taking control of their own affairs, and not being trapped in a dependency syndrome. In other words, people should be empowered through sound institution building to enable them make their own choices in all spheres of life if sustainable development is to be ultimately realized.
In Kenya, sustainable development approach has taken place in two “epochs” from 1980 to 1989 and from 1990 onwards, with emphasis laid on “sustainable development” and “sustainable human development”, respectively. In the former case, the government stressed strengthening of administrative institutions/conditions, physical environment and public finance, hence the introduction of District Focus for Rural Development (DFRD) from July 1983. There was then a strong belief in using state mechanisms to enhance both equitable distribution of resources and exploitation of natural resources. The latter case can be termed theoretically, as the public choice and/or liberalization era. People got disillusioned with government institutions due to poor service delivery and instead preferred non-governmental institutions such as community-based organizations. The international system also began to interact directly with the private concerns. Meanwhile, the government also somehow due to its inability to either offer better alternative or compel people’s compliance to the status quo, accepted the scenario by either completely or partially withdrawing from the delivery of some services thereby inviting partnership of the civil society, i.e., NGOs, individuals, CBOs and POs. This scenario is presently dominating the development space in Kenya.

3.3.3.1 District Focus For Rural Development (DFRD)

This was a product of the Report and Recommendations of the Working Party on Government Expenditure under the Chairmanship of Philip Ndegwa, which was concluded in 1982. In many respects, especially in its attempt to address public finance, administrative weaknesses and institutional capacity building, the Ndegwa report was a response to the World Development Report 1981 in its attempt to prescribe ways of achieving sustainable development. We can also justifiably argue that the DFRD in many ways especially in structure and functions was similar
to the recommendations of the 1971 civil service commission under Chairmanship of Duncan Ndegwa.

Both the 1971 and 1982 Commission Reports designated the district as the focal point for development planning, co-ordination and implementation, and provided for the creation of the District Development Officer's (DDO) post. They however differ in the role to be played by the DC, DDO and DOs as well as the composition of the DDC. According to the GOK statement, the DFRD is a strategy "based on the principle of a complementary relationship between the ministries with their sectoral approach to development and the districts with their integrated approach to addressing local needs. Responsibility for general policy and planning of multi-district and national programmes remains with the ministries. The development activities of local authorities, parastatals, regional development authorities and non-governmental organizations are all to be properly integrated with the programmes of the District Development Committee. The objective of this strategy of shifting increased responsibility to the districts is to broaden the base of rural development and encourage local initiative in order to improve problem identification, resource mobilization, and project design and implementation (GOK 1987).

The Government of Kenya therefore hoped that DFRD would help correct the imbalances both regional and rural-urban and at the same time help exploit local resources both human and physical. In this way, the strategy was seen to have incorporated corrective lessons learnt from SRDP, thereby not only promoting sustainable but also accelerating the local development. Each district, through its DDC is responsible for rural development planning and co-ordination, project implementation, management of financial and other resources, overseeing local procurement of goods and services, management of personnel and provision of public
information. The Provincial Administration in general and the DC in particular gained an increasingly prominent role under this strategy. Through the DDC, the PA played very crucial roles in the DFRD strategy. These roles ranged from planning and co-ordination to mobilization or "demobilization" for popular participation. Since the DC was both the Chairman and the Chief Executive Officer of the DDC, virtually no project could take place without his approval. This applied as well to the DOs, Chiefs and Sub-chiefs at their respective levels. Local Authorities' proposals also had to be endorsed by DDC before they were forwarded to the Ministry of Local Government for funding. The same applied to NGOs as made clearer by the following Government statement. "The district responsibility for planning and co-ordination covers district-specific projects sponsored by the Government (ministries will provide policy guidelines), including those supported by foreign donors and those supported through the local authorities and through Harambee efforts. The district also reviews and endorses projects in the district sponsored by parastatal organizations and by NGOs including local self-help organization. All NGOs must submit their project and programme proposal for review and endorsement by the DDC" (GOK 1987).

We agree with Wallis (1994) observation that although District Focus as a planning strategy for development implied decentralization on the face, in reality, it meant decentralization to field agencies representing the centre and particularly the District Commissioners. The immediate repercussion was that the DDC's were more of "rubber stamps" of the executive than it appeared. Out of fear or respect, it was the views of these executives who carried the day, either directly or indirectly, at their respective development committees. Their authority or dominance went largely unchallenged. In the end, the much-touted "Bottom-up approach" to development planning was just but a redesigned "Top-down approach". The behavior of the Provincial Administration is best summarized by Anangwe (1994:95) in his assertion that often the officials
would like be seen as veritable representative of the rural population, with a mandate to act on their behalf on other development matters; thus they would attempt to sell government policies to the rural people persuasively, sometimes using populist rhetoric, to convince them that the policies were the panacea to rural development problems and that it was in the best interest of these people to accept and implement the policies. Nonetheless, in the event that the populist posture seriously conflicted with the demands of their superiors at the center, or when the rural people mistakenly responded by making certain demands that the field officials may construe as unacceptable, these officials would resort to coercive methods to have their ways in rural affairs”. It was therefore usual for the Chiefs and Sub-Chiefs to compel (harambee) contribution from their subjects in the process of mobilizing resources for a public project.

In practice, the DDC became a tool for the government to control not only the movement but also the activities of the citizens since all development initiatives which could probably win opponents some sympathy, had to be vetted first by the DC. This scenario was encouraged by the fact that most of the foreign donations or grants in aid were throughout 1980s channeled through the state. It could control not only their disbursements but also their distributions, in terms of how loyal a region was, in the judgment of government agents. This implied that the more loyal benefited in terms of receipts and subsequently development at the expense of less loyal areas. The individuals concerned were frustrated, disillusioned, and responded by disengaging from the public sector in favor of private and or community based activities. In 1990s, allowing private participants including opposition individuals and various people’s organizations, which subsequently sprung up, opened up the development space. This reduced the influence of both the PA and the DDC on the local development. The international donors, then accusing the state of corruption and lack of accountability and transparency began to offer donation to individuals and private organizations directly, bypassing the state. The DDCs
subsequently became inactive, especially in opposition dominated areas, where Provincial Administration not only became more unpopular but also tended to be synonymous with public vices i.e. corruption, non-accountability and lack of transparency. Nobody knew exactly the best way forward. There have been several engagements, disengagements and partial re- engagements among the actors in the development space i.e. individuals, NGOs, PO and the state. It is an attempt to find an all-inclusive framework that a new approach, Comprehensive Development Framework, now comes into vogue for the new millennium.

3.3.4 COMPREHENSIVE DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK (CDF)

Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) is a recent World Bank perspective as a possible better substitute for the previous development approaches notably, Sustainable development, and subsequently Sustainable Human Development. In Kenya, other than sustainable human development, all other approaches put a lot of faith in state-led development, which assigned Provincial Administration in particular, a leading role in development planning, co-ordination and implementation through mobilization for popular participation. Implicit in this approach was the view that it was only the PA, being products of modernization, who knew better what development the masses required, and how and when to engineer it.

It however became evident around 1997 that, the NGOs, CBOs and private individuals alone, could not deliver the envisaged development and that the near-absence of the state created some vacuum which none of the actors could perfectly substitute, hence the need for CDF, to once more incorporate the state. According to the World Development Report 1999/2000, the shift in development thinking could be summarized in four propositions. First, that sustainable
development has many objectives such as raising per capita income, and improving quality of life, which includes better health services and educational opportunities, greater participation in public life, a clean environment, intergenerational equity, and more. Secondly, that development policies are inter-dependent and no single development policy can make much of a difference in an unfavourable policy regime. Policies require complementary measures in order to work best, and a policy failure can occur because these complements are not in place. Thirdly, governments play a vital role in development, but no single set of rules tells them what to do. Beyond generally accepted rules, the role of government in the economy varies, depending on capacity, capabilities, the country's level of development, and external conditions among other factors. Finally, that processes are just as important as policies. Outcomes of policies based on consensual, participatory, and transparent processes are more easily sustained. Institutions of good governance that embody such processes are critical for development and should encompass partnerships among all elements of civil society. The CDF is expected to serve several purposes: to sharpen the focus on the major goals of development, to highlight the integrated nature of policymaking, to emphasize the institutional processes required to sustain development, and to co-ordinate development efforts (World Bank 1999). The framework underscores the growing realization that the many elements that make up the development processes must be planned together and co-coordinated in order to obtain the best results — and sometimes to arrive at any results at all” (World Bank 1999). For instance, putting up a school building is only a start of a process which will require to be complemented with the need to raise educational levels through such mechanisms as selecting, training, and remunerating teachers adequately and sufficient resources to buy enough textbooks and supplies. A similar analogy can also be made for instance, to privatisation programmes, social safety nets, and sustainable energy programmes. It is a comprehensive framework, according to the World Bank, that makes this complementariness explicit by emphasizing the relationships among the human,
physical, sectoral and structural aspects of development. Whereas sectoral aspects include such elements as co-ordination, management, and maintenance of an effective enabling environment for private business and community initiatives, structural aspects focus on the need for good governance, transparent decision-making, efficient legal and judicial processes and sound regulatory systems.

CDF is a holistic approach to development designed to serve as both a planning and a management tool for co-coordinating the responses aimed at overcoming bottlenecks and meeting development goals by way of consulting with and winning support of a range of actors in civil society, as well as NGOs, donor groups and the private sector under the overall direction of the government. The framework could enable the government to develop a matrix of responsibilities in each area showing what each group must do to fight poverty and encourage growth.

The CDF is designed to be a means of achieving greater effectiveness in reducing poverty. It is premised on four principles. First, the country, not assistance agencies, should own its development strategy, determining the goals, timing, and sequencing of its development programmes. Secondly, governments need to build partnerships with the private sector, NGOs assistance agencies, and the organizations of civil society to define development needs and implement programmes. Thirdly, a long term, collective vision of needs and solutions should be articulated that would draw sustained national support, and fourth, structural and social concerns should be treated equally and contemporaneously with macroeconomic and financial concerns (World Bank 1999).
We can argue that it is the IMF and the World Bank chartered CDF strategy that Kenya has been trying to adopt especially under the civil service reform and with particular regard to the role of Provincial Administration in development. It appears the government has acknowledged the fact that it can not provide all services and may not be able to do without NGOs and even the various people's organizations including CBOs undertaking various self-help initiatives. The government is currently trying to win the people as well as NGOs and CBOs by inviting cooperation of the different stake holders in the development process through the sharing of both costs and responsibilities where necessary. The recent move by the government of Kenya to trim powers of the DCs, Chiefs and the sub-chiefs powers is a strong indicator of this new trend. The DCs, for example no longer handle relief food. This is currently a preserve of NGOs and other foreign agencies. Likewise, they are not to collect land board fees any other public money (The Daily Nation Newspapers, 14/3/2000). This also applies to the Chiefs and sub-Chiefs down the hierarchy of the PA.
CHAPTER FOUR

4.0 PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION AND THE CIVIL SOCIETY

IN THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

4.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines the extent to which democratization of the development process has indeed occurred in the three sampled districts (Nyamira, Migori and Nairobi), and how this has impacted on the role of the PA in the development process. In other words, what is the current configuration of local development space, with specific reference to the interplay among the various actors? Do the people participate both as individuals and as groups in the development forums? Are there People's organizations (POs) and Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the form of political parties, interest groups and voluntary development associations? What role does the PA play in the activities of these organizations?

4.2 THE DEMOCRATISATION OF THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

Three variables are under consideration here, namely, the existence of various forms of civil society such as People's Organizations (POs) and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs); the public attendance of various development forums, and finally the role of Provincial Administration (PA) in the activities of POs and NGOs.
4.2.1 THE EXISTENCE OF VARIOUS FORMS OF CIVIL SOCIETY

To establish the existence of various forms of civil society organizations, each of the 72 respondents were asked to list any three forums where he/she ever participated in the discussion of development programmes affecting him/her in his/her locality. A total of 92 development forums were mentioned in all the three districts. The main concern here was not the number but the types of organizations in the locality. Table 4.1 below shows various responses obtained from the three districts in percentages based on the frequency of mention. The raw figures are presented in bracket against each percentage.

Table 4.1: The Distribution Of Various Types Of Civil Society By District In Percentages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF CIVIL SOCIETY</th>
<th>DISTRICT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NAIROBI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Based Organizations (CBOs)</td>
<td>11.9 (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Churches</td>
<td>4.3 (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare Organizations (men/youth/women)</td>
<td>8.7 (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other self-help projects (NGOs)</td>
<td>8.7 (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>33.6 (31)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.1 shows recognizable presence of civil society in all the three districts in various forms and proportions. Since respondents were only listing the forms of civil society each was participating in, we can deduce that all the forms of the civil society listed exist and are avenues for local level participation in development in these districts. Community Based Organizations having been mentioned 25 times, appear to be the most prevalent form reflecting a distribution of 27.2% followed by NGOs, churches, and welfare organizations in that order. Attendance of church, which is the most common form of local participation in
development in Nyamira, is least in Nairobi. In Nyamira district, the only active NGO, Africa Medical Research Foundation (AMREF) is concerned with Reproductive Health. International Fund For Agricultural Development (IFAD), now defunct in the area, concentrated in Zero grazing (animal husbandry). The other self-help projects (NGOs) are foreign-based organizations but carry out projects within the localities. They involve the local population in specific processes of the projects. They operate according to their programmes and not those of the local population. Migori has several NGOs, such as: World Vision, CIDA, CARE, Lalmba Association and IFAD. BAMAKO Initiative is now defunct in the area. All these NGOs in Migori district, are concerned with the involvement of the local communities in transformational development activities such as education, public health and water including irrigation, clinical healthcare among others.

4.2.2 PUBLIC ATTENDANCE OF DEVELOPMENT FORUMS

The attendance of development forums aims at assessing participation of members of the public in development activities. An individual can be deduced to be active if he/she attends or participates in development forums of various types, either governmental, public barazas, or non-governmental, voluntary development associations such as CBOs, NGOs, churches and welfare organizations. This question was put to all the 72 respondents and a total of 97 responses were registered. Table 4.2 below shows the responses obtained from the three districts based on the frequency of mention. The raw figures are also presented in bracket against each percentage.
forums ranging between 13.6% for public barazas at the highest and 5.0% each for NGOs and welfare organizations at the lowest.

4.2.3 THE ROLE OF PA IN THE ACTIVITIES OF POs AND NGOs

This section attempts to establish what role PA play in the activities of civil society. For instance, has PA teamed up with the organizations? Are they opponents? Or are they indifferent? The question was put to each of the 72 respondents and a total of 72 responses obtained. Table 4.3 below shows the tasks performed by PA in the civil society project activities based on the frequency of mention. The raw figures are presented in bracket against each percentage.

Table 4.3: The Involvement Of PA In The Activities Of Civil Society By District In Percentages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INVOLVEMENT OF PA</th>
<th>DISTRICT</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NAIROBI</td>
<td>NYAMIRA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security/solving disputes</td>
<td>1.4 (1)</td>
<td>14.9 (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical advise/public education</td>
<td>1.4 (1)</td>
<td>5.4 (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilization/publicity</td>
<td>4.1 (3)</td>
<td>14.9 (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-ordination</td>
<td>1.4 (1)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaison/reconciliatory/Arbitration</td>
<td>1.4 (1)</td>
<td>1.4 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management/Appraisal</td>
<td>2.7 (2)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>12.2 (9)</td>
<td>36.5 (25)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Provincial Administration (PA) is involved in the development activities of the civil society in various ways and at different levels. The provision of security including solving of disputes
Table 4.2: The Percentage Distribution Of Public Attendance Of Specific Development Actors By District.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEVELOPMENT FORUM</th>
<th>DISTRICT</th>
<th>NAIROBI</th>
<th>NYAMIRA</th>
<th>MIGORI</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community Based Organizations</td>
<td></td>
<td>7.9 (7)</td>
<td>4.3 (4)</td>
<td>5.7 (6)</td>
<td>17.9 (17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Churches</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.9 (3)</td>
<td>7.1 (7)</td>
<td>5.7 (6)</td>
<td>15.7 (16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare Organizations (men/youth/women/groups)</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.7 (6)</td>
<td>3.6 (3)</td>
<td>5.0 (5)</td>
<td>14.3 (14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barazas (Chiefs/Assistant Chiefs)</td>
<td></td>
<td>8.6 (8)</td>
<td>12.9 (12)</td>
<td>13.6 (13)</td>
<td>35.1 (33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other self-help projects (NGOs)</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.7 (6)</td>
<td>6.4 (6)</td>
<td>5.0 (5)</td>
<td>17.1 (17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>30.8 (30)</td>
<td>34.3 (32)</td>
<td>35.0 (35)</td>
<td>100 (97)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.2 shows that public barazas, which was mentioned 35 times, are the single most attended forum for development in each of the three districts. This does not necessarily mean that public barazas are more popular than other forums. It should be noted that people may attend barazas for various reasons i.e. reporting crimes, seeking permits, some of which occur involuntarily. The fact that these scenarios are more frequent in the rural areas may explain why the attendances of the public barazas are higher in the rural, Nyamira and Migori districts, each recording 13 mentions than the urban areas, Nairobi, which recorded a frequency of 8. Whereas the urban areas have various alternative forums for handling such related cases, in rural areas, the barazas are more predominant. In general, we can state that the barazas are all inclusive while other development forums are project-specific.

Welfare organizations forums' attendance is greatest in Nairobi at 5.7% and least in Nyamira district at 3.6%. The attendance of churches forums is greatest in Nyamira district at 7.1% and least in Nairobi district at 2.9%. Migori district shows a better distribution of civil society.
and maintenance of law and order is the chief role of PA forming 35.1% of all the activities recorded in the three districts. This is followed by the mobilization of people including the publicity of the projects adding up to 29.7%. Other roles include offering advisory services, including public education; co-ordination of projects activities; liaison/arbitration; and management/appraisal of projects forming 12.2%, 8.1%, 10.8%, and 4.1%, respectively.

Table 4.3 also shows that there is more involvement of PA in the development activities of civil society in Migori than either Nyamira or Nairobi and the range of activities of involvement is also greater in Migori. In Nyamira, PA is involved in all the activities listed in the table, except the management, and coordination of projects activities. In Nairobi, PA involvement registered a meager (1.4%) figure in all the recorded development activities except mobilization of people/publicity of the projects (4.1%) and management/appraisal (2.7%).

We can therefore conclude that the major roles of the PA in the activities of POs and NGOs are basically the three traditional ones, i.e. security to, advisory of, and mobilization of the local population. At the same time, we can argue that there are other emerging developmental roles of PA, i.e. co-ordination, liaison and management. We can also conclude that the traditional roles are more felt in rural areas (Nyamira and Migori) than urban (Nairobi) areas. This can be attributed the availability of other alternatives in Nairobi besides the PA, i.e. police, courts and other professionals, which are not available in the rural areas. The PA is the main provider of these services or their equivalents in the rural areas.

4.3 INVOLVEMENT OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN DEVELOPMENT

The activities of civil society are assessed bearing in mind that the state also still runs several projects. Each of the 72 respondents were asked to state from the list given which projects/programmes formerly dominated by PA (state), had changed hands to non-state actors, and concomitantly, what had prompted the declining role of the state in the local
development project activities. A total frequency of 82 responses was recorded. Table 4.4 and 4.5 below show the various responses received based on frequency of responses/mention. The raw figures are presented in bracket against each percentage.

Table 4.4: The Projects Currently Dominated By Non-State Actors In Percentages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROJECT</th>
<th>DISTRICT</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NAIROBI</td>
<td>NYAMIRA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revival of co-op societies</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>5.6 (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>0.9 (1)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bursary scheme</td>
<td>3.7 (3)</td>
<td>4.6 (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community health</td>
<td>13.9 (11)</td>
<td>8.3 (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of schools</td>
<td>7.4 (6)</td>
<td>11.1 (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>8.3 (7)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>34.3 (28)</td>
<td>29.6 (25)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.4 shows that non-state actors, in all the three districts, are currently dominating three types of projects, i.e. Bursary scheme, community health services, and construction of schools. The construction of schools and community health leading, 37.0% and 34.3% respectively are fairly evenly distributed in all the three districts. The distribution can be attributed to the greater involvement of the local community through Parents Teachers Association (PTAs), Board of Governors (BOGs), and School Committees, fund raisings among others. These efforts whether done singly or jointly account for the increasingly greater involvement of the civil society than the state in the local development projects. The respondents stated the activities in which each one participates therefore no mutual exclusivity of the events.
Community health and construction of schools have attracted a lot of subsidies and supportive interventions from both the local population and NGOs. These are the advantages Nairobi and Migori districts have over Nyamira district. Nairobi has several NGOs providing health care and related needs in addition to the City Council services. Migori has several missionary-run facilities, foreign NGOs run-clinics i.e. (LALMBA Association), IFAD and World Vision International (both running primary health and Bamako Initiative (now non-functional in the area), offering both mobile clinics and pharmacy services, and the fact that virtually all the government dispensaries in the district have attracted heavy community involvement through cost-sharing efforts. Although cost-sharing policy has to some extent kept some people away from health services, in Migori district, it has been welcome by a large number of the population since they see it as a way of expanding the services such as maternity wings and the purchase of drugs to a larger number of people through direct payment of some fee and provision of labour for the construction efforts. Nyamira district recorded only one NGO (AMREF) involved in the provision of health (reproductive) services. IFAD, which used to provide zero-grazing promotion service, is no longer functional in the area.

The fact that security recorded nil in both Migori and Nyamira districts, and a paltry 0.9% for Nairobi, shows that it is still dominated by the Provincial Administration. Migori and Nairobi recorded higher proportion of projects currently dominated by non-state actors at 36.1% and 34.3% compared to Nyamira at 29.6%. The higher proportion of NGOs recorded in the former districts than the latter district could explain the variation. Another reason could be the fact that Nyamira district is the ruling party KANU zone and is bound to experience more of governmental than non-governmental activities than either of the two districts. The government gives more attention to KANU–supported than the opposition areas in terms of development projects.
Table 4.5: The Main Reasons For PA’s Declining Role In Percentages.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REASON</th>
<th>DISTRICT</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NAIROBI</td>
<td>NYAMIRA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA’s negligence</td>
<td>4.7 (4)</td>
<td>3.7 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of co-operation from local community</td>
<td>4.7 (4)</td>
<td>6.5 (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft of assets</td>
<td>1.9 (2)</td>
<td>0.9 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption and misappropriation of funds</td>
<td>13.1 (10)</td>
<td>11.2 (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shortage of capital</td>
<td>5.6 (5)</td>
<td>6.5 (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>6.5 (5)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>36.4 (30)</td>
<td>29.0 (23)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.5 shows that corruption and misappropriation of funds is the highest ranked reason for the PA declining role, followed by lack of co-operation from the local community. Shortage of capital, and PA’s negligence were third. The fact that theft of assets was only 3.7%, and 0.9% in Migori and Nyamira districts, respectively and 1.9% in Nairobi, lends credence to the argument that provision of security is seen by majority of the local population as still being dominated by PA. More often than not, the security portfolio of PA has been construed to imply almost exclusively, the maintenance of law and order, the traditional role right from its colonial beginnings. Irrespective of the period, colonial or post-independence, PA has performed this role with a lot of zeal, usually to the delight of the government and to the chagrin of the opposition in most cases perceived by PA as dissidents. The performance of this role quite often was accompanied by excessive force and brutality showing virtually no humane feelings, hence the traditional fear and respect which the PA has received from their subjects.
The role of PA in the maintenance of law and order was further lent credence by the constitution of Kenya under the Chief’s Authority Act, especially Part II which places a common man’s destiny in as far as association, movement, public responsibility etc were concerned, almost entirely on the Chiefs’ sole discretion. It was when invoking this act, often wrongly, that the Chiefs (PA in general) illegally confined and restricted “dissidents” and their activities notably. Political rallies. On a positive note, the PA has in most cases, under the same act contained local petty robberies, thefts, misdemeanour and, production and consumption of local brews among others.

Lack of co-operation from local community appears to be higher in Migori district 12.1% compared to Nyamira district 6.5% and Nairobi district 4.7%. This could be as a result of the people’s tendency to opt for civil society whenever there is a choice, and the fear of PA prompted by occasional invocation of the Chief’s Authority Act by the PA personnel. The relatively higher number of civil society organizations in Migori district implies a wider option for the local people and subsequently the relatively greater percentage for lack of co-operation from the local community. On the same note, there is a lower response for corruption and misappropriation of funds in Migori district. There are fewer engagements between members of the local community and PA in Migori than other districts.

4.4 THE PARTICIPATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN DEVELOPMENT

This section examines the overall participation by the civil society by tracing civil society’s record on either initiating or reviving stalled development projects compared to other actors such as individuals or state actors, Local Authority or Provincial Administration; and assessing the impact of civil society on the delivery of services, for instance, the problems it might be facing and the possible ways of enhancing its performance. Table 4.6 below shows the most dominant
actors in the delivery of development services in the three districts. The raw figures are presented in bracket against each percentage.

Table 4.6: Dominant Organizations In Initiating And/ Or Reviving Development Projects By District In Percentages.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORGANIZATION/ INDIVIDUAL</th>
<th>DISTRICT</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NAIROBI</td>
<td>NYAMIRA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local community</td>
<td>9.3 (6)</td>
<td>13.1 (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local church</td>
<td>13.1 (9)</td>
<td>3.7 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A local NGO</td>
<td>11.2 (8)</td>
<td>5.6 (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial Administration</td>
<td>1.9 (2)</td>
<td>0.9 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Authority (County council)</td>
<td>2.8 (2)</td>
<td>3.7 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local MP</td>
<td>1.9 (2)</td>
<td>2.8 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>29.9 (22)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NGOs, at 30.8%, are the most dominant organizations in either initiating or reviving stalled development projects followed closely by local community at 29.9% and local churches, 23.4%, respectively. The three categories of actors, local based church, local community, and a local NGO, have attracted voluntary popular participation in their respective areas of operation. Joint participation by the local people is frequent. The three actors appeared to be mutually reinforcing in most cases.

The areas in which PA has faced, perhaps the stiffest competition from NGOs and POs are: The articulation of development policies, and mobilisation of popular participation in local
development projects. A large number of NGOs and POs have penetrated deep into the interior parts of the country and most of the times without the assistance of PA officials.

Generally, Nairobi district recorded the highest proportion of development projects, either initiated and/or revived (40.2%) compared to Nyamira and Migori districts each recording 29.9%. It can be concluded that the civil society alone comprising the local community, local church and NGOs participated in about 83% of the initiated and/or revived development projects in all the three districts.

4.4.1 THE IMPACT OF THE CIVIL SOCIETY ON THE DELIVERY OF SERVICES

Respondents were asked to state the effect of the civil society on the development of their localities. The raw figures are presented in bracket against each percentage.

Table 4.7: The Impact Of The Civil Society On The Delivery Of Goods And Service By District.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IMPACT</th>
<th>DISTRICT</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NAIROBI</td>
<td>NYAMIRA</td>
<td>MIGORI</td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved</td>
<td>9.3 (7)</td>
<td>27.9 (20)</td>
<td>44.2 (32)</td>
<td>81.4 (59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not improved</td>
<td>4.7 (3)</td>
<td>11.6 (8)</td>
<td>2.3 (2)</td>
<td>18.6 (13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>14.0 (10)</td>
<td>39.5 (28)</td>
<td>46.5 (34)</td>
<td>100 (72)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An overwhelming majority (81.4%) of all the respondents felt that the services had improved, while 18.6% felt there was no improvement. The highest percentage of “improved” response 44.2% was recorded in Migori district while the least was recorded in Nairobi district at 9.3%.

The highest not improved response 11.6% was recorded in Nyamira district while the least, 2.3% was recorded in Migori district. This may be attributed to a greater number of civil society
activities in Migori than other districts, and the subsequent participation of the local people in their (civil society organizations) activities hence the realization of the impact.

4.4.2 PROBLEMS OF EFFICIENCY OF NON-STATE ACTORS (CIVIL SOCIETY)

Although non-state actors in the development process have made encouraging in-roads into the delivery of goods and services, there have been some setbacks. The raw figures are presented in bracket against each percentage.

Table 4.8: The Nature Of Problems Facing People's Organizations In The Development Of District In Percentages.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROBLEM</th>
<th>DISTRICT</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NAIROBI</td>
<td>NYAMIRA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial shortage</td>
<td>22.9 (16)</td>
<td>15.6 (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management problems i.e</td>
<td>7.3 (5)</td>
<td>10.4 (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>incompetence, and corruption.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition from other actors</td>
<td>1.0 (1)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frustration from PA</td>
<td>5.2 (4)</td>
<td>1.0 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>5.2 (4)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>41.7 (30)</td>
<td>27.1 (19)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.8 shows that financial shortage is leading (55.2%) of all the problems identified. The problem of management is ranked second, (27.1%). However, frustration from PA though ranked third at 10.4% is relatively more of a setback in Nairobi and Migori districts than in Nyamira district. Competition from other actors appears to pose virtually no tangible
problem in all the three districts. The actors in development process have presented themselves in the form of: NGOs, both international and local; POs including CBOs; affluent individuals, as well as political parties. In security matters, it is common to find rural villagers organising their own vigilante groups, mostly the youth to take care of security in their locality especially against thefts, robberies, and cattle rustling. In urban centres, especially in the slums, political party youths keep vigil at night and/or during their parties’ public gatherings to counter any threats to orderliness. Most affluent individuals do hire their personal bodyguards.

The inadequate funds to facilitate PA’s operations in the form of proper remunerations, equipments, and training, have also been a major problem. Until early 1990s when the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund withheld Enhanced Structural Facilities (ESAF) assistance to Kenya, the PA was fairly equipped with basic facilities such as vehicles down to DOs offices. The chiefs also had APs stationed at their offices. Currently, most DOs hardly have reliable means of transport to enhance their supervisory role. The APs have also been withdrawn from chiefs’ camps partly due to housing problems. Under these difficult circumstances, the PA, intended to be a rapid response force, can hardly be effective in containing insecurity, and law and order maintenance in their respective areas of jurisdiction.

This shows that in as much as the people have widely accepted the activities of the civil society organizations, they have not regarded them as substitutes for or competitors against PA but as complementing their (PA) efforts.

4.43 ENHANCING THE PERFORMANCE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

Each respondent was asked to suggest ways in which the performance of the non-state actors in development of their localities could be enhanced. The responses obtained from the three
districts are recorded in Table 4.9. The raw figures are presented in bracket against each percentage.

Table 4.9: Distribution Of Suggestions For Enhancing The Performance Of Non-State Actors In Development By District.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUGGESTED METHOD</th>
<th>DISTRICT</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NAIROBI</td>
<td>NYAMIRA</td>
<td>MIGORI</td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased capital base</td>
<td>2.7 (2)</td>
<td>8.1 (6)</td>
<td>13.5 (9)</td>
<td>24.3 (17)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public education</td>
<td>4.1 (3)</td>
<td>5.4 (4)</td>
<td>4.1 (3)</td>
<td>13.5 (10)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased freedom</td>
<td>1.4 (1)</td>
<td>5.4 (4)</td>
<td>12.2 (9)</td>
<td>18.9 (14)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation with others</td>
<td>4.1 (3)</td>
<td>5.4 (4)</td>
<td>9.5 (7)</td>
<td>18.9 (14)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of local resources</td>
<td>1.4 (1)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>1.4 (1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision of more security</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>1.4 (1)</td>
<td>9.5 (7)</td>
<td>10.8 (8)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduce reliance on outsiders</td>
<td>1.4 (1)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>1.4 (1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involve the local people</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>6.8 (4)</td>
<td>2.7 (2)</td>
<td>9.5 (6)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved management</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>1.4 (1)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>1.4 (1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>14.9 (11)</td>
<td>33.8 (24)</td>
<td>51.4 (37)</td>
<td>100 (72)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The respondents identified increased capital base (24.3%), public education (13.5%), increased freedom in operation (18.9%), cooperation with other stakeholders (18.9%), provision of more security (10.8%), and involvement of the local people in the projects as the major methods for enhancing the performance of non-state actors in development in all the three districts. In all instances, Migori district recorded the highest response rate, and Nairobi district the least.

We can infer that the local people see limited coverage and services by non-state actors as being caused by shortage of capital, and that should the capital base be increased, the services would also improve.
CHAPTER FIVE

5.0 PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION AND POPULAR PARTICIPATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

5.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines the relationship between Provincial Administration (PA) and popular participation in development. It considers the fact that PA can directly or indirectly influence the attendance of "barazas" by the members of the public as a way of sensitising them on government policies. The increased or decreased attendance by the public of the barazas as a result of the PA's action or inaction, therefore, could directly or indirectly, influence the rate of popular participation. The key concern is to assess: the level of involvement of PA in the development process, the performance of PA in development, and the relationship between the level of popular participation and the involvement of PA in the development process.

5.2 THE LEVEL OF INVOLVEMENT OF PA IN THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

The main focus is the activities of Provincial Administration and its methods of operation, such as the attendance of public barazas by the local people, the conduct of public barazas by the local administrators, and the impact of the development efforts of PA.
5.2.1 PUBLIC ATTENDANCE OF BARAZAS

To establish the attendance of barazas, respondents were asked to state how frequently each attended local assistant/chief's barazas. For instance, if one attends a chief's baraza weekly, it implies that, he/she would be informed of the PA activities, either in a positive or negative manner. If a person does not attend a baraza even once in a month, it goes without saying, that such a person, for whatever reason, would be relatively less informed of PA activities. Since barazas have been, from colonial times forums where the government policies were communicated to the public. It is therefore normal for an active citizen to attend barazas regularly.

Table 5.1: The Distribution Of Public Attendance Of Barazas By Political Party And District In Percentages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POLITICAL PARTY</th>
<th>NAIROBI</th>
<th>NYAMIRA</th>
<th>MIGORI</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KANU</td>
<td>4.1 (3)</td>
<td>30.6 (23)</td>
<td>14.3 (10)</td>
<td>49.0 (36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>4.1 (3)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>18.4 (13)</td>
<td>22.5 (16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>2.0 (1)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>2.0 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORD-K</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>2.0 (1)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>2.0 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHERS</td>
<td>14.3 (10)</td>
<td>4.1 (3)</td>
<td>6.1 (5)</td>
<td>24.5 (18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>24.5 (17)</td>
<td>36.7 (27)</td>
<td>38.8 (28)</td>
<td>100 (72)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NB The raw figures are presented in bracket against each percentage.

Table 5.1 shows that of all the respondents who attend public barazas in the three districts, 49.0% belong to the ruling political party KANU, 22.5% belong to NDP, 2.0% each belong to DP and FORD-K. Migori district records the highest (38.8%) attendance of public barazas most of whom are either KANU (14.3%) or NDP (18.4%) members. Of the 36.7% of the respondents
attending public barazas in Nyamira district, 30.6% are KANU members while 2.0% belong to FORD-K. In Nairobi district, those who attend public barazas comprises of KANU, NDP, and DP at 4.1%, 4.1% and 2.0%, respectively.

We can infer that political party affiliation influences an individual’s attendance of public barazas in the sense that the barazas are most likely to be attended by either members of the ruling party or members of the opposition supporting the ruling party (government), who may consequently tolerate the PA in a given area. For instance, of the 36.7% of those who attended public barazas in Nyamira, 30.6% are members of the ruling political party.

We can also infer an impact of the political co-operation between the ruling political party, KANU and opposition party, NDP, in both Migori and Nyamira districts. The even distribution of attendance level of public barazas amongst the two parties in the two districts attests to this, i.e., 18.4% of NDP to 14.3% of KANU contrary to common expectation that KANU members would greatly dominate the barazas.

5.2.2 THE CONDUCT OF PUBLIC BARAZAS

This section assesses the responsiveness of PA to the plight of the local people by examining the agenda at the barazas, and also how significant a forum for discussing people's development needs, a chief’s baraza can be. In this latter case, we consider the nature of these barazas. Tables 5.2 and 5.3 show the main agenda discussed at the last two barazas attended by the respondents, and the problems faced at the barazas in each district. Table 5.4 shows whether or not local people still have hope in the barazas as forums for discussing, and by extension planning local development. The raw figures are presented in bracket against each percentage.
Table 5.2: The Main Agenda Discussed In Barazas By District In Percentages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MAIN AGENDA</th>
<th>NAIROBI</th>
<th>NYAMIRA</th>
<th>MIGORI</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A visit by senior PA official</td>
<td>2.0 (2)</td>
<td>1.0 (1)</td>
<td>9.2 (9)</td>
<td>12.2 (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The deterioration of local infrastructure</td>
<td>2.0 (2)</td>
<td>7.1 (7)</td>
<td>3.1 (3)</td>
<td>12.2 (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The worrying security operation</td>
<td>4.1 (4)</td>
<td>8.2 (8)</td>
<td>3.1 (3)</td>
<td>15.3 (15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The conduct of harambee in the area</td>
<td>2.0 (2)</td>
<td>2.0 (2)</td>
<td>8.2 (8)</td>
<td>12.2 (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistance to bright children from poor families</td>
<td>5.1 (5)</td>
<td>5.1 (5)</td>
<td>2.0 (2)</td>
<td>12.2 (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The falling educational standards</td>
<td>1.0 (1)</td>
<td>9.0 (9)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>10.2 (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problems with co-operative movement</td>
<td>2.0 (2)</td>
<td>1.0 (1)</td>
<td>1.0 (1)</td>
<td>4.1 (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural extension services</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>2.0 (2)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>2.0 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>14.3 (13)</td>
<td>1.0 (1)</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>32.7 (31)</strong></td>
<td><strong>36.7 (36)</strong></td>
<td><strong>30.6 (30)</strong></td>
<td><strong>100 (97)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.2 above shows that the agenda discussed in the public barazas are of importance to the public, i.e., education, infrastructure, self-help and security almost on equal proportions. It is however worrying why visits by senior PA officials is given more prominence than either co-operative movements, 4.1%, or Agricultural extension services, 2.0%. Since this is more acute in Migori district, we can infer that this is consistent with the co-operation spirit existing between the ruling party, KANU and the dominant opposition party in the area, NDP. The process of cooperation is usually perfected through senior PA officials, i.e., PC, DCs and DOs who traverse the area on pacification missions, usually through harambees. This may also
explain why conduct of harambees is also given prominence in Migori district, 8.2% out of the total 12.2% for all the three districts combined.

Table 5.3: The Percentage Distribution Of The Main Problems Faced In Barazas By District

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MAIN PROBLEM</th>
<th>DISTRICT</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NAIROBI</td>
<td>NYAMIRA</td>
<td>MIGORI</td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief's arrogance towards opponents (not given ample time)</td>
<td>2.5 (2)</td>
<td>2.5 (2)</td>
<td>3.8 (3)</td>
<td>8.8 (7)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victimization for anti-government sentiments</td>
<td>2.5 (2)</td>
<td>1.3 (1)</td>
<td>1.3 (1)</td>
<td>5.0 (4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepotism</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>7.5 (6)</td>
<td>12.5 (10)</td>
<td>20.0 (16)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief does not allow free discussion (dictatorial)</td>
<td>6.3 (5)</td>
<td>5.0 (4)</td>
<td>10.0 (8)</td>
<td>21.3 (17)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public's ignorance</td>
<td>3.8 (3)</td>
<td>15.0 (12)</td>
<td>7.5 (6)</td>
<td>26.3 (21)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>16.3 (13)</td>
<td>1.3 (1)</td>
<td>1.3 (1)</td>
<td>18.8 (15)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>31.3 (25)</td>
<td>32.5 (26)</td>
<td>36.3 (29)</td>
<td>100 (80)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.3 shows that most of the problems faced in the barazas are related to the traditional functions of PA, i.e., law and order maintenance under the Chief's Act Authority. These include nepotism, dictatorship, arrogance and victimization by the chief. These misdeeds by PA have aggravated the limited awareness rate amongst members of the public of what is expected of them (26.3%).

We also note that the Chief's arrogance and victimization of opponents, against expectations, recorded a relatively low score in all the three districts particularly when against the period prior to and the years immediately after the re-emergence of multi party politics in Kenya. This can be accounted for by the KANU-NDP political re-arrangements that occurred. For
instance, in the recent past, opposition party leaders “co-operating” with KANU i.e. NDP and Ford-K have always been supported by the PA against confrontation from either recalcitrant KANU members or their own members of opposition dissenting their “so-called” co-operation with KANU.

Table 5.4: The Public’s Suggested Solution To The Problems At The Barazas By District

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUGGESTED SOLUTION</th>
<th>DISTRICT</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NAIROBI</td>
<td>NYAMIRA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report to higher authorities</td>
<td>1.9 (2)</td>
<td>25.9 (28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stop going to baraza</td>
<td>1.9 (2)</td>
<td>0.9 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nothing</td>
<td>3.7 (4)</td>
<td>1.9 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>24.1 (26)</td>
<td>5.6 (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>31.5 (34)</td>
<td>33.3 (35)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.4 shows that in all the three districts, only 1.9% of the respondents felt people should stop going to barazas, while 5.6% felt nothing could be done. Over half of the respondents (53.7%) felt the problems should be reported to higher authorities. We can infer that nearly two thirds of the respondents still considered barazas as important tools in addressing development. It can therefore be argued that barazas are still important forums for discussing development agenda in all the three districts.

5.2.3 THE DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS OF PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION

This section examines the action(s) taken by the Provincial Administration over the development programmes discussed at the public barazas. In other words, does the PA act on
These demands or pressures initiated at the barazas or are they mere "wish lists"? The respondents were asked to state the ways in which the PA addressed the development programmes discussed at the barazas and Table 5.5 shows the various responses received by district. Table 5.6 shows the public's judgment of the PAs efforts in addressing the issues while Table 5.7 will show the options for the members of the public not satisfied with the PA's efforts. The raw figures are presented in bracket against each percentage.

**Table 5.5: The PA 's Efforts in Addressing Development Issues Discussed at Barazas by District in percentages.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PA EFFORTS</th>
<th>NAIROBI</th>
<th>NYAMIRA</th>
<th>MIGORI</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conducted door to door awareness campaign</td>
<td>2.7 (2)</td>
<td>4.5 (3)</td>
<td>3.6 (3)</td>
<td>10.7 (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invited senior government officials and technical experts</td>
<td>2.7 (2)</td>
<td>8.9 (7)</td>
<td>7.1 (5)</td>
<td>18.8 (14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encouraged local people to pool up resources (harambees)</td>
<td>7.1 (5)</td>
<td>5.4 (4)</td>
<td>13.4 (9)</td>
<td>25.9 (18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encouraged locals to form own groupings or associations</td>
<td>3.6 (3)</td>
<td>8.9 (6)</td>
<td>9.8 (7)</td>
<td>22.3 (16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sought involvement of churches and NGOs</td>
<td>2.7 (2)</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>0.9 (1)</td>
<td>7.1 (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urged people to join the ruling party</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0.9 (1)</td>
<td>0.9 (1)</td>
<td>1.8 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encouraged formation of local bursary schemes</td>
<td>3.6 (3)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>3.6 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All of the above</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0.9 (1)</td>
<td>0.9 (1)</td>
<td>1.8 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>8.0 (5)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>8.0 (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>30.4 (22)</td>
<td>33.0 (25)</td>
<td>36.6 (27)</td>
<td>100 (74)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.5 shows that the PA is involved in various activities in an attempt to address the development agenda discussed in the barazas. The fact that PA officials encourage the operations of the civil society in the form of formation of groups and involvement of NGOs is in a way an indication that the PA acknowledges the government’s inadequacy in as far as the provision of development services is concerned. This is further lent credence by the fact that more state-initiated than either NGO’s or POs-initiated projects have stalled (Table 4.6). There is therefore general public reluctance to participate in state-driven projects vis-à-vis people-driven ones.

We note also that PA still invites government officials (18.8%) and conduct awareness campaigns (10.7%). It can therefore be deduced that the PA has combined both traditional roles of law and order maintenance, and the contemporary functions of incorporating civil society in development. This implies that PA has tolerated some changes in its operations. The fact that PA’s encouragement of harambees is more prominent in Migori district than the other two combined can be attributed to KANU-NDP cooperation, which usually manifest itself mainly through conduct of joint harambees.

Table 5.6: Options Open For The People Not Satisfied With The PA Efforts By District

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPTIONS</th>
<th>DISTRICT</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NAIROBI</td>
<td>NYAMIRA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ignore PA and start own self help projects</td>
<td>6.3 (5)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Request assistance from churches and NGOs</td>
<td>3.1 (3)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ignore PA and start own self help from churches and NGOs</td>
<td>18.8 (18)</td>
<td>18.8 (18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>18.8 (18)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>46.9 (44)</td>
<td>18.8 (18)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.6 shows that even those who are dissatisfied with the efforts of PA in development still have some hope. Over Fifty nine percent (59.4%) of the respondents in all the three districts opted to start own self-help projects and also request assistance from churches and NGOs while 18.8% opted to start their own self help projects when not satisfied with PA’s development efforts. This scenario can account for the mushrooming of CBOs and POs in the development arena in all the three districts. We can also conclude that POs and NGOs in the local development arena do not contradict but supplement the development services (POs and NGOs) provided by (PA).

5.3 THE PUBLIC’S PERCEPTION OF PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION IN DEVELOPMENT

This section looks at public perception of PA development effort in a locality. It considers the public's view of its performance, the impact it has on the level of popular participation, and its effectiveness in development delivery. It considers, in a nutshell, the relationships between popular participation and the involvement of civil society, and popular participation and the involvement of Provincial Administration.

5.3.1 THE PUBLIC’S VIEW OF THE PERFORMANCE OF PA BY DISTRICT

To test how crucial a factor PA can be in development, the respondents were asked to state the likely effect on the delivery of goods and services should the activities of the NGOs and POs be put under direct management of local PA. Tables 5.7 and 5.8 show the reasons for the perceived non-reduction and impact, respectively. Table 5.9, then shows the impact of total withdrawal of PA services from the POs and NGOs' projects. The raw figures are presented in bracket against each percentage.
Table 5.7: The Reasons For Perceived Reduction Of Goods And Services Should Civil Society Activities Be Put Under Direct Management Of PA In Percentages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REASON FOR REDUCTION</th>
<th>DISTRICT</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NAIROBI</td>
<td>NYAMIRA</td>
<td>MIGORI</td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA's misappropriation of funds</td>
<td>26.0 (19)</td>
<td>16.0 (12)</td>
<td>24.0 (17)</td>
<td>66.0 (48)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Withdrawal from active participation by most members of local community</td>
<td>6.0 (4)</td>
<td>8.0 (5)</td>
<td>2.0 (2)</td>
<td>16.0 (11)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Struggle for authority between PA and donors/hence frustration of each others effort</td>
<td>6.0 (4)</td>
<td>6.0 (4)</td>
<td>2.0 (2)</td>
<td>14.0 (10)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>4.0 (3)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>4.0 (3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>42.0 (30)</td>
<td>30.0 (21)</td>
<td>28.0 (21)</td>
<td>100 (72)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.7 shows that the fear of PA's misappropriation of funds is the highest ranked reason in all the districts at 66.0% for the reduced delivery of goods and services should PA take over the direct management of the projects run by the civil society. The other problem is the fear of struggle for authority between PA and the donors culminating into frustration for each other's efforts (14%). Another problem was the withdrawal by most members of the local community (16%). It appears the public's fear of the funds being misappropriated by the PA is much greater than all other reasons combined. This may explain why a large number of people have preferred the civil—society organizations projects to state-initiated ones. It is a leading issue in all the three districts.
Table 5.8: The Distribution Of Perceived Impacts Should PA Totally Withdraw Its Services From Civil Society Activities By District In Percentages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERCEIVED IMPACT</th>
<th>DISTRICT</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NAIROBI</td>
<td>NYAMIRA</td>
<td>MIGORI</td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Projects would collapse since it is through PA that both the security and local community participation is guaranteed</td>
<td>10.4 (8)</td>
<td>20.9 (15)</td>
<td>13.4 (9)</td>
<td>44.8 (32)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Projects would thrive more those who had withdrawn their participation due to political difference would now actively participate</td>
<td>13.4 (9)</td>
<td>9.0 (7)</td>
<td>16.4 (12)</td>
<td>38.8 (28)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No difference whatsoever since vigilante groups can be organized to take charge of security.</td>
<td>10.4 (8)</td>
<td>1.5 (1)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>11.9 (9)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>3.0 (2)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>1.5 (1)</td>
<td>4.5 (3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>37.3 (27)</td>
<td>31.3 (23)</td>
<td>31.3 (22)</td>
<td>100 (72)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.8 shows that 44.8% of the respondents stated that should PA totally withdraw its services from civil society activities, the projects would collapse since it is through PA that both the security and local community participation is guaranteed. Nyamira district alone KANU affiliates accounted for 26% of the responses. About 38.8% felt the projects would thrive best since more resourceful people who had withdrawn their participation due to political differences would then actively participate. In this category, Migori district had a score 16.4% response rate followed by Nairobi with 13.4% and Nyamira district last with 9.0%. Those feeling that there would be no difference whatsoever accounted for 11.9% of the responses with Nairobi district accounting for a disproportionate greater proportion 10.4% and nil for Migori.

We can conclude that the PA is considered an important actor in the sustainability of local development activities. The feeling is much stronger in Nyamira district, a KANU dominated
zone. This is consistent with our argument that the activity of PA is more appreciated in the ruling party dominated than opposition areas.

The fact that the activities of vigilante groups have been recognized, are an indication that domination of security provision by PA, is currently being challenged. This development is more pronounced in Nairobi, but negligible in other districts. This can be accounted for by the mushrooming of private security arrangements in Nairobi in the form of Community policing being supported by various Estates’ Associations.

5.3.2 THE LEVEL OF POPULAR PARTICIPATION IN DEVELOPMENT

This section examines the extent to which there is popular participation in the development of a given locality. It is recognized that popular participation can be activated, reactivated or even dwarfed depending on several interventions by development actors such as Provincial Administration, civil society, and political education. Popular participation can be gauged by the attendance of a public baraza and/or civil society activities. The attendance of a public baraza can also influence the participation in civil society activities. Table 5.9 shows the distribution of public attendance of civil society and public baraza forums by district.
Table 5.9: The Distribution Of Public Attendance Of Civil Society Forums And Public Barazas By District in percentages.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PUBLIC ATTENDANCE OF DEVELOPMENT FORUMS</th>
<th>DISTRICT</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NAIROBI</td>
<td>NYAMIRA</td>
<td>MIGORI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>38.2 (27)</td>
<td>29.6 (22)</td>
<td>32.2 (23)</td>
<td>100 (72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public barazas</td>
<td>6.0 (4)</td>
<td>9.0 (6)</td>
<td>8.5 (6)</td>
<td>23.6 (16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other development forums (civil society)</td>
<td>10.6 (8)</td>
<td>10.1 (7)</td>
<td>9.5 (7)</td>
<td>30.2 (22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public barazas but not civil society</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>1.5 (1)</td>
<td>1.5 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public barazas and civil society (other development forums)</td>
<td>5.5 (4)</td>
<td>9.0 (6)</td>
<td>8.0 (5)</td>
<td>22.6 (15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society but not barazas</td>
<td>5.0 (4)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0.5 (1)</td>
<td>5.5 (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not attend public barazas</td>
<td>7.0 (5)</td>
<td>0.5 (1)</td>
<td>1.5 (1)</td>
<td>9.0 (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not attend civil society forums</td>
<td>2.0 (1)</td>
<td>0.5 (1)</td>
<td>2.0 (1)</td>
<td>4.5 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not attend either civil society forums or public barazas</td>
<td>2.0 (1)</td>
<td>0.5 (1)</td>
<td>0.5 (1)</td>
<td>3.0 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>38.2 (27)</td>
<td>29.6 (22)</td>
<td>32.2 (23)</td>
<td>100 (72)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.9 shows that the civil society (POs and NGOs) is the highest attended development forum (30.2%) followed by public barazas (23.6%). Nine per cent (9.0%) of the respondents in all the three districts do not attend public barazas. Over (4.5%) do not attend civil society development forums. However, only 3.0% of the respondents neither attend public barazas nor civil society development forums. In all the three districts almost a similar proportion of those who attend civil society meetings also attend public barazas.

From the above statements, we can infer some form of relationships exist between the attendance of civil society forums and that of public barazas. It would seem that the level of
zone. This is consistent with our argument that the activity of PA is more appreciated in the ruling party dominated than opposition areas.

The fact that the activities of vigilante groups have been recognized, are an indication that domination of security provision by PA, is currently being challenged. This development is more pronounced in Nairobi, but negligible in other districts. This can be accounted for by the mushrooming of private security arrangements in Nairobi in the form of Community policing being supported by various Estates’ Associations.

5.3.2 THE LEVEL OF POPULAR PARTICIPATION IN DEVELOPMENT

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involvement of Provincial Administration influences the level of popular participation
(attendance of both public barazas and civil society forums).

5.3.3 THE DELIVERY OF DEVELOPMENT SERVICES
This section assesses the effectiveness of Provincial Administration in the delivery of
development services. It considers from the public point of view, the problems faced by PA,
the need for role review, and ways of reviewing PA's role in order to be more efficient in the
delivery of development services.

5.3.3.1 Problems hampering the effectiveness of Provincial Administration in
the development process

Each respondent was asked to state the main problem he/she thought hampered the effectiveness
of PA in the development process. The responses are summarized in Table 5.10. The raw
figures are presented in bracket against each percentage.

Table 5.10: The Distribution Of Main Problems Hampering The Effectiveness Of PA In
The Development Process By District in percentages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MAIN PROBLEMS</th>
<th>DISTRICT</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NAIROBI</td>
<td>NYAMIRA</td>
<td>MIGORI</td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shortage of capital</td>
<td>8.3 (6)</td>
<td>14.6 (10)</td>
<td>11.5 (8)</td>
<td>34.4 (24)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management problems i.e. incompetence,</td>
<td>19.8 (14)</td>
<td>10.4 (7)</td>
<td>13.5 (10)</td>
<td>43.8 (31)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>corruption</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stiff competition from other organizations</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>3.1 (2)</td>
<td>3.1 (2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non co-operation from local Community</td>
<td>4.2 (3)</td>
<td>1.0 (1)</td>
<td>9.4 (7)</td>
<td>14.6 (11)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>2.1 (2)</td>
<td>. . . .</td>
<td>1.0 (1)</td>
<td>1.0 (1)</td>
<td>4.2 (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>34.4 (25)</td>
<td>27.1 (19)</td>
<td>38.5 (28)</td>
<td>100 (72)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.10 shows that management problems i.e. incompetence, corruption, nepotism, is the leading problem (43.8%) hampering the effectiveness of PA in the development process followed by shortage of capital (34.4%) and non co-operation from the local community (14.6%). Competition from other service providers was recorded in Migori district only (3.1%). It appears that relationships amongst the development actors are either cordial or that of non-interference in each other’s agenda.

5.2.3.3 Ways of reviewing the role of Provincial Administration in the development process

The respondents who thought the role of PA in the development process should be reviewed, were again asked to state how they thought this could be done. The raw figures are presented in bracket against each percentage.

Table 5.11: How The Role Of PA In The Development Process Should Be Reviewed By District In Percentages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WAYS OF REVIEWING ROLE OF PA</th>
<th>DISTRICT</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NAIROBI</td>
<td>NYAMIRA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA to concentrate on the maintenance of security, law and order and leave development to NGOs and POs</td>
<td>15.9 (11)</td>
<td>17.5 (13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA to take &quot;overseer&quot; role (reporting authority) rather than being an equally interested participant in the development process</td>
<td>1.6 (1)</td>
<td>3.2 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA to be an equal partner whose role can be negotiated whenever it has interest just like any other actor in the development process</td>
<td>12.7 (9)</td>
<td>9.5 (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>7.9 (6)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>38.1 (27)</td>
<td>30.2 (22)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.11 shows that 58.7% of the respondents, the highest being in Migori, district (25.4%) compared to 15.9% for Nairobi and 17.5% for Nyamira district, felt that the role of PA in the development process should be reviewed such that PA concentrates on the maintenance of security, law and order. As discussed in Chapter Four, Migori has had the highest level of participative/interactive civil society than any of the other districts. It is therefore not strange to find a majority of them opting for the concentration of PA activities on security, unlike other districts. The same reason can be used to account for the low response (3.2%) in Migori compared to Nyamira (9.5%) and Nairobi 12.7% that PA be made an equal partner whose role can be negotiated whenever it has interest just like any other actor in the development process. Another reason for the low response for the equal partnership could be the fact that shortage of capital and management problems were seen as the greatest problems facing PA, yet so crucial for equal partnership. Finally, Nyamira's higher response (3.2%) than Nairobi's 1.6% and Migori' nil for PA's being the reporting authority in the development process appear consistent with our earlier argument that being a KANU zone, Nyamira still tolerates PA more than either of the districts. Members of the PA have more often than not, been identified with the ruling party, which they have defended at all functions. It therefore follows that wherever the ruling party commands support, PA would be, relatively more tolerated.
CHAPTER SIX

6.0 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 CONCLUSION

The study was an attempt to investigate the impact of the democratisation of the development process on the developmental role of Provincial Administration especially during the new era of political pluralism in Kenya. It observed that of late there has been a rapid proliferation of various development actors especially NGOs and CBOs at both the local and the national scene. All these actors besides PA have of necessity been competing for the relatively congested development space. The study was conducted within the framework of development theories specifically statism and public or political choice.

An attempt was made to put the PA in perspective by looking at its historical origins and development as an institution beginning 1896 when Kenya was declared a British East Africa Protectorate through 1920 when it became a British colony, and to 1963 when it became an independent state up to date. The main gist of the historical evolution discussion was to underscore the impact of the developmental and institutional metamorphosis of PA on its developmental role as an agent of the central government at the local level.

A further analysis was done on the development perspectives and planning in Kenya. The study looked at various conventional meanings of development. It also brought into perspective how the development approaches such as Top-Down and Bottom-Up have been applied as tools of development planning in Kenya. Above all, the study underscored the fact that Kenya appears to have been modelling its development approaches in line with the shifting world development themes spearheaded by both the World Bank and International
Monetary Fund (IMF) such as modernization in the 1960’s, Rural development in 1970’s,
Sustainable development in 1980s and early 1990s, Sustainable human development in which
the UNDP plays a lead role from mid 1990s and finally, comprehensive Development
Framework from late 1990s. Kenya, on each occasion responded to each programme by
developing a strategy that more or less addressed the world development themes. For
instance, it formulated Special Programme for Rural Development Programme (SRDP) to
address rural development in 1970s and District Focus for Rural Development (DFRD) from
1983. The study did not concern itself per se with the critical evaluation of how effective or
ineffective each of the programmes was but how each of them elicited different roles for PA
during the particular period under discussion. It emerged that PA and other development
actors have gone through engagement and reengagement processes under each of the
programmes to an extent that PA and civil society organizations today recognizes each
others role and the inevitability of mutual cooperation in the development process.

The interplay amongst PA, CBOs and NGOs in the local development process based on
primary data obtained from three districts in Kenya, namely, Nairobi, Nyamira and Migori
was presented in chapters four and five where the relationships between PA and civil Society,
and PA and Popular Participation were discussed.

6.1.0 FINDINGS

The findings are considered based on the objectives of our study, which were: First, to
investigate the nature of the relationship between the civil society (NGOs and POs) as new
actors of the development process, and the Provincial Administration. Second, to examine the
current development tasks of Provincial Administration. Thirdly, to examine the impact of the
democratization of the development process on PA with specific reference to the development activities of a given locality, and fourth, to investigate the impact of the emergence of the new actors (NGOs and POs) in the development space on popular participation.

6.1.1 THE IMPACT OF THE DEMOCRATISATION PROCESS ON THE PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION

The operational hypothesis used was that the democratization of the development process has significantly reduced the necessity of Provincial Administration in the development activities. The hypotheses was measured on the basis of the existence of various forms of civil society, the public attendance of various development forums, and the role of PA in the activities of POs and NGOs. The study found that there is civil society participation in the form of CBOs, churches, welfare organizations and NGOs in all the three districts, Migori, Nyamira and Nairobi in various proportions with highest concentration being in Migori followed by Nyamira and finally Nairobi.

It also emerged that public barazas, a proxy for both public and PA’s attendance in development forums, were very important, the second most ever attended development forum after the attendance of CBOs’ activities. It was also clear that the number of civil society organizations (democratization) in a locality is directly influenced by the involvement of PA in the development activities of the area. In other words, the increased democratization process increases the need for Provincial Administration in development activities especially in terms provision of security, coordination, and mobilization of the local population.

Our hypothesis that democratization of the development process has significantly reduced the necessity of PA in the development activities is therefore, not upheld.
6.1.2 CURRENT DEVELOPMENT TASKS OF THE PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION

It was hypothesized that the Provincial Administration influences the effectiveness of civil society in its development agenda. The above hypothesis was measured through the roles PA played in the activities of the civil society. It emerged that the major roles of the PA are basically the three traditional ones, viz, provision of security, advisory task and mobilization of the local population, which took the greatest proportion of all the roles of PA in the POs and NGOs activities in all the three districts. It was also found that co-ordination of various activities in the locality, liaison with the governmental organs on behalf of the POs and NGOs, and management in some local CBOs projects are crucial to operations of most of the POs and NGOs especially in Nyamira and Migori districts. Some NGOs especially the World Vision in Migori district organized their own security (communal) although the local chief continued to mobilize popular participation for their projects voluntarily. Our hypothesis, in this case, is partially confirmed.

6.1.3 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POPULAR PARTICIPATION AND PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION

We hypothesized that the level of involvement of Provincial Administration is indirectly proportional to the level of popular participation in the development activities. This hypothesis was measured through the attendance or non-attendance of public baraza for PA and civil society development forums. It was found that there is more popular involvement in development forums in rural (Migori and Nyamira) districts, which also happen to have a higher involvement of Provincial Administration through public barazas than the urban (Nairobi) district. It emerged that the district with the highest public baraza attendance (Nyamira) also had the highest popular participation. The same applied to the district with the least public attendance of baraza (Nairobi). It was established that the level of involvement of
Provincial Administration influences the level of popular participation in the development activities.

6.1.4 THE IMPACT OF THE PARTICIPATION OF NEW ACTORS (CIVIL SOCIETY) IN THE DEVELOPMENT SPACE

It was hypothesized that the level of involvement of the civil society in the development activities is directly proportional to the level of popular participation in the development process. The hypothesis was measured on the basis of attendance of NGOs and POs (Civil Society) forums, and the attendance of both civil society forums and public barazas. It emerged that in both Migori and Nyamira (rural) districts, all those who attend civil society meetings also attend public barazas while in Nairobi 5.0% of the population attend civil society but not public barazas. In Nyamira district (KANU zone) all those who attend public barazas also attend civil society forums while in Migori and Nairobi (opposition zone) only 1.5% and nil, respectively of the respondents attend public barazas only but not civil society development forums. There was therefore evidence that the level of involvement of civil society in development activities is directly proportional to the level of popular participation in the development process. However the rate and level of impact can be affected by such interventions as political party affiliation and the level of involvement of Provincial Administration. Our operational hypothesis is therefore, partially confirmed implying that the emergence of new actors (NGOs and POs) in the development space have increased the level of popular participation.
6.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

On the basis of our findings the following recommendations are formulated to both policy makers and to academic researchers.

6.2.1 TO ACADEMIC RESEARCHERS

The recommendations to researchers include some of the tasks that this study did not explore exhaustively, especially regarding the issues of security, advisory and mobilization roles of the Provincial Administration, and the impact of political parties on popular participation.

The study found out the Provincial Administration still plays a crucial role in the provision of security especially in rural areas. It also emerged that some groups do supplement security arrangements in Nairobi. It was not within the scope of this study to compare the quality of security provisions by various organizations. The rural population also appeared to have had no substitute to PA despite the existence of vigilante groups in some areas. This study therefore recommends a further research on the impact of liberalization of security arrangements on the role of Provincial Administration.

The study did not also conclusively establish the impact of the emergence of the civil society in the development space on popular participation. It was clear that the level of civil society participation in development varies proportionally with the level of popular participation to some extent implying that the rate of proportionality of the relationships differs from one area to another, and that the civil society does not operate alone. This study therefore recommends a further study on the impact of political parties on popular participation.
6.2.2 TO POLICY MAKERS

The study offers three recommendations to policy makers.

First, since management problems i.e. incompetence, corruption emerged as the highest ranked problems hampering the effectiveness of PA, and it appears to be having even an increasingly bigger role in the development process during the multi-party era, the policy makers should consider training and re-training of members of the Provincial Administration so as to make them more professional. In particular they should strive to move from their traditional, authoritative and dictatorial tendencies to a community friendly character, in which the administrators would be playing the role of facilitators, public educators and mobilisers.

Secondly, since CBOs appear to have become the most pervasive development actor, and PA still the unchallenged security provider, the policy makers should consider integrating some of the PA roles into the community based organizations. PA should provide their services readily, and any decision on any activity affecting the locality should involve all the stakeholders in the development process i.e. local security committees.

Finally, due to the disparities in the development activities in the different areas i.e. over-concentration of NGOs activities in some areas apparently at the expense of others, the government should consider instituting a local regulatory or coordinating body that involves all the stakeholders and which not only oversees but also reviews the activities of all development actors. The decision should be seen to be coming from the stakeholders and not from external source particularly Provincial Administration. In other words, the development of a given area should be undertaken according to the local needs, provided it does not contravene the country’s development priorities or policies. Each community may adopt a different pattern of policies depending on their local needs.
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Nairobi, November 8, 1999.

Nairobi, April 25, 1999


APPENDIX

QUESTIONNAIRE

Please encircle the letter that corresponds to your answer, and where applicable, give a brief specification.

PERSONAL DETAILS

1. NAME

2. AGE BRACKET
   (a) 18 - 30 years
   (b) 31 - 43 years
   (c) 44 - 56 years
   (d) 57 and above

3. SEX
   (a) Male
   (b) Female

4. RELIGION
   (a) Christian
   (b) Muslim
   (c) Others
      Specify ......................................................

5. MARITAL STATUS
   (a) Single
   (b) Married

6. MAIN OCCUPATION
   (a) Farmer
   (b) Fisherman
   (c) Business person
   (d) Civil servant
   (e) Others... specify ..........................................

7. SUB-LOCATION ..................................................

8. LOCATION ......................................................

9. DIVISION
   (a) Westlands
   (b) Kibera/Langata
10. DISTRICT

(a) Nairobi  (b) Nyamira  (c) Migori

11. HIGHEST EDUCATIONAL LEVEL

(a) Primary  (b) 'O' Level  (c) 'A' Level
(d) Diploma  (e) University

12. POLITICAL PARTY AFFILIATION

(a) KANU  (b) DP  (c) KSC
(d) NDP  (e) FORD-K  (f) SDP
(g) Others. Specify

13. How frequent do you attend your local chief's baraza?

(a) Once every week
(b) Once after two weeks
(c) Once in a month
(d) Do not attend
(e) Others
   Specify

14. What has been the main agenda discussed during the last two "barazas" you attended?

(a) A visit by a senior member of Provincial Administration i.e. D.O/D.C. to the area
(b) The worsening of the local infrastructure
(c) The worrying security operations in the area
(d) The conduct of "harambee" in the area
(e) Assistance to the needy bright children from poor families.
(f) The falling educational standards in the area.
(g) The problems of co-operative movement.
(h) Agricultural extension services.
(i) Others
   Specify
15. Below are some of the problems associated with the conduct of most barazas. In your opinion which one is/are the most problematic in your case? (NB. if necessary, you may give more than one choice).
(a) The Chief is very arrogant and does not allow opponents ample time to air their views.
(b) Those who express anti-government statements are victimised for harassment.
(c) There is a lot of nepotism i.e. clannism
(d) There is no free discussion since the Chief instead of seeking from the public, only states what is going to be done.
(e) Ignorance on the part of the public
(f) Others
Specify

16. What suggestions would you offer for solving the problem(s) stated in No. 15.
(a) Report to the higher authorities
(b) Stop going to barazas all together
(c) Nothing
(d) Others
Specify

17. Besides the chiefs bara, do you have other forums where you participate in the discussion of development projects affecting you?
(a) Yes (b) No

18. If your answer to no.17 is YES, please list any three (3) such forums.
(a)
(b)
(c)

19. In what ways has the Provincial Administration (Chief) addressed the development programmes ever discussed at the barazas?
(a) Has conducted a door to door awareness campaign
(b) Has invited senior government officials and technical experts i.e. agricultural extension officers to do field demonstrations.
(c) Has encouraged the local people to pull up their resources together i.e harambee
(d) Has encouraged the locals to form their own local groupings i.e. youth, men and women groups, clan associations
(e) Has sought the involvement of the church and other Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs)
(f) Sent out agents i.e. headmen and Administration Police to force people to contribute
(g) Has urged the public to join the ruling party en mass so that the government could extend to them more services.
(h) Encouraged the formation of a locational bursary scheme, with the help of influential individuals.
(i) All of the above
20. Have the strategies mentioned in No.19 been successful in improving the delivery of the services by Provincial Administration?

(a) Yes   (b) No

21. If your answer to question 20 is No, what are people doing about the poor service delivery?

(a) Ignore Provincial Administration and start up their own local self-help groups
(b) Request assistance from the churches and other NGOs
(c) Sit down and hope that Provincial Administration would improve its services.
(d) Do both a + b
(e) Others

Specify .................................................................

C DEMOCRATISATION OF THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

22. Which projects that used to be dominated by state actors (Provincial Administration) are currently almost completely taken over by non-state actors i.e. NGOs and POs, in your location? (NB you may give more than one answer if necessary)

(a) Revival of co-operative societies
(b) Security
(c) Bursary scheme
(d) Community health services
(e) Construction of schools
(f) Others

Specify .................................................................

23. From no. 22, what do you think is the main reason for the Provincial Administration declining role?

(a) Negligence on the part of the Provincial Administration
(b) Lack of co-operation from the local community
(c) Theft of the assets
(d) Corruption and misappropriation of funds
(e) Shortage of capital
(f) Others

Specify .................................................................

24. Who or which organization has of late been playing on increasingly dominant role in either initiating or reviving stalled development projects in your location?

(a) Local community
25. From your observation, are members of the public happy with the performance of the non-state actors i.e NGOs, POs? (NGO - Non governmental Organizations, PO - People’s Organization)

(a) Yes    (b) No

26. In your view, what has been the main problem responsible for most non-state actors’ (in development) non-performance to expectations in your location?

(a) They are corrupt
(b) They are competing Provincial Administration
(c) Some of them i.e. NGOs are foreigners to the locals
(d) They are not co-operative with the locals
(e) Others
Specify .....................................................................................

27. What particular attribute of the non-state actors benefit the public most?

(a) Their efficiency and accountability
(b) Their co-operation with the local community
(c) Their persuasive methods of mobilisation of the public.
(d) Their availability of capital
(e) Others
Specify .....................................................................................

28. Is there likely to be a reduction in the delivery of services and goods if the activities of the NGOs and POs i.e. self-help projects, harambee, were to be put under direct management of local Provincial Administration?

(a) Yes    (b) No

29. If your answer to no. 28 is “YES”, why should there be a reduction in the delivery of services and goods?

(a) The Provincial Administration would misappropriate the funds.
(b) Most members of the local community would either withdraw or reduce their active participation in the projects.
There is likely to be a struggle for authority between the donors and Provincial Administration, culminating into either party frustrating each other's efforts.

Others
Specify ...

30. If your answer to no. 28 is “NO”, what is the reason for your answer?

(a) The Provincial Administration can still force the local community to participate in the projects.

(b) The NGOs and POs would feel more comfortable working with Provincial Administration due to guaranteed security.

(c) It does not matter to the local community who or which organization is in charge of the management of the projects.

(d) Others
Specify ...

31. What is most likely to happen should the Provincial Administration totally withdraw its participation in all the NGOs and POs projects?

(a) The projects would collapse because it is only through the Provincial Administration that both the security and local community's participation is guaranteed.

(b) The projects would thrive more because more resourceful people who had probably withdrawn their participation due to political differences with Provincial Administration would now actively participate.

(c) There would be no difference whatsoever since vigilante groups can be organized to take charge of security.

(d) Others
Specify ...

D RELATIONSHIP AMONGST ACTORS IN DEVELOPMENT (Key Informants Only)

32. Have you ever witnessed any joint undertaking of projects/activities by any two or more of the various organizations in your location/division/district

(a) Yes
(b) No
33. From No.32, where are these joint ventures commonly witnessed?

34. What stake does the Provincial Administration have in the relationship amongst these non-state actors?

35. Please briefly explain the effect of the influx of non-state development actors (NGOs, POs) on the development in your location/division/district, in as far as delivery of goods and services is concerned.

36. In your opinion, how best can the performance of the NGOs and POs be enhanced?

E OVERVIEW

37. What is your overall observation of the performance of the People's Organizations i.e. self-help projects, women groups, in so far as delivery of goods and services is concerned?

(a) Excellent  
(b) V. Good  
(c) Fair  
(d) Poor  
(e) Very poor

38. What is your overall assessment of the performance of NGOs i.e. world vision, International Christian Aid etc. in the delivery of goods and services in your location?

(a) Excellent  
(b) V. Good  
(c) Fair  
(d) Poor  
(e) Very poor

39. What is the main problem affecting the People's Organizations (POs)?

(a) Financial shortage
40. What is the main problem facing the NGOs in your location?

(a) Financial shortage
(b) Management problems i.e. incompetence, corruption, non-accountability
(c) Frustration from Provincial Administration
(d) Non-co-operation from the local community
(e) Others
Specify .................................................................................................

41. Please state the main problem, which you think, hampers the effectiveness of Provincial Administration in the development process

(a) Shortage of capital
(b) Management problems i.e. incompetence, corruption and non-accountability
(c) Stiff competition from other organizations
(d) Non-co-operation from the local community
(e) Others
Specify .................................................................................................

42. Do you think the role of Provincial Administration in the development process should be reviewed?

(a) Yes (b) No

43. From No. 42, in what ways should the role of Provincial Administration in the development process be reviewed?

(a) Provincial Administration should concentrate on the maintenance of security, law and order only and leave development to NGOs and POs.

(b) Provincial Administration should just take the "overseers" (reporting authority) role rather than being an equally interested participant in the development process.

(c) Provincial Administration should be made an equal partner whose role can be negotiated whenever it has interest just like any other actor in the development process

(d) Others
Specify .................................................................................................

Thank you very much for your co-operation. Good luck

Okeyo, J. O