The challenges encountered by government to re-integrate the UPDF veterans of Kisoro District into civilian life
Moses Bukenya Seguya

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The Challenges Encountered by Government to Re-Integrate the UPDF Veterans of Kisoro District into Civilian Life

2000
THE CHALLENGES ENCOUNTERED BY GOVERNMENT TO RE-INTEGRATE THE UPDF VETERANS OF KISORO DISTRICT INTO CIVILIAN LIFE

BY

SEGUYA MOSES BUKENYA

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN SOCIAL SECTOR PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT OF MAKERERE UNIVERSITY

FEBRUARY 2000
DECLARATION

I, Seguya Moses Bukenya, declare that this is my original work and has never been submitted to any university for the award of a degree or any other award.

Signed: ________________________
Seguya Moses Bukenya

Date: FEBRUARY 12, 2000

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   Date: FEBRUARY 14, 2000
DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my late mother, Margret Nayiga who unfortunately has not lived to enjoy the fruits of her sweat; my late dear friend Stella Maris Kwera and to all the UPDF veterans of Kisoro District.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Writing a book has never been a solo effort and this has been the case for myself.

I wish to express my sincere thanks to all the lecturers of Makerere University who interacted with me on this course and whose guidance provided a foundation for this work. I am specifically indebted to my Supervisors Messrs. Frank Kakinda Mbaaga and Narathius Asiingwire for having accepted to guide a novice like me in the field of research. Your patience and unreserved technical input has been noted with much appreciation.

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I also extend my gratitude to all the respondents who availed to me the data I required upon which this thesis has been finally compiled.

Special mention goes to the Austrian Scholarship Programme and Kisoro District Administration whose financial assistance enabled
me to undertake this course. Surely, you have added value to my professionalism. Thank you very much.

Perhaps I could not have undertaken this course had it not been for the wise advise of my friend Stella Maris Kwera, who unfortunately passed away while I was still undertaking the course. Your encouragement has gone deep into my heart and will always linger in my mind. May the Lord rest your soul in eternal peace.

Tribute is also paid to my brothers; Dan, David, Willy, sisters; Rhoda, Becca, Justine, Florence, friends; John Tereraho, Abel Nsimbananiye, Diana Nyago, Dribiri Elson, Josephine Watulo, Margaret Meke and Richard Mugera for all the support you rendered to me during the course.

To Grace Kawooya, the excellent skills you displayed while typing this work are highly appreciated.

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Lastly but most important, glory be to God for having steered me through this course.

Seguya Moses Bukenya
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contents</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Declaration</td>
<td>(ii)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dedication</td>
<td>(iii)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgement</td>
<td>(iv)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table of Contents</td>
<td>(vi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of acronyms</td>
<td>(x)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Appendices</td>
<td>(xii)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of figures and tables</td>
<td>(xiii)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definition of operational terms</td>
<td>(xiv)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>(xvi)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## CHAPTER ONE

**Introduction** .................................................... 1

1.1 Introduction............................................ 1

1.2 Background to the study ......................... 1

1.3 Statement of the problem ....................... 10

1.4 Objectives of the study .......................... 11

1.4.1 General Objectives................................. 11

1.4.2 Specific Objectives............................... 11

1.5 Research issues ...................................... 12

1.6 Significance of the study ....................... 13
1.7 Scope of the study .............................................. 13
1.8 Conceptual Framework ........................................ 15

CHAPTER TWO

Literature Review .................................................. 17

2.1 Introduction .................................................... 17
2.2 Accessing land to veterans .................................... 18
2.2.1 Resettlement of Landless veterans ....................... 18
2.3 Provision of locally marketable skills to the Veterans .... 21
2.3.1 Education/vocation training of veterans ............... 21
2.4 Support to the chronically sick and disabled Veterans ... 25
2.4.1 Health care for the chronically sick veterans ......... 25
2.4.2 Financial assistance to the disabled veterans ......... 27
2.5 Economic empowerment of veterans ....................... 29
2.5.1 Accessing finance and income generating projects to veterans ........................................ 29
2.5.2 Accessing employment opportunities to veterans .... 33
2.6 Counteracting community stigmatisation of the Veterans ..................................................... 34
2.6.1 Public Relations Programmes .............................. 34
CHAPTER THREE

Methodology........................................................................ 36

3.1 Introduction ................................................................... 36

3.2 Area of the study ......................................................... 36

3.3 Population of the study ................................................. 38

3.4 Research design .......................................................... 38

3.5 Sample size and sample selection ................................. 39

3.5.1 Sample size........................................................... 39

3.5.2 Sample selection....................................................... 40

3.6 Data collection techniques ............................................. 43

3.6.1 Methods .................................................................. 43

3.6.2 Instruments .......................................................... 44

3.7 Research Procedure...................................................... 44

3.8 Data analysis and interpretation ..................................... 47

3.9 Limitations of the study and solutions ......................... 48

CHAPTER FOUR

Findings and Interpretations .......................................... 50

4.1 Introduction ................................................................... 50

4.2 Accessing land to veterans ......................................... 51

4.2.1 Resettlement of landless veterans.............................. 51

4.3 Provision of locally marketable skills to veterans .......... 56

4.3.1 Education/vocational training of veterans............... 56

4.4 Support to the chronically sick and disabled veterans 66
### ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACFODE</td>
<td>Action for Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAO</td>
<td>Chief Administrative officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community Based Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>District Administrator (the former title of the current Resident District Commissioners' RDCs).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDHS</td>
<td>District Director of Health Services (the new title for the former District Medical Officers).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DES</td>
<td>District Executive Secretary (the former title for the current Chief Administrative Officers CAOs).</td>
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<tr>
<td>DISO</td>
<td>District Internal Security Officer.</td>
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<tr>
<td>DMO</td>
<td>District Medical officer (the former title for the current District Directors of Health Services)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DVAC</td>
<td>District Veterans Advisory Committee</td>
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<td>DVPO</td>
<td>District Veterans Programme Officer.</td>
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<td>DVR</td>
<td>District Veterans Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECS</td>
<td>“Entandikwa” Credit Scheme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Development Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGD</td>
<td>Focus Group Discussion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGDs</td>
<td>Focus Group Discussions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDDP</td>
<td>Kisoro District Development Plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDLG</td>
<td>Kisoro District Local Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDVAC</td>
<td>Kisoro District Veterans Advisory Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEO</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOS</td>
<td>Non Government Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRA</td>
<td>National Resistance Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRM</td>
<td>National Resistance Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAP</td>
<td>Poverty Alleviation Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDC</td>
<td>Resident District Commissioner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIPM</td>
<td>Re-integration Programme Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPDF</td>
<td>Uganda Peoples' Defence Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ushs</td>
<td>Uganda Shillings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UVAB</td>
<td>Uganda Veterans Assistance Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UVAP</td>
<td>Uganda Veteran Assistance programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAP</td>
<td>Veterans Assistance Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VOCA</td>
<td>Volunteers in Overseas Co-operative Assistance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>A</strong>- Recurrent expenditure for selected ministries in Uganda for the financial years 1986/87 to 1990/91</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B</strong>- Development expenditure for selected Ministries in Uganda for the financial years 1986/87 to 1990/91</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C</strong>- Map of Uganda showing area of study</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>D</strong>- Interview guide for government officials</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>E</strong>- Interview guide for 25 veterans of various army ranks</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>F</strong>- Focus Group Discussion guide for veterans</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>G</strong>- Focus Group Discussion guide for civilians</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H</strong>- Criteria for identifying individuals as Beneficiaries to benefit from PAP</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>I</strong>- Criteria for selection of individuals within groups, co-operative societies and CBOs to benefit from PAP</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Conceptual Framework</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Tables

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Respondents selected and their categories...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Allocation of funds received by veterans after Demobilisation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
DEFINITION OF OPERATIONAL TERMS

(i) **Challenges**

Challenges refers to "a situation of being faced with something needing great mental or physical effort in order to be done successfully."


(ii) **Re-integration**

In this study, re-integration will refer to the state in which a veteran and his or her family have established a viable economic base for themselves and can afford to earn a living independent of outside financial resources at least commensurate with the conditions in their localities, have learnt how to live in the new community and have been fully accepted in their new community by its members (socially) and leaders (politically).

(iii) **A veteran** is that person who ceased to be a member of the National Army (UPDF formerly, NRA) as result of the reduction in force of the National Army. (UVAB Statute: 1992).
(iv) **Demobilisation**

This is the release of (someone) or one or to be released from the armed forces especially at the end of the war. (Cambridge International Dictionary; 1995).

(v) **“Kadogo”**

Is a Swahili word, literally meaning a small, short person. In this study it refers to persons who joined and served in the National Resistance Army (now UPDF) before they were eighteen years of age.

(vi) **Disabled veterans** – In this study it refers to those veterans who got injured in one way or another while in active service in the N.R.A. (now UPDF) and whose prospects of engaging in gainful economic activity were substantially reduced as result of duly recognised physical impairment resulting from the injuries they sustained.
ABSTRACT

This study focused on the challenges faced by government in the re-integration of the UPDF veterans of Kisoro District into civilian life. The study utilised a predominantly qualitative design and therefore all the 134 respondents were purposively selected. Government (KDVAC and UVAB) officials and veterans were the primary respondents; local district officials and civilians were the key informants. FGDs and in-depth interviews were the techniques used to collect data. Thematic and content analysis were used to manage the data.

The study findings revealed that government put up measures to ensure that the veterans of Kisoro District smoothly get re-integrated into civilian life. These measures included a resettlement programme for the landless veterans, an educational/vocational training programme to enable the veterans acquire locally marketable skills, a health care fund for the chronically sick veterans and financial assistance to the disabled veterans to improve on their health status and assist them set up income generating projects, assisting the veterans to acquire finance and thus engage in income generating projects and self-employment and counteracting community stigmatisation of the veterans through various public relations programmes. However,
most of the measures that government put in place were constrained by several factors such as shortage of funds to resettle the landless veterans, inadequate funds for the educational/vocational training programme to train all the eligible veterans, lack of tools for the veterans, inadequate training periods to enable the veterans acquire sufficient skills to compete in the labour market, inappropriate training in disciplines that are already saturated on the labour market and insufficient funds to finance the health care programme.

The study makes the following recommendations; decentralisation of the resettlement programme to districts; the disabled veterans should be incorporated into the Community Based Rehabilitation programmes of the NGOs in the district; the funding for the health care fund be increased given the high costs of treating the chronically sick veterans; pension and gratuity promised to the veterans should be promptly paid and thereafter the veterans should be given training in business management skills. As for the veterans who are trainable and wish to acquire formal employment government should facilitate them for further training to enable them compete favourably on the labour market. For future educational/vocational training programmes a training needs assessment for all the veterans should be carried out.
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction
This Chapter presents the general background to the study from the global to the Ugandan context, and the background to the problem which generated the researcher's interest to undertake the study. Further, a statement of the problem, objectives of study, research issues, significance of the study, scope of the study and the conceptual framework are presented.

1.2 Background to the Study
The Army Veterans Phenomenon in the Global Context
The phenomenon of army veterans is a global and an old one. Worldover, several countries and states have carried out reductions in their armies hence creating the phenomenon of army veterans. The Bonn International Centre for Conversion (1996) on global disarmament, demilitarization and demobilisation points out that several army demobilisations have taken place in several countries of Africa, Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, the United States, Spain and also among the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). The survey further reveals that the Czech Republic had plans of reducing its army from 93,333, to 65,000 by the end of 1995. Other countries that
were conducting or preparing for demobilisation cited by the survey include South Africa, Angola, Zimbabwe and Liberia.

Kingma (1995) points out that in Somaliland efforts have been taken to start disarming and eventually demobilise the militia. The Monitor Newspaper of 10th December, 1998 also revealed that the Republic of Rwanda under its phase I army demobilisation had so far laid off 5,000 soldiers in 1998, and still in 1998 more 3,639 were to be laid off in phase II of its four year demobilisation programme.

The Army Veterans Phenomenon in the Ugandan Context

In Uganda, the phenomenon of army veterans can be traced as far back as 1900. Mbaguta (1996) notes that in 1900 the then Commissioner for the Uganda Protectorate established what became to be known as Sir Harry Johnstone's armed forces constabulary in Kampala. This constabulary was made from demobilised ex-Nubian mutineers and a mixture of military and paracivilian personnel. According to the Uganda Protectorate Civil Re-absorption Progress Report (1947) some Ugandans were recruited by the colonial government to fight alongside the British troops during the Second World War (1939 – 45) in several parts of the world. At the end of the war, they were demobilised and made to return to their homes.
In the post-colonial period (1990s), the idea of army demobilisation and consequently army veterans re-surfaced in Uganda. Tumwine (1995) notes that Uganda has for the greater part of its post-independence period suffered as a result of chronic civil conflicts. He states that between October 1962 to January 1986 Uganda had eight regimes, coming and going through the use of the gun. He further asserts that in a bid to have a firm grip on power, each regime recruited into the forces its "trusted" soldiers. As such, every new regime was accompanied by increases in the army. The climax of these increments in numbers hit the peak after 1986 when the National Resistance Movement (NRM) with its military wing the National Resistance Army (NRA) took over power after overthrowing the Tito Okello Lutwa Military junta.

A UVAB Final Monitoring and Evaluation Report (1993:1) on the Uganda Veterans Assistance Board states;

At the time NRA captured the capital city its strength was estimated at less that 15,000 officers and men. However the size of the army increased rapidly to an estimated 80,000 officers and men by 1992.

Kazoora (1997), Tumwine (1995) and the UVAB Final Monitoring and Evaluation Report (1993) on the Uganda Veterans Assistance Board reveal that the rapid increase in the size of the NRA was
due to the outbreak of a large scale rebellion in the North and North Eastern parts of the country in 1987, the need to integrate the military wings of the various political organisations that had been fighting the Obote II Government, the need for the army to participate in the maintenance of law and order and the need for ensuring general internal security, especially to contain the Karamojong cattle rustlers in the North and North Eastern parts of the country. This rapid build up of the army had its own price. Defence consumed a significant proportion of the national budgetary resources in comparison to other services as shown by tables in appendices A and B.

The tables reveal that defence consumed between 28 and 37 percent of recurrent expenditure between 1986/87 and 1990/91 contrasting heavily with expenditures on directly productive, tertiary and social services. Similarly, Defence consumed between 18 and 38 percent of the development budget.

A UVAB Final Monitoring and Evaluation Report (1993) on The Uganda Veterans Assistance Board noted that overtime, the NRA successfully contained the security situation in the country and restored relative peace and security that had been unknown in the country for over two decades. The report adds that with the continuing progress towards peace and stability it became
necessary to reduce the number of military personnel as the then strength of the army was no longer necessary and it was a heavy burden on the national budget. Moreover, as Kazoora (1997) notes, many men and women who had joined the NRA had not done so in execution of a professional military career but rather to fight oppression, misrule and other forms of mismanagement that existed then and on accomplishing this mission many combatants saw no reasons for staying in the army which tendency manifested itself in "self demobilisations" (desertions). Kafanka (1989) reveals that some "Kadogo" combatants just joined while seeking asylum in the NRA guerilla ranks while others were simply helpless. Kyeirembo (1998) says that some "Kadogos" had had their parents and families killed in the NRA bush war while others were simply destitute having been cut off from their families, hence inevitably joining the NRA guerilla ranks.

At the same time, the huge Ugandan military expenditure had acquired international dimensions. Kazoora (1997) holds that the donor community saw the high Ugandan military expenditure at the expense of social and economic programmes as in itself a source of instability. Langseth (1996) and Colleta (1995) state that a nations or country's armed forces play a central role in providing secure conditions under which development can occur, at the
same time however the military sector can also severely constrain development by absorbing too many resources, it may prevent the growth of a responsible; accountable government and its tendency to emphasize conflict over compromise may destabilise internal economic forces.

In 1987, the NRM government embraced the structural adjustment programme of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as a way of addressing the then worsening economic performance of the country. Museveni (1987) and Kiyonga (1987) under the pressure from IMF and World Bank announced new economic policies and among them was the re-affirmation of the significant roles to be played by the private sector. There was therefore, strong pressure from the IMF and World Bank to reduce expenditure on the public enterprises and the NRA was no exception. Colleta et al (1996:220) confirm this when they state:
Donors and government alike were concerned about the heavy burden that the defense expenditure exerted on scarce government resources... In 1991, following a World Bank Public Expenditure Review, the government's attention was called to the fact that in ordinate defense expenditures were seriously crowding out other sectoral development efforts, particularly in education and health. Finally in December 1991, the President of Uganda, in Consonance with the Financial and Economic Sector Adjustment Program, approached the Bank for technical and financial leadership in demobilising about 50 per cent of the NRA.

It is against these macro-economic pressures that the government of Uganda launched the NRA soldiers demobilisation scheme as part of a wider scheme of reducing the size of the public service commonly known as retrenchment.

Government through an Act of Parliament (statute No. 18 of 1992) established the Uganda Veterans Assistance Board (UVAB) that was charged with carrying out the demobilisation and implementing the Uganda Veterans Assistance Program (UVAP). Government approached the World Bank and other donors for assistance. Their response was favourable and UVAB started its phase I demobilisation of 36,358 NRA soldiers in December 1992. Out of the 36,358 veterans that were demobilised 215 of them were from Kisoro District (UVAB Data Unit; 1998).
Colleta et al (1996) reveals that 22,903 veterans had been demobilised by the end of phase I of the demobilisation programme in July 1993. A Final UVAB Monitoring and Evaluation Report (1993) on the Uganda Veterans Assistance Board points out that of those veterans 53% were in the age bracket of 20 – 35 years, 1% were below 20 years of age, 35% had primary level education 18.7% had secondary education, 1% had post secondary education and only 0.2% had university education. Only 2.9% had acquired skills (other than military skills) during their military service.

Colleta et al (1996) further reveals that one-third out of the 9,308 veterans who were demobilised in 1994 under phase II were estimated to be under eighteen years of age in 1986 when the NRA (now UPDF) now took over power in Uganda. Only slightly more than a quarter of phase II veterans have secondary or higher education, 12% had no formal education, approximately 50% finished primary school, only 13% possess skills in mechanics, metal work, wood work and tailoring, only 34% of phase II veterans possessed cash cropping skills, only 50% knew how to undertake subsistence farming and not more than 4% were familiar with cattle raising.
Figures from UVAB Data Unit (1998) show that 9,376 (26%) of the entire 36,358 veterans were discharged on medical grounds while 3,583 (10%) were discharged due to old age.

A UVAB Final Monitoring and Evaluation Report (1993) on the Uganda Veterans Assistance Board points out that only 5.6% of Phase I veterans had skills such as masonry, handicrafts, and fishing prior to joining the army and that most of them were from a peasantry background. Colleta, et al (1996) further points out that almost 31% of phase II veterans had not had home contact since 1991 yet another 22% had visited home only once.

The above statistics reveal that the majority of the veterans are young and consequently with little or no experience at all in civilian life, a substantial number is illiterate with little to no education at all and limited marketable skills; a significant number is old and sick, a substantial number cannot engage in personal income generating projects and many of them are not even familiar with subsistence farming. Worse still many of them had even lost touch with their families.

Recognising the plight of the veterans, the Uganda government adopted a deliberate affirmative policy of commitment to ensure the re-integration of her veterans into civilian life (Mondo; 1997).
Consequently, a UVAB veterans Re-integration Action Plan (1998) was drawn up. Given the aforementioned appalling socio-economic characteristics of the veterans, the researcher assumed that government is encountering a number of challenges as it struggles to re-integrate the veterans into civilian life. It is against this background that this study was conceived, designed and undertaken to unearth these challenges.

1.3 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The study focuses on the challenges of government to re-integrate the UPDF veterans of Kisoro District into civilian life. Empirical indicators of re-integration among others include owning assets such as land, possession of locally marketable skills, securing employment, establishing a viable economic base for oneself and family, being elected to a position of leadership and ability to maintain oneself in good health.

It, however, appears that since 1992 when the government started the demobilisation of the UPDF soldiers it has been and is still facing daunting challenges in its efforts to re-integrate the veterans into civilian life. These challenges could range from lack of adequate land, marketable skills, employment and income generating projects by the veterans; support to the chronically sick and disabled veterans and counteracting community
stigmatisation of the veterans. However, these are mere theoretical assumptions as no study has been empirically carried out to establish these challenges. It is on this basis that this study was undertaken to fill this knowledge gap.

1.4 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

1.4.1 General Objective

The overall objective of the study is to establish the challenges encountered by government in the re-integration of the veterans of Kisoro District into civilian life.

1.4.2 Specific Objectives

The study seeks;

1. To find out what government has done to provide land to the landless veterans.

2. To establish what government has done to equip the veterans with locally marketable skills through education and vocational training.

3. To assess the assistance that government has extended to the chronically sick and disabled veterans.

4. To find out the efforts of government in accessing finance, income generating projects and employment opportunities to veterans.
5. To establish what Government has done to counteract community stigmatisation of the veterans.

6. To find out the perceptions of the veterans as regards the measures which government has put in place to re-integrate them into civilian life.

1.5 RESEARCH ISSUES

This study was guided by the following research questions;- 

1. How has government assisted the landless veterans of Kisoro District to acquire land?

2. What measures has government undertaken to equip the veterans of Kisoro District with locally marketable skills?

3. What assistance has government extended to the chronically sick and disabled veterans of Kisoro District?

4. What measures has government put in place to access finance, employment and income generating projects to the veterans of Kisoro District?

5. What measures has government put in place to counteract community stigmatisation of the veterans of Kisoro District?

6. What are the perceptions of the veterans of Kisoro District as regards government's measures to re-integrate them into civilian life.
1.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

To scholars, academicians and researchers the findings of the study are expected to contribute to the existing literature about government's efforts to re-integrate the veterans of Kisoro District and Uganda in general into civilian life.

It is further anticipated that the findings of this study will incite the opening up of new areas of research in the field of the veterans' re-integration into civilian life.

The findings of this study are expected to provide empirical information to policymakers (government) in formulating appropriate policies for the re-integration of the UPDF veterans into civilian life. The study findings are therefore expected to influence the better planning and management of future veterans' re-integration programmes in Uganda. The successful re-integration of this special group of people into civilian life is important to government, otherwise the trauma and bitterness of war may compel them to re-organise and start war again or join the rebel factions that are currently fighting government.

1.7 SCOPE OF THE STUDY.

The study focused on investigating the challenges of government in re-integrating the UPDF veterans into civilian life. Only Kisoro
District in South Western Uganda was studied. The researcher limited the scope of the study to accessing veterans to land, provision of locally marketable skills to veterans, support to the sick and disabled veterans, economic empowerment of the veterans and counteracting community stigmatisation of the veterans.
Figure I: Conceptual Framework
The above conceptual framework emanates from the point where a soldier is still in active service. The soldier is then demobilised, becomes a veteran and joins a new environment (civilian environment). The framework further postulates that government intervenes to re-integrate the veteran into the new civilian life environment. As government intervenes a number of variables come into play and these are the very challenges that government is facing to re-integrate the veteran into civilian life. As shown in Figure 1, the challenges include accessing veterans to land, provision of locally marketable skills, finance, employment and income generating projects to the veterans, support to the chronically sick and disabled veterans, and counteracting community stigmatisation of the veterans.

All these challenges and how government has endeavoured to address them impact on the level of re-integration of the veterans into civilian life.
CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

This Chapter covers a review of the related literature to the topic of study. The literature was reviewed in line with the themes and sub-themes in the conceptual framework and the objectives of the study along which the study was conceptualised and undertaken. The literature reviewed, for example Mondo (1997), Colleta et al (1996), UVAB Veterans Re-integration Action Plan (1998) has revealed that several measures have been undertaken by government to re-integrate the UPDF veterans into civilian life. However, this literature has left many limitations like the adequacy and relevance of the educational/vocational training fund that the veterans received, the reliability and adequacy of the health care fund that was provided to the veterans and the efficacy of government's efforts to access finance and income generating projects to the veterans, among others. This provided an impetus to carrying out this study with an aim of bridging the limitations.
2.2 ACCESSING LAND TO VETERANS

2.2.1 Resettlement of Landless Veterans.

According to the UVAB Veterans Re-integration Action Plan (1998) the landless veterans are those found to be severely affected not only by lack of land ownership but also access to family or customary land. This problem is being addressed by relocating the veterans to government gazetted land. Colleta et al (1996:14) note that "Access to land is a major factor facilitating economic re-integration." He further mentions that in Uganda landlessness is a more serious problem in the more densely populated districts in the South Western and Central regions.

Indeed, the UVAB Veterans Re-integration Action Plan (1998) points out that a total of 173 landless veterans' households registered so far that are to be resettled in Kagadi Resettlement Scheme and in designated ranches in Uganda are from Kabale, Kabarole and Mbarara Districts. So far, U Shs 104,455,000 has been spent on this resettlement exercise (UVAB Data Unit; 1998).

These measures so far taken by UVAB in its attempt to provide land to the landless veterans sound very convincing. The matter of contention however is, how effective are these measures to provide a lasting solution to the problem of landless veterans. UVAB's approach seems to be piecemeal aimed at only accessing
the veterans to land and not bothering about permanent ownership of land by the veterans. What is not clear is whether the veterans’ rights over land in resettlement schemes and designated ranches are clearly stipulated. Worth noting is the fact that it is in these same areas that other vulnerable groups like refugees and internally displaced persons are often given refuge by the government. The implication here could be limited acreage of available land to the veterans who may wish to fully exploit their potential in terms of arable and livestock farming hence undermining their economic re-integration efforts. To Butt (1985:5) “land is undoubtedly the most important factor of production.” This is because all activities of production must be situated on some land somewhere.

One therefore wonders how the veterans that are resettled in the designated ranches and resettlement schemes will be fully engaged in production given the above scenario of uncertainty in land rights, ownership and use yet the UVAB Veterans Re-integration Action Plan (1998) is totally silent about these issues. These issues put the researcher in a dilemma and was compelled to undertake research about them.

Adugna (1995) notes that in Ethiopia’s re-integration strategy the major problem was the scarcity of usable land. He reveals that
the plan to provide one hectare of land to every demobilised combatant re-integrating in farming and 1.6 hectares to those re-integrating as pastoralists could not be implemented. It was later changed to one hectare for pastoralists and 0.6 hectare to farmers in 1992. In 1993 it was increased to one hectare for farmers and 1.6 hectare for pastoralists. He further reveals that 30 - 40% of the ex-combatants who had stayed in the army for more than seven years were unable to repossess their land. The Inter Africa Group (1994) also notes that land allocation was a problematic issue at the start of the Ethiopian re-integration process and that very few demobilised soldiers were able to repossess their land which their neighbours had been tending while they were in the army. Adugna reveals that through a proclamation, government allocated land that was previously owned by the community to the ex-combatants.

Adugna’s study is however silent about the implementation and success of the government proclamation. It is therefore not clear whether the ex-combatants received the land and if they did whether it was adequate to re-integrate them into the civilian life of farming and pastoralism.
2.3 PROVISION OF LOCALLY MARKETABLE SKILLS

2.3.1 Education/Vocational Training of Veterans.

The UVAB Veterans Re-integration Plan (1998) points out that this component was built into the Veterans Assistance Programme in the Second Phase of the demobilisation exercise in 1994. Colleta et al (1996:232) reveals:

Many Veterans have little to no education and limited skills. Only slightly more than a quarter of phase II veterans have secondary or higher education; 12 percent had no formal education, and approximately half finished primary school. Of Phase I veterans, 70 percent have not progressed beyond primary education. Although more than half of Phase II veterans stated that they acquired skills while in the army, most of these skills are not marketable. Only 13 percent possess skills in mechanics, metal work, wood working or tailoring.

With such a lamentable state of affairs in the veterans formal and technical skills the establishment of the education and vocational training programme by UVAB was an important step towards the development of marketable skills for veterans.

The vocational/education training fund supported three kinds of training namely; formal education for veterans in possession of at least ordinary level certificates training for technical or professional qualifications; vocational training in practical skills
like carpentry, masonry, tailoring, metal works; and individual on-the-job training and advice by master craftsmen.

Mondo (1997) reveals that 3,727 veterans have been trained in several vocational and formal education courses through the education/vocational training fund.

The above measures and commitments by UVAB to provide marketable skills to the veterans are very commendable and sound very convincing. However, due to financial constraints UVAB did not provide tools and kits to the veterans who had acquired the vocational skills (Mondo: 1997), yet the tools would have assisted them to create their own employment given the scarcity of jobs in Uganda’s formal employment sector. It cannot thus be ruled out that these veterans could have ended up being job seekers and not makers hence rendering their vocational skills idle. This study attempted to address this concern. Shiundu and Omulande (1992) note that vocational education greatly contributes to an individual’s economic advancement because that individual skills are badly needed on the labour market. In the case of the Ugandan veterans it is not clear how the vocational skills they acquired enhanced their economic advancement given the fact that they were not put to use. Again, UVAB has no provision for refresher or upgrading courses to enable the veterans
cope up with the increasingly competitive labour market and the continuous changes in technology. The UVAB's assumption that the veterans could undertake the upgrading courses by themselves needed be investigated to ascertain its efficacy. The question, also remains to how many veterans are capable of doing so? According to Mugalu (1997:11) vocational education is "that type of education which aims at equipping the recipients with practical skills, knowledge and attitudes to respond to the immediate demands of the environment." He further contends that vocational education produces craftsmen, technicians and other skilled manpower badly needed to meet the demands of industry, agriculture and the commercial sector. It is questionable whether the vocational skills that were received once and for all by the veterans with no refresher and upgrading opportunities will stand the test of time in the labour market. According to Thompson (1973), vocational education is geared at stimulating intellectual growth so as to produce members of society who can cope up with the socio-economic and cultural needs of the environment. It appears the UVAB vocational training programme did not live up to this expectation. It thus generated research interest in how marketable and appropriate the skills that the veterans received were to their environment.
A more challenging issue is that no survey was carried out by UVAB to establish the training needs of individual veterans and the skills that were on demand at the labour market. Veterans were only advised to join the already existing training centres where courses were already available. In the cases of the veterans who received formal education this meant that they joined the conventional education system whose products are of late widely criticised as functionally illiterate and unemployable. On the other hand it is not clear whether those who received vocational education had an edge over other civilians already on the labour market. This study attempted to establish whether the veterans' training needs were met.

Colleta et al (1995:263) succinctly summarised the plight of the veterans as regards the training programme when he noted:

Several veterans expressed dissatisfaction with the education and training fund as it would not impart adequate technical skills.

The authenticity of the above claims by Colleta is what constituted the researcher's investigations in this study.

All the above contradictions identified in UVAB's vocational and education training programme in its attempt to equip the veterans with locally marketable skills seem to suggest that UVAB has problems in equipping the veterans with marketable skills.
However this serves theoretical purposes and remained to be empirically investigated. The education/vocational training programme was also a prominent feature in Ethiopia's re-integration strategy of her veterans.

The ILO (1995) points out that in Ethiopia about 5,300 veterans received training while over 4,000 upgraded their skills. However, as it was in the Uganda case, there was no sufficient time to identify the specific needs of individual veterans. The main factors which determined the selection of training programmes were availability of training centres and courses which could easily be taught. The efficiency of the training centres in designing effective courses was also a matter that was not explored.

2.4 SUPPORT TO THE CHRONICALLY SICK AND DISABLED VETERANS.

2.4.1 Health Care for the Chronically Sick Veterans

According to the UVAB veterans Re-integration Action Plan (1998) the health care fund was introduced in the Veterans Assistance Programme in phase II of the demobilisation exercise in 1994. The funds were to assist in the treatment of the chronically sick veterans who had been demobilised on medical grounds.
Mondo (1997) points out that it was expected that only 15% of the total 36,358 veterans, that is 5,454 veterans would be eligible for this healthcare fund. However, according to UVAB as cited by Colleta, et al, (1996) the actual number of veterans demobilised on medical grounds is 9,376, that is 26% of all the veterans. Right from the start therefore UVAB experienced a funding gap for this programme.

Mondo, (1997), indeed reveals that only 5,294 sick veterans received assistance out of the healthcare fund which assistance was also insufficient. Worse still this fund did not consider those veterans whose ailments would develop into chronic ones after returning to their homes and according to the UVAB Veterans Reintegration Action Plan (1998) many veterans who became chronically sick after returning home continued to visit the offices of their District Veterans Programme Officers (DVPOs) for assistance, which assistance was not forthcoming. It is worth noting that the exercise of army demobilisation of the UPDF started in December 1992 and was implemented in three Phases. Phase III was done in October 1995 and phase II ended in July 1994.

However, by July 1995 out of a total number of 7,558 veterans who had been demobilised on medical grounds under phases I
and II (UVAB Data Unit: 1998), 1,696 (22.4%) had already died due to various illnesses (Colleta et al 1996). At such an alarming death rate and given the fact that UVAB had no sufficient funds to cater for the increasing number of chronically sick veterans the question that remained unanswered has been; how has government confronted the issue of accessing health care assistance to the chronically sick veterans? It was therefore imperative for the researcher to carry out a critical empirical inquiry and establish how government has responded to this challenge and more so in light of the user – fees levied in public health units and centres.

2.4.2 Financial Assistance to the Disabled Veterans

According to the UVAB status report on the Disabled Veterans Fund (1998), the 1995 World Bank Aide Memoir for the third phase demobilisation of the UPDF recommended a modification in the vocational training eligibility to allow disabled veterans priority consideration. As a result some twenty veterans were trained in auto-mechanics, carpentry and joinery at the vocational training centre - Lugogo in Kampala. However, according to the UVAB Reintegration Action Plan (1998) the estimated number of disabled veterans is about 700. This indicates that the majority of disabled veterans did not benefit from the vocational training arrangement.
It was thus decided that the rest of the disabled veterans should be considered for grants to assist them set up income generating projects.

According to UVAB status Report on the Disabled Veterans Fund (1998) the severely disabled received Ushs 200,000 and those moderately disabled received Ushs 150,000. By October 1998, Ushs 89,250,000 had been disbursed to the disabled veterans (UVAB Data Unit: 1998).

It should be noted however that this was a once and for all payment to the disabled veterans and no mechanisms were put in place to monitor that the disabled veterans used the funds for the intended purpose. Another issue at stake is whether the amounts given to the veterans were adequate to set up sound and sustainable income generating projects. Above all, what is not clear is whether the funds given to the disabled veterans were not diverted to the more pressing needs of medication by the veterans and in such an eventuality where does the disabled veteran then go for redress? This present study attempted to address these issues.
2.5 ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT OF VETERANS.

2.5.1 Accessing Finance and Income Generating Projects to Veterans

According to the UVAB Data Unit (1998), the first payment of Ushs 558,935 to every veteran was simply a transitory safety net package for the veteran to tide over during the first six months of resettlement immediately after being discharged from the army. It was specially meant to assist the veteran acquire civilian clothing, food, agricultural tools and seeds, simple building materials, simple medical care, and other simple daily requirements of civilian life within the first six months of discharge from the army. It was merely a re-settlement package with no re-integration component. This meant that the veterans did not have reserve funds to invest in income generating projects to enable them establish viable economic bases for their smooth re-integration into civilian life. Colleta et al (1996:266) succinctly recognises the plight of the veterans in this regard when he notes:

Many veterans suffer from a shortage of capital. Even if pooled in groups, the cash entitlements do not suffice when other, more immediate needs have to be met.

Government in one of its attempts to access finance to the veterans and thereby enabling them to set up income generating projects embarked on paying pension and gratuity to the veterans
with effect from 1997 and according to the UVAB Re-integration Action Plan (1998), Ushs 43 billion has been approved by government for this purpose. However what is worth noting is that the payments for pension and gratuity to the veterans have been phased from the 1997/98 financial year to the 2000/2001 financial year. It is not known at what specific time they will receive their payments. Worse still, it is also not known how much the veterans will receive from government. This measure of accessing finance to the veterans through pension and gratuity from government seems to be moving at a snail’s pace and what was worthy investigating is whether government has put in place other alternatives for her veterans.

Colletta et al (1996) reveals that government has earmarked the veterans as a vulnerable group to benefit from loans that are available from credit programmes like Entandikwa credit scheme and Poverty Alleviation Project (PAP). However, while government has earmarked the veterans for such opportunities it has failed to appreciate the conditionalities attached to such loans like technically and economically viable project proposals, experience in the management of credit among others which most veterans may not possess. Worse still, the prohibitive interest rates could be another scare to the veterans to apply for such loans leave
alone the required initial deposit of 22% of the required loan amount in cases of loans from PAP. Besides, the likely skepticism of the loaning agencies about the veterans abilities to repay the loans could be another obstacle to veterans' access to credit. Given such a situation, the researcher deemed it imperative to undertake an empirical inquiry and ascertain how government is trying to access finance to its veterans.

In another development, UVAB has tried to assist the veterans acquire finance by linking them to training opportunities in managing income generating projects.

Mondo (1997) points out that UVAB has approached several NGOs to assist in training the veterans to manage viable income generating projects as a way of raising their own funds. These NGOs have trained veterans in agriculture, apiary, piggery, diary, silk farming and other vocational skills. They include VOCA, Afri Care, ACFODE, Heifer Project International, World Learning Inc. among others. Despite UVAB's role in linking the veterans to the NGOs it is not known how the veterans have utilised such opportunities. Indeed a survey carried in Luwero District by VOCA (1997 : 48) reveals:
Some NGOs have very strict criteria that at times keep away veterans from benefiting from NGO services.

This study attempted to investigate this issue.

Worse still, most of the veterans trained do not put to use their knowledge because of lack of funds to set up the income generating projects hence rendering them unable to raise their own funds. Even the few who venture end up failing to sustain the projects due to lack of enough funds. Colletta et al (1996:266) notes this obstacle to the veterans when he reveals:

Many promising income-generating activities have failed because of lack of funds to overcome the first critical phase.

Mutambirwa (1995) amply articulates that the success of income-generating projects set up by veterans in Zimbabwe in an attempt for self employment largely depended on availability of funds. She reveals that one co-operative society established by ex-combatants in Zimbabwe was very successful because of the assistance (financial and material) that it received from the donor community. On the contrary however, Mutambirwa reports that the majority of co-operatives established by the disabled ex-combatants in Zimbabwe failed and one of the factors that she cites is inadequate finance especially working capital to sustain the projects.
2.5.2 Accessing Employment Opportunities to Veterans

UVAB has also made some efforts to secure formal employment for the veterans. Mondo (1997: 40 – 41), summarises government's efforts in this direction as:

We have established a rapport with several industrialists who have promised to take on veterans should employment opportunities arise. Some employers have contacted us to provide veterans with suitable qualifications and as on October 30th 1996, at least 1043 veterans were employed in Kampala alone in private security firms.

However, the extent to which to date veterans are continuing to be absorbed in the private employment sector is not known. This study attempted to unravel such.

Also it is not clear how UVAB will market the veterans in formal employment when it has no provision for continuous education and training of the veterans in several skills to enable them compete in the labour market. In a country such as Uganda where the structural adjustment programmes have greatly reduced employment opportunities in the public sector and there is increasing pressure on the private sector, it became important to undertake this research so as to establish how government is responding to the challenge of accessing employment opportunities to the veterans.
2.6 COUNTERTACTING COMMUNITY STIGMATISATION OF
THE VETERANS.

2.6.1 Public Relations Programmes.

According to a report on the VAP seminars of DAs, DESs and
DVPOs held on 11\textsuperscript{th} - 12\textsuperscript{th} November 1992 in Kampala, the
announcement of the demobilisation programme of the NRA was
received with mixed feelings from the public. The reasons for the
negative views advanced by the public mentioned in the report
were that; the initial recruitment into the army was not putting
emphasis on the behaviour of the army recruits. The aim was to
increase the number of the fighting force. Consequently the
community thought that government was using the VAP to phase
out the indisciplined and notorious soldiers as it embarked on
building a pro-peoples' army. Further, during the integration of
the many former fighting forces into the NRA no much attention
was paid to screening out the indisciplined soldiers, hence the
suspicion by the community that government was sending wrong
characters to the community.

To crown it all, the demobilisation exercise began when the
community's historical experience of ill-treatment from the former
Ugandan armies was still very live in the minds of many
Ugandans. Given such a background the veterans were bound to
be received with suspicion in their home localities and this
definitely could pose an obstacle to their re-integration into
civilian life. Colleta et al (1996:280) summaries this view as:

... with memories of a marauding army still
fresh for many Ugandans, communities
inadvertently or on purpose erected visible and
invisible barriers to a veteran’s re-integration.

Mondo (1997), on the other hand however, claims that with the
introduction of the veterans’ quarter hour radio programme that is
broadcast in nine languages on Radio Uganda the public is
increasingly viewing the veterans in a positive context. This radio
programme according to Mondo, emphasises the role of the
community and the veterans in the veterans’ re-integration
process. Mondo, however, falls short of substantiating his claims
with empirical evidence. His claims could therefore be lacking.
The establishment of the authenticity of these claims by Mondo
was the subject of the researcher’s investigation in this study.
CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

3.1. Introduction
This chapter presents the methodology used to carry out this study. It presents among others the research design, sampling, methods, data collection techniques, research instruments, research procedure, data analysis techniques, and finally the limitations of the study and how the researcher tried to overcome them.

3.2. Area of Study
The study was carried out in Kisoro District. Kisoro District is situated in the extreme corner of South-west Uganda (See Appendix C for a map of Uganda showing Kisoro District). It borders Kabale District to the East, Rukungiri District to the North, in the South it is bordered by the Republic of Rwanda and to the West it is bordered by the Democratic Republic of Congo. Kisoro District is divided into thirteen rural sub-counties and one Town Council that is Kisoro Town Council. The study was conducted in five rural sub-counties (Busanza, Chahi, Nyakabande, Nyarusiza, Nyakinama) and Kisoro Town Council.
This is because out of the 215 veterans in Kisoro District, 143 are found in those areas. (UVAB Data Unit; 1998).

Further, Kisoro Town Council was purposively included in the sample because it is the only urban area in the area of study hence enabling the researcher to compare and contrast the data from the town council with that of the rural areas.

Kisoro District was chosen for this study because of the following reasons:

Kisoro is a densely populated district with a projected population of 401 persons per square kilometre with an annual growth rate of 3.53%, the average land holding per household is about 0.25 hectares (KDLG, KDDP, 1999 – 2002). Land for agricultural purposes is therefore not enough for the people of Kisoro. Of the 215 veterans of Kisoro District that were demobilised and made to return to Kisoro, 80% were illiterate and did not have any other skills to make them earn a living, their hope therefore lay in agriculture (UVAB Data Unit: 1998). Given such a background Kisoro was perceived to be an appropriate case for study to find out how government is assisting its veterans to access them to land so that they could engage in agriculture in order to earn a living as a way of re-integrating them into civilian life.
Further, Kisoro is a predominantly rural district with only one urban area (Kisoro Town Council). The usual casual employment opportunities in other urban areas like car washing, vending and petty labouring are very rare in Kisoro yet these are the jobs that the majority of the veterans who are illiterate and professionally unskilled (apart from military skills) would have engaged in. Kisoro therefore merited as a good case of study to establish how government is assisting its veterans to secure employment in such an opportunity constrained environment.

Further, the biggest part of this study was funded by Kisoro District Administration. The researcher therefore deemed it just and appropriate to carry out a study in Kisoro District so that the study findings could directly benefit his funders.

3.3. Population of the study

The study population comprised of veterans in Kisoro District, some civilians, local District officials, officials of the Uganda Veterans Assistance Board (UVAB) and all the Members of the Kisoro District Veterans Advisory Committee (KDVAC)

3.4. Research Design.

A predominantly qualitative design was utilised to carry out this study. In this design, the study respondents had to describe the
situation in detail as they perceived it best by themselves. The researcher wanted to get a wider in-depth understanding and description of the problem of study from the respondents. Thus qualitative methods were used to collect the data for the study including in-depth interviews and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs).

3.5. SAMPLE SIZE AND SAMPLE SELECTION

3.5.1 Sample size

A total of 134 respondents were selected for this study. Their categorisation is shown in table 1 below.

Table I  Respondents selected and their categories.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of respondents</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(i) Kisoro District Veterans</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advisory Committee (KDVAC)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) UVAB Officials</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iii) Local District Officials</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iv) Veterans of various army Ranks</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(v) Veterans from 5 sub-counties and Kisoro Town Council</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(vi) Civilians from 5 sub-counties and Kisoro Town Council</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.5.2 Sample Selection

Given the qualitative nature of this study, purposive sampling was used to select the study respondents. This type of sampling was applied due to the following reasons:

a) The study aimed at specific and in-depth information from the members of the KDVAC and UVAB officials who are the government officials directly involved in the implementation of the UVAP. The KDVAC consists of the Resident District Commissioner, Chief Administrative Officer, Chairperson Local Council V, District Internal Security Officer, Secretary for Defence Local Council V, District Veterans Representative, District Police Commander, District Veterans Programme Officer and the District Female Veterans representative (Co-opted). The four UVAB officials included the Executive Secretary who is the Chief Executive of UVAB, the Re-integration Programme Manager who is the Chief Planner and implementor of the Veterans' re-integration programmes, the Monitoring and Evaluation Officer who appraises the progress of the veterans' re-integration measures and the Public Relations/Veterans Welfare Officer who counsels and advises the veterans on re-integration opportunities.
b) The study also targeted a specific category of respondents, that is, some civilians and some veterans in those sub-counties of the District with the highest number of veterans. By conducting FGDs with such respondents the researcher expected to get a deeper understanding of the subject of study. Six FGDs of veterans (Five from the purposively selected rural sub-counties and one from Kisoro Town Council) were conducted. Each FGD consisted of eight veterans making the total number of forty eight. Further another six FGDs of civilians consisted of six members each making the total number of thirty six. The researcher worked very closely with the District Veterans programme offices, the Sub-county Chiefs and Sub-county Council (Local Council III) Chairpersons to make appointments with the veterans and civilians in their respective sub-counties. Transport refund and lunch allowance was paid to the participants of the FGDs. This motivated them to attend the FGDs.

c) The study also targeted another specific category of respondents, that is the local District officials of those sub-counties with the highest numbers of veterans in the District. The researcher expected that these officials had
acquired a wider exposure with the veterans and could therefore avail to him some in-depth information about the subject of study. The twelve local district officials that were interviewed were five rural sub-county chiefs and five rural sub-county (Local Council III) chairpersons, the Town clerk of Kisoro Town Council and the Chairperson LC III Kisoro Town Council.

d) The researcher was also interested in acquiring a wide range of views from veterans of various army ranks in the district so that he could get a deeper understanding of his topic of study. Such veterans could only be appropriately got through purposive sampling. The twenty five veterans of various ranks who were subjected to in-depth interviews consisted of 12 privates, 4 Lance Corporals, 4 Corporals 2 Sergeants, 2 Lieutenants and 1 Captain. The rank of private was the lowest and had the majority of the veterans in the District while the rank of captain was the highest with only one veteran in the district. Veterans with those various ranks were chosen because the researcher was interested in a variety of experiences from the lowest veteran in rank to the highest. For purposes of gender sensitivity the researcher included the only two female veterans.
currently resident in the district out of the twelve female veterans on the veterans register in the District. It was learnt while in the field that the other ten female veterans had migrated to other parts of the country.

Government officials (KDVAC and UVAB officials) and the veterans were the primary respondents. Local district officials and the civilian were the key informants.

3.6. Data Collection Techniques

3.6.1 Methods

Data for this study was collected using in depth interviews, and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) and documentary review.

a) In-depth Interviews

The in-depth interviews were personally conducted by the researcher with 50 respondents (I – iv) in table 1 above.

(b) Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)

These were conducted with 84 respondents (v-vi) in table 1 above. In all the FGDs the principal researcher made the introductory remarks and two research assistants assisted in moderating the discussions by introducing the key themes.
c) Documentary Review

Secondary data was also obtained through reading materials from public libraries, UVAB offices and the office of the District Veterans Programme Officer (DVPO) of Kisoro District. This supplemented research findings from the field.

3.6.2 Instruments.

Two data collection instruments were employed by the researcher to gather data from his respondents. These were in-depth interview guides and Focus Group Discussion Guides (See appendices D, E, F and G). In-depth interview guides were used to collect data from 50 respondents (I – iv) in table 1 above, while focus group discussion guides were used to collect data from 84 respondents. (v – vi) in table 1 above.

All the above methods and instruments for data collection were used by the researcher to enable him get a wider magnitude and deeper understanding of the problem under study. The methods and instruments were also used to corroborate the findings from one another hence ensuring validity of the research findings.

3.7 Research Procedure

The researcher discussed the content of the research instruments with his supervisors so that the instruments could capture the
required information from the field. He then got a letter of
introduction from the Faculty of Social Sciences to the District
authorities. Though an employee of the District where the study
was carried out and quite well known there, he deemed it ethical
to introduce himself to the Chief Administrative Officer about his
research who gave him permission to undertake the research.
The researcher then identified and trained two research assistants
who later assisted in the moderation of the FGDs.

He then made appointments with the government officials at the
hours and venues of their own choice and convenience. Most
interviews were carried out in their offices. Some were interviewed
from their homes for fear of disturbances by their clients while in
office. The researcher worked very closely with the District
Veterans Programme Offices, the sub-county chiefs and sub-
county council (Local Council III) chairpersons to make
appointments with the veterans and other civilians in their
respective sub-counties at the hours and venues of their own
choice and convenience. This made the respondents to fully co-
operate during the in-depth interviews and FGDs since they were
conducted in their familiar home environments.

The duration of the interviews and FGDs ranged from 45 minutes
to 1 hour depending on how informative and patient the
respondents were. The probing technique was employed by the researcher where the respondents had not clearly or adequately answered the question.

At the onset of each interview and FGD the researcher explained to his respondents the purpose of his visit and study and their consent was obtained in all cases. He personally conducted all the in-depth interviews because the study targeted detailed qualitative data. At the onset of the study, a tape recorder was used especially during in-depth interviews to avoid mis-quoting and forgetting the answers from the respondents. However, some respondents were not loud enough and hence the recording was faint. The researcher therefore resorted to verbatim recording of the answers from the respondents. In FGDs two research assistants assisted in moderation and note taking.

After collecting data from the district the researcher moved to Kampala where he got in touch with the UVAB officials that had been purposively selected to participate in the study. These were very co-operative and availed all the required information during the interviews. In addition they also availed to him some documentary data.

All in all, it took the researcher five weeks to collect the data he required for this study.
3.8 Data Analysis and Interpretation

Qualitative techniques were employed in analysing the data that had been collected. The qualitative data that had been collected through FGDs and in-depth interviews was continuously analysed in the field as collection took place. Some information that had been taped was continuously transcribed and that which had not been taped was written in full at the end of each day of the research. The data was then continuously manually analysed throughout the period of the research using themes and code categories in the conceptual framework.

During the analysis a list of key beliefs, opinions, ideas, statements and attitudes expressed for each topic (theme) of the interview was made. The statements were coded in the left margins of the interview reports and comments were put on the right side margin. The statements were further categorised. Answers from different respondents were compared to establish the most occurring responses and these were used in the analysis and interpretation of the data. The data was summarised in a narrative form and the most important quotations from the field were used to illustrate the major findings of the study presented in Chapter four. Relevant and reviewed literature was also used to discuss the findings of the study.
3.9 Limitations of the Study and Solutions

Several methodological, practical and theoretical limitations were encountered during the course of the study.

Some respondents especially civilians in the FGDS were at the beginning of the study not very free to air out their views because of the presence of the principal researcher who works as an assistant Chief Administrative Office in the district. This was solved by the researcher being frank to the respondents and explaining to them the purpose of the study. He requested the respondents to detach the study from his official capacity in the district.

The veterans posed double pronged limitations to the study. On one hand some of them were reluctant to co-operate in the study because some of their benefits that government promised to them like pension and gratuity had not been paid to them and thus regarded the study as time wasting on their part, others expected on-spot material rewards. Although the researcher patiently explained to them the purpose of his study and managed to convince the majority of them to participate, it was noted that some of them were very evasive during the interviews. Other veterans were however very enthusiastic to participate in the study in anticipation of material rewards from government. The
researcher was therefore afraid that such veterans could give incorrect responses to the questions. This was solved by sensitising these veterans about the purpose of the study and through continuous probing during the FGDs and interviews.

In spite of some limitations cited above, the study was successfully conducted.
CHAPTER FOUR

FINDINGS AND INTERPRETATIONS

4.1. Introduction

In this chapter the researcher presents the findings and interpretations of the study. The findings are interpreted and discussed in relation to the objectives of the study as stated in chapter one and in comparison with the literature review in chapter two and other relevant literature. Further, the findings are presented and corroborated with quotations arising from in-depth interviews and participants in FGDs.

This chapter combines finding from in-depth interviews, FGDs and documentary (secondary) data.

As a result of the qualitative methodology used, the findings are presented in a narrative rather than the statistical form basing on five major themes namely:-

(i) Accessing land to veterans
(ii) Provision of locally marketable skills to the veterans.
(iii) Support to the chronically sick and disabled veterans.
(iv) Economic empowerment of the veterans.
(v) Counteracting community stigmatisation of the veterans.
4.2. Accessing Land to Veterans

4.2.1 Resettlement of Landless Veterans.

The focus of this theme was to find out what government has done to provide land to the landless veterans of Kisoro District.

According to the UVAB Re-integration Action Plan (1998), veterans with no access to personal and customary land are considered landless and are to be resettled by government in gazetted ranches and resettlement schemes. However, the study findings revealed that there is a sharp contrast on what is on paper and what is actually happening on the ground. Indeed, the study found out that government plans to avail land to the landless veterans of Kisoro district have not been implemented. A close look at the DVPO’s records indicated that by November 1994, forty four veterans (20%) had been registered as landless and requested to be availed with land but their requests have hitherto not been met. The DVPO summarised the reasons for not honouring the veterans’ requests as follows:

This information was sent to UVAB Headquarters way back in 1994 and my office was informed that action would be taken. I have continued to remind them but I have been informed that resettlement is a very expensive venture and that funds are still a prohibiting factor to resettle the landless veterans from all over the country at ago. It appears this problem may not be solved in the immediate future...
This state of affairs means that the landless veterans will continue with this problem for an unknown period of time.

In an interview with the Re-integration Programme Manager at UVAB headquarters, it was clear that UVAB was not fully equipped and prepared to execute its resettlement programme of all the landless veterans. When further probed about what he exactly meant by not being fully equipped and prepared the Re-integration Programme Manager noted:

It is our desire, wish and ambition to access all landless veterans to land through our resettlement programme. However, inadequate funds have cut down our ambitions and we have to take on a small number of veterans at a time.

In this regard, the study findings revealed that the activities involved in the resettlement of landless veterans include land inspection in the resettlement schemes, construction of reception centres and the facilities there on (latrines, water points, temporary shelter), actual transportation of the veterans, issuing supplies (food, seeds, agricultural tools) to the veterans and land allocation to the veterans settlers. All these activities require huge sums of money to implement which apparently UVAB cannot afford to undertake at ago and resettle all the landless veterans at the same time. The RIPM revealed that out of the 170 landless veterans households in Kabale, Kabarole and Mbarara only 52
had been resettled in Kagadi resettlement scheme. This was due to inadequate funds.

The dissatisfaction about government's failure to access the veterans to land was mentioned by several individual veterans during the in-depth interviews that the researcher held with them. The veterans argued that since they lack capital to engage in trade and that they also do not possess marketable skills to enable them compete for jobs in the formal sector, the only solution lay in accessing them to land so that they could engage in agriculture if they were to achieve economic re-integration into civilian life. One veteran, a lieutenant by rank while narrating his ordeal about lack of adequate land, had this to say:-

I only have 3/4 acres of land for my family of seven people which I strainly use for subsistence production. I cannot engage in large scale commercial agriculture so that I get a surplus for sale and advance economically.... At least me, because of my rank I used to get pass leave while in the army and this is when I bought this land. What about the privates who never had such chances? Up to now they do not have land..., their economic situation must be worse.

The above views were corroborated with those of one veteran, a private by rank aged 30 from a veterans' FGD in Busanza who put it clearly as:
I have no land to use for growing crops for sale. My father only availed to me a small plot to use for subsistence purposes with my family. This situation has made me very poor. I can only get money to use at home by selling my labour and in most cases I am paid very little...

The above veteran’s views do concur with the observations of Colleta et al (1996:14), when he notes that “Access to land is a major factor facilitating economic re-integration.”

The findings above are similar to those of Adugna (1995) and the Inter Africa group (1994) in Ethiopia where Ethiopia’s efforts to re-integrate her veterans into farming and pastoralism were greatly constrained by the scarcity of usable agricultural land.

A UVAP Report (1995) on the Evaluation of the second phase of the veterans Assistance Programme Volume III also concurs with the above findings that adequate land at both family and community level was a major factor that facilitated or constrained the smooth transition of the veterans into civilian life in Kabarole and Luwero districts.

In all the FGDs of veterans and civilians the issue of accessing land to landless veterans attracted enthusiastic discussions. It was reported in all these FGDs that the landless veterans have not been assisted by government to acquire land and that unless
they are provided with some land they are likely to continue earning meagre incomes and living from hand to mouth as petty labourers and porters. Such a situation would definitely negate the veterans economic re-integration into civilian life. The concern for the provision of land to the landless veterans was clearly reported by one local council leader in a focus group discussion in Busanza Sub-county. This official did not mince his words when he said:

These children of ours are in trouble because we also have no land to give them..., government must hurriedly do something to assist them. Even if they have very good farming ideas where will they do the farming from without land, to us elders land is the starting point of all wealth.

The above views are shared by Butt (1985) when he reveals that land is the most important factor of production because all activities of production must be situated on some land somewhere.

In the same FGD of civilians in Busanza Sub-country it was reported that even the youths who never joined the army were being encouraged by their parents to migrate to other parts of the country where they can sell their labour and in turn buy land and settle there. The problem of lack of land in Kisoro is therefore not unique to veterans alone but to everybody, especially the youths.
who depend on their parent’s land as there is no more land to divide among all the family members.

This theme investigated what government had done to access land to the landless veterans of Kisoro District. The findings have revealed that the issue of accessing land to the landless veterans of Kisoro District is still unattended to. Government is therefore still faced with this challenge.

4.3. Provision of Locally Marketable skills to veterans.

4.3.1. Education/vocational Training of Veterans.

The concern of this theme was to find out what measures government had undertaken to equip the veterans of Kisoro District with locally marketable skills.

The study findings indicated that UVAB has undertaken the provision of marketable skills to the veterans through an education/vocational training programme. Records from the Kisoro DVPO’s office revealed that out of the 32 veterans who applied for various courses under the education/vocational training programme, only 8 were considered. The number of those who were trained was further confirmed at the UVAB headquarters Data Unit. Attempts to establish why other veterans were not trained were fruitful. The researcher learnt from the Re-integration Programme Manager (RIPM) at UVAB
headquarters that inadequate funds were still a constraining factor to allow all eligible veterans undergo training. He lamented that the problem was not isolated to Kisoro District alone but it was a country wide issue and that more applications were still being received from the veterans from all over the country.

Elucidating this point the RIPM noted:

... for vocational training and scholarship more funding is still required. Apart from the 1453 veterans on the waiting list more veterans and families of veterans would wish to be trained ...

The above views of the RIPM were corroborated with those of individual veterans. For example one veteran, aged 50 a Sergeant by rank while expressing his dissatisfaction about government's failure to access him to vocational training due to absence of funds, put it clearly:

At my age I cannot start loitering around looking for employment. I want to acquire vocational skills so that I can be self-employed. The DVPO told me that the funds for training have run out. I cannot believe it... this is direct frustration.

The RIPM revealed that this financial strain was also responsible for UVAB' failure to provide refresher and upgrading courses to the veterans already trained. This lack of refresher courses will with time render the veterans skills inappropriate to the constant
changes in technology making them jobless and hence undermining their economic re-integration into civilian life.

The study, further revealed that some veterans were willing to undertake the education/vocational training but could not meet the admission requirements of the training centres and institutions. One veteran, a private by rank aged 30 remarked:-

I joined the army after senior secondary school form two when I was 17 years old. When I was demobilised from the army I was 23 years old. I was too old to join school again and I had a family to fend for. Now, qualifying for professional vocational training requires a minimum academic standard of senior secondary school form four. I am interested but not legible.

The UVAB Public Relations/Veterans Welfare office concurred with the above veteran when he noted:

Some veterans are frustrated by the conditions of entry to the educational/vocational training institutions. Given the fact that the majority of them never completed senior secondary school form four many training institutions have turned down their applications, a situation over which we are apparently helpless...

A UVAP report (1995) on the Evaluation of the second phase of the Veterans Assistance Programme Volume II, also reveals that in Luwero District, most institutions, declined to admit the veterans because they lacked the required academic qualifications. Only
one institution, (Wobulenzi Vocational Institute) accepted to admit the veterans.

These findings postulate that some veterans willing to acquire educational/vocational skills have been alienated from the training programme. This situation has been further aggravated by the fact that UVAB has no solution to this category of veterans as yet and this was acknowledged by the Public Relations/Veterans Welfare Officer at UVAB headquarters quoted above. The plans of government to re-integrate the veterans of this category into civilian life through equipping them with locally marketable skills have therefore continued to be a mere myth.

The study findings revealed that even the majority of those veterans who received the vocational training were not provided with tools to enable them create their own employment.

The RIPM at UVAB headquarters attributed this undesirable situation to lack of funds to procure the tools for the veterans. Mondo (1997;28) concurs with the RIPM in this regard when he says:-

Except for the 11 disabled veterans who trained in auto-mechanics at the Vocational Training Centre, Lugogo the rest of the veterans' who completed courses in various skills have not been provided with tools basically due to financial constraints.
Many of the veterans who received the vocational training therefore have ended up being job seekers and not makers. One veteran a Sergeant by rank, aged 36 who had completed a certificate course in carpentry from Muhabura Diocese Vocational Training Centre in Kisoro District decried his situation of lack of tools as follows:-

I feel I am now a good carpenter because I have all the skills I need to do carpentry work. But, I can't put the skills to use when I have no tools to use..., I have looked around for jobs but I have not yet got any. I am apparently getting impatient and frustrated.

This veteran showed the researcher his copy of a letter that the DVPO had written to UVAB headquarters requesting for tools to assist him. It was later learnt from the DVPO that no response had been received from UVAB headquarters about that letter.

Female veterans were similarly in the same predicament. For instance a female veteran, a private by rank, aged 28 who had completed a tailoring course succinctly put it:

After the training I requested for a sewing machine from UVAB through my DVPO but all has not been fruitful. I am still unemployed yet I have my skills. I hate this situation.

These findings indicate that UVAB has not made a follow-up of the veterans who received the vocational training to provide them with tools so that they can put to use the skills.
This situation in which the veterans of Kisoro District have found themselves in is similar to that of the veterans in other district such as Kabarole in Western Uganda as put forward by a survey carried out by VOCA (1997) where out of the 23 veterans who received training by UVAB only three received tools and only six were using the skills they had acquired.

In all, these findings concur with those in Mozambique where lack of funds to procure tools for the veterans to start up self-employment income generating projects emerged as a prominent barrier to the Mozambican government efforts to re-integrate her veterans into civilian life. Buque et al (1999).

According to Shiundu and Omulande (1992) vocational education greatly contributes to an individual's economic advancement as that individual's skills are badly needed on the labour market. The study findings have however revealed that this has not been the case for the veterans of Kisoro District partly because they have no tools to enable them practise their skills. This has undermined government's efforts of equipping the veterans with vocational skills and hence making their re-integration into civilian life an uphill task for government.
The study findings revealed that some of the veterans who joined the training institutions did not receive ample training time in these institutions to enable them perfectly master the skills they intended to acquire. These veterans according to the DVPO were subjected to a limited training duration on the grounds that funds were not available to sponsor them for long courses. Many of them therefore did not acquire adequate skills in the various disciplines and trades in which they were trained. This has impacted negatively on their ability to compete for jobs with the more skilled and experienced professionals already on the labour market hence compounding their inability to be economically re-integrated into civilian life by government.

In this vein, one female veteran, aged 27, a lance corporal by rank observed:-

I attended a tailoring course for just eight weeks. I only learnt the basics of tailoring. I do not know the latest designing and fashioning which the customers want. I am lucky I am doing a different job not tailoring because other tailors in town are far better than me... I do not think I would have managed to compete with them.

The findings are above are similar to those of Colleta et al (1996) and Buque et al (1999) where the former points out that in Uganda veterans received inadequate skills from the training
institutions due to short training periods; the latter reports the same scenario in Mozambique.

The duration of training Buque expressed dissatisfaction about was 90 days. However, the veteran quoted above received training for only eight calendar weeks. Certainly it could have been very hard for her to compete with the more skilled and experienced tailors.

According to Thompson (1973), vocational education is aimed at stimulating intellectual growth so as to produce members of society who can cope up with the socio-economic and cultural needs of the environment. However the findings of this present study have revealed that the veterans of Kisoro District who received the vocational training were ill trained and have not been able to meet Thompson's expectations. Their re-integration by government into civilian life using the intervention of vocational skills has been negated by inadequate training periods.

A UVAP report (1995) on the evaluation of the second phase of the Veterans Assistance Programme volume II also reveals the inadequacy of the training duration of the veterans who received vocational training in Luwero District. The report points out that
the veterans who were taken up in Wobulenzi vocational institute were given training for only three weeks.

The study findings further revealed that the courses that were offered to the veterans did not take into account the current demands of the labour market and that the veterans’ individual training preferences were not respected. In all the FGDs of the veterans it was reported that the veterans had not been given liberty to join institutions of their own choice. Further probed about this issue the veterans revealed that the DVPO had a list of institutions where he was advising the veterans to place their applications. It was however learnt from the DVPO that this measure was taken to ensure that the veterans received training from bonafide institutions. All in all, this meant that some veterans joined the institutions against their wish.

Veterans were therefore compelled to join the conventional training institutions whose other products had already saturated the labour market. Besides, some of the skills they acquired were not marketable on the labour market. For instance the DVPO reported that out of the eight veterans who had been trained, only two were being employed in the disciplines they qualified in at the time of this study.
A survey by VOCA (1997) reveals a similar predicament of lack of market study for the skills that the veterans received in Kabarole and Soroti districts. Buque et al also reveals a similar situation in Mozambique.

According to Mugalu (1997) vocational education is geared towards equipping the recipients with practical skills, knowledge and attitudes so as to adequately respond to the immediate demands of their environment. He further argues that vocational education is meant to produce craftsmen, technicians and other skilled manpower badly needed to meet the demands of industry, agriculture and the commercial sector.

The study findings have however revealed that the vocational education that the veterans of Kisoro District received fell short of Mugalu's expectations. For that matter it still remains a daunting task for government to economically re-integrate them into civilian life given the non-marketable skills they acquired.

This theme investigated what measures government had undertaken to equip the veterans of Kisoro District with locally marketable skills. The findings of the study have demonstrated that government instituted an education/vocational training programme for the veterans. However, this programme has been
characterised by inadequate training funds for all eligible veterans, lack of tools for the trained veterans to engage in self employment hence becoming job seekers, lack of ample training time for the trained veterans to master their skills hence rendering them less competent than other practitioners on the labour market, irrelevant training in disciplines and trades that are not readily marketable and that have already been saturated on the labour market and lack of the required academic qualifications to join the training institutions by some willing veterans. All these shortcomings have negated government’s intervention of equipping the veterans with marketable skills through education/vocational training as it attempts to re-integrate them into civilian life. It therefore remains an unresolved task for government.

4.4. SUPPORT TO THE CHRONICALLY SICK AND DISABLED VETERANS

The concern of this theme was to assess the assistance that government has extended to the chronically sick and disabled veterans of Kisoro District.
4.4.1 Health Care for the Chronically Sick Veterans.

This subtheme presents the findings on what health care assistance government has extended to the chronically sick veterans of Kisoro District.

The study findings revealed that during Phase II of the Demobilisation of the NRA in 1994 government set up a health care fund to cater for the medical treatment of her veterans who had been demobilised on medical grounds; and had contracted various diseases while still in active service in the N.R.A. According to the Kisoro D.V.P.O's office out of a total number of 215 veterans on the district veterans' register, only 68 were demobilised on medical grounds. Thus, only 68 veterans were eligible to benefit from the health care fund in Kisoro District. However, as the study found out this was not the case.

During the study, it was reported by the D.V.P.O. that some veterans' discharge certificates indicated that they had been discharged voluntarily yet in reality they had been discharged on medical grounds. Such a category of veterans also applied for the health care fund and after verification by the district medical authorities they were found to be genuine cases to benefit from the health care fund. It was further found out that there were
even some other veterans who became chronically sick after being
demobilised from the army yet they had not been demobilised on
medical grounds. These too, applied for consideration under the
health care fund and many of them were found to be included in
the category of the beneficiaries. A VOCA (1997) baseline survey
reports similar complications in the administration of the health
care fund in Luwero and Soroti districts.

When interviewed as to how these unexpected and unplanned for
veterans in the health care fund were handled, the R.D.C. who is
the Chairperson of the DVAC had to this to say:-

We were overwhelmed by the big numbers of
sick veterans in comparison to the meagre
funds available, so we developed a system of
first come first serve; many veterans
continued to claim for support but we could
not assist when the funds had been
exhausted...

The inadequacy of the veterans' health care fund has not only
been a problem in Kisoro District alone. A VAP report (1995) on
the Evaluation of the Second phase of the Veterans Assistance
Programme Volume III reports similar findings in Kabarole,
Luwero and Soroti districts where the DVPOs and some veterans
reported that the health care fund could not support all the
chronically sick veterans who qualified for it.
To make matters worse even some veterans who had received some assistance still needed more because of the chronic nature of their sicknesses. One veteran, a corporal by rank aged 35 from Nyakabande Sub-county had this to narrate:

When I went to the hospital I was told I was suffering from tuberculosis. I was then offered money for treatment by the DVPO. Now, the DVPO has no more money to give me yet I am still sick. I need more assistance.

As a way of assisting the veterans who fell in this category it was learnt that such cases were referred to UVAB headquarters. It is worth noting however that this referral system was very short lived. The health care fund was introduced to the district in 1994; by 1996 that is only two years later, even UVAB headquarters could no longer handle any more referral cases from the district headquarters. A notice issued by UVAB management to all DVPOs dated 24th January 1996 stated:-

No new cases of health... will be handled until Phase III funds have been released. DVPOs are advised to take note of this and desist from forwarding veterans to UVAB headquarters. You will be notified when more funds are available.

At UVAB headquarters, the RIPM had this to say in relation to the above cases:

When the funds got exhausted we had no way out. The burden was left to the veterans families. It was a painful decision yet a reality.
The words of the RIPM above were confirmed in all the FGDs held with the veterans and the civilians. In both the veterans' and civilians' FGDs it was reported that the relatives of the veterans took over the responsibility of health care for their 'sons and daughters' (the veterans) after UVAB's failure to meet that obligation. One female participant in a civilian FGD in Busanza sub-county, a mother to a deceased veteran remarked:-

I treated my son with no assistance at all from government for thirteen months till he passed away. I always went to the DVPO's office at the district headquarters for assistance but I was always informed that the funds had got exhausted. I too had limited funds... may be if I had got some more funds from government my son would still be alive.

Given the inadequacy of the medical facilities in most of Uganda's health units the treatment of the chronically sick veterans had to be undertaken by their relatives when UVAB failed to do so.

The circular dated 24th January 1996 issued by UVAB management to all DVPOs instructing them not to refer to cases of sick veterans to UVAB headquarters was only lifted almost three years later in December 1998 by circular number 11/98, reference VAB/1/49 dated 8th December 1998 addressed to all DVPOs by the Executive Secretary (Chief Executive) of UVAB. This circular stated in part :-
A limited amount of money has been allocated this financial year (1998/99) for the enhanced health care of eligible and deserving cases of chronically ill veterans. Because of this financial limitation not every sick veteran can be assisted. However, deserving cases at the discretion of the DVAC on the recommendation of the DMO may be referred to Mulago Hospital as hardship cases. UVAB will meet the transport, up-keep and treatment costs while the patient is at Mulago...

The contents of the circular above have made the access to the health care fund by the deserving veterans even more stringent. In the first instance there is no more treatment of the veterans at the district headquarters. Further it is only the extremely sick veterans who can be considered given the tight financial situation of UVAB. Indeed by the time of this study (May to June 1999) that is six months after the issuance of the circular, out of the four veterans who have applied for health care assistance none has been approved by the DDHS and DVAC according to the records in the DVPO's Office.

The findings discussed in this sub-theme have revealed that the health care fund that government set up to cater for her chronically sick veterans has persistently been insufficient, on and off, unreliable and hard to access by all the would be beneficiaries. Health care provision to the chronically sick veterans, therefore still remains a daunting task for government.
4.4.2. Financial Assistance to the Disabled Veterans.

The disabled veterans were targeted for assistance under the UVAB veterans' disabled fund so that they could set up income generating projects as a step towards their economic re-integration into civilian life. During the study, it was found out from the records in the DVPO's office that out of the 33 veterans who had applied for assistance from the disabled veterans' fund only 7 were successful. Of the seven, one was severely disabled and received Ushs 200,000 while the other six, were moderately disabled and each received Ushs 150,000.

The major finding of this study was that the veterans who received the disabled funds to assist them set up income generating projects were not using the funds for the intended purpose. All the seven veterans who received the funds reported that the funds were not even enough to cater for the medical attention that they required in their state of disability. These veterans conceded that they could not set aside funds to invest yet they had the more immediate pressing need of medication. One of these veterans, a corporal by rank aged 30 in an FGD in Nyarusiza Sub-county put it clearly as:
We were attacked by rebels in northern Uganda when I was escorting a convoy of civilian vehicles from Lira town to Kitgum town. Bomb fragments hit my head and chest. Still, one time at battle when I was operating an anti-tank gun my eyes got injured and up to now I cannot see properly. I used the USh. 150,000 I got from the DVPO for only eye treatment and to buy eye glasses..., there is even no balance to treat my chest which is still aching. There is no way I could invest the money before I handle my health problems.

Such a view reveals that the disabled veterans of Kisoro District have nothing beyond their subsistence level as the funds intended for commercial activities (Income generating projects) have been used for medication purposes. This has undermined their economic re-integration into civilian life.

The issue therefore is, how do the disabled veterans cope up with the economic demands of civilian life given the fact that the supportive fund provided to them by government has not served the intended purpose? The RIPM at UVAB headquarters clarified the issue at hand as:

Apparently the issue of support to the disabled veterans is too expensive for government to adequately handle. We have left it at the good will of the veterans' families. We may revisit it in future if we get more funds.

Similarly, the RDC who is the Chairperson of the DVAC acknowledged this problem when he pointed out that the
rehabilitation of the disabled veterans and their re-integration into
civilian life is too expensive for government to handle alone. He
further observed that it should be a responsibility of both the
government and the communities of the veterans’ localities.

In all the FGDs of the veterans and civilians it was reported that
government has the obligation to assist the disabled veterans get
re-integrated into their civilian communities. However, it was also
pointed out in all the civilian FGDs that government had limited
capacity to meet all the obligations it owes her veterans. The
participants in these FGDs further observed that the disabled
veterans were being assisted by their families to meet the
economic demands of their day to day lives using the limited
means at their disposal. One opinion leader in an FGD in
Busanza Sub-county remarked:-

The disabled veterans are our loved children. Though we do not have much money we are
assisting them with the little we have to meet their daily survival needs so that they at least
do not become beggars... but we do not have the resources to assist them set up income
generating projects.

The words of the opinion leader above signal a strong community
spirit and will to assist government re-integrate the disabled
veterans into civilian life. The irony, however, is that the
communities are also resource constrained and hence can only
afford the simple day to day re-integration requirements of the
disabled veterans like food, and simple shelter yet the study
findings have already revealed that government is apparently
relying on the good will of the communities. The prospects of
viable economic re-integration of the disabled veterans into civilian
life are therefore still very bleak and for that matter it remains a
challenge to government for which it has not provided a plausible
solution.

4.5 ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT OF VETERANS

The concern of this theme was to investigate what measures
government has put in place to access finance, income generating
projects and employment opportunities to the veterans of Kisoro
District in its efforts to re-integrate them into civilian life.

4.5.1 Accessing Finance and Income Generating Projects to
Veterans

The study findings revealed that government paid UShs 558,935
to every veteran who was demobilised from the army. Table 2
shows how the funds received were to be spent.
Table 2. Allocations of Funds Received by Veterans After Demobilisation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Amount in UShs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) Clothing allowance</td>
<td>36,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Half settling in per diem</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Medical Care</td>
<td>17,435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Building materials</td>
<td>154,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Half ration allowance</td>
<td>126,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f) Agricultural tools and seeds</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>558,935</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UVAB Data Unit (1998)

In an interview with the Monitoring and Evaluation Officer (MEO) at UVAB Headquarters, it was reported that the above funds were simply supposed to assist the veterans for a period of only six months after being demobilised so that the veterans could start up a new civilian life. The observations of the MEO were corroborated with the words of the RIPM. The RIPM had this to say:-

The Ushs 558,935 which every veteran initially received was simply for reinserting the veteran back to the civilian community. It had nothing to do with re-integration aspects.
When further probed as to why government did not provide funds to the veterans for re-integration purposes right after demobilisation, the RIPM pointed out that the veterans were to be paid their pension and gratuity towards the end of the first year of demobilisation from the army and that this was the fund that they would use to set up income generating projects for their long term economic re-integration into civilian life. This situation meant that up to a full year after demobilisation veterans were not to have any funds from government to assist them engage in long term re-integration aspects like setting up income generating projects. This slowed the pace of their economic re-integration into civilian life.

Worse still, all the individual veterans interviewed reported that they had used the money (UShs 558,935) for the most immediate demands that they were confronted with when they returned home. This is what was even reported in all the FGDs of the veterans. One veteran, a private by rank, aged 30 from a veterans’ FGD in Busanza Sub-county had this to say:-

I was in the mobile force in Northern Uganda. I knew nothing like a home and my only asset in life was my gun. When I was demobilised from the army I had spent six years without coming home. I bought cutlerly, basins, clothes... and the money got finished.
A survey by VOCA (1997) in Soroti District also reveals that although, all veterans received a financial package upon discharge from military service, very few used it for local integration purposes as the money was spent on the most urgent issues related to basic survival such as food, medical treatment and clothes.

Given such a financial status that the veterans found themselves in, their only hope from government in terms of financial support lay in pension and gratuity. Demobilisation of the NRA started in December 1992 (Colleta et al, 1996) and according to Nanyumba (1992), the then N.R.A. Chief of Staff the veterans who had been demobilised in December 1992 were supposed to receive their pension and gratuity in August 1993. However, the study findings indicate that government did not honour its commitment. Records at Kisoro DVPO’s office revealed that out of a total number of 215 veterans on register in the District only 64 had been paid their pension and gratuity by July 1999. The records further showed that the first disbursement of pension from UVAB headquarters to the District was made in April 1998, three and a half years later after the promised time by the then N.R.A. Chief of Staff.
The 64 veterans so far paid (by July 1999) represented only 29.7% of all the eligible 215 veterans for pension and gratuity in the District and this is the percentage of veterans that has been paid from April 1998 to July 1999 (one year and two months).

The study findings revealed that it was the Ministry of Defence (MOD) that had not disbursed the funds to UVAB on the scheduled time so that UVAB could in turn pass it over to the veterans. The UVAB Public Relations/Veterans Welfare Officer similarly had this to say:

UVAB is the body responsible for the overall welfare of the veterans. But as for pension and gratuity it's the Ministry of Defence to calculate it and pass it over to UVAB because they are the ones who have the records of service for the veterans. Ministry of Defence also claims that the problem lies with the government's national treasury that has not availed to them the funds on schedule.

These findings indicate that government's plans of accessing her veterans to finance through pension and gratuity so that they can start up income generating projects have been frustrated by delayed releases of funds from the national treasury.

The study findings indicate that the veterans' lack of finance to start up income generating projects has been aggravated by the culture of military dependence harboured by most of the veterans.
While in the army the veterans depended entirely on the state for salary, food ration and clothing.

At the time of this study it was clear that most veterans had failed to disentangle themselves from this dependence syndrome and still expected government to provide for them. One veteran, a lance corporal by rank, aged 27 summarised the existing situation as:

The RDC is always telling us to approach our relatives and credit institutions for loans but why should we when government still owes money for which we fought and shed our blood. Government must give us our money first ... it is a must.

Such words still signal high expectations of handouts by veterans from government.

The dependency mentality of the veterans like the one quoted above was corroborated with the words of the C.A.O. who had this to say:-

Most veterans have not yet re-orientated their minds to the demands of civilian life where survival is a matter of personal ingenuity. They still look to government for everything ... for example they say that when they get their pension they will be able to undertake income generating projects. We are trying to counsel them to change that attitude but their response is very slow.
Mondo (1997) also reveals that veterans suffer from dependence syndrome and that many of them believe they cannot start viable income generating activities unless they are given grants by or through UVAB for capital.

These findings have revealed that government's efforts to counsel and advise the veterans to acquire personal funds instead of looking at only government for funding have been greatly undermined by the veterans slow response in re-orientating their minds to the civilian perspective of personal ingenuity and resourcefulness.

However, despite most of the veterans' failure to orientate themselves to civilian life there were a few who had tried to overcome the army dependency syndrome. These veterans had acquired some finances through selling their labour in petty road work contracts with the District Administration. The accruing finances were being invested in some income generating projects although they were deemed inadequate to enable the veterans run all their projects as they would have wished. One such case was of a veteran, a sergeant by rank, aged 52 from Nyakinama Sub-county. This veteran had a coffee plantation of about 1,000 trees, an irish potato garden of about 3 acres and a tomato garden
of about 2 acres. He however complained of lack of adequate finances to properly manage all his projects as he noted:

I do not have enough money to run all these projects properly though I need all of them. Buying pesticides for all those crops is too expensive for me to afford. This is the same problem that my colleague in Muramba Sub-county is facing. After selling the Irish potatoes and tomatoes I will stay with only coffee till I get more funds ... I have no alternative as of now.

This predicament to the veterans of lack of funds to sustain their projects is also noted by Mutambirwa's studies (1995) in Zimbabwe and Colleta et al's findings (1996) in other parts of Uganda.

The study findings have also revealed that government's failure to equip the veterans with business management skills has undermined the ability of the veterans to manage income generating projects even if they acquire some finances. The researcher learnt from the DVPO that some five veterans had attended a business management workshop organised by UVAB headquarters so that they would in turn train the other veterans. The DVPO however informed the researcher that due to logistical problems these veterans had not trained their colleagues. The predicament of lack of business management skills was echoed in all the veterans' and civilian FGDs. One opinion leader and Local
Council official in an FGD of civilians in Kisoro Town Council commented:

Business these days requires a lot of trickery and expertise which one acquires over time. You can make sales of Ushs 1,000,000 and you have a profit of only Ushs 50,000 out of it yet you have already used Ushs 200,000 for personal welfare ... this is why the few veterans who have got their pension funds and set up shops have failed. They have no business experience.

The DVR commenting on the business management capacity of his colleagues echoed similar sentiments:

Veterans have not yet adequately internalised the management of business, they cannot detach business funds from their domestic demands. I have always advised those who get their pension not rush into business and some have heeded to my advice. Those who ignored and rushed to open up shops have already failed.

A statement by UVAB (1996) on the position of the state of implementation of the veterans programme confirms the above findings that most income generating projects started by veterans have collapsed due to mainly weak management capacity among other factors.

Colleta et al (1996) reports similar findings in Ethiopia. He points out that an NGO, the Catholic Relief Services provided a rehabilitation grant to the veterans in form of a small scale credit scheme to the veterans to undertake micro-enterprise activities.
However, during the evaluation of the scheme it was discovered that lack of appropriate training for beneficiaries (especially in business skills) to manage the projects contributed to the failure of some of the projects.

The study findings revealed that government had taken deliberative affirmative action to ensure that her veterans get access to loans from the loan lending agencies particularly PAP and “Entandikwa” where government has injected its funds. Colleta et al (1996) reveals that the target group of the “Entandikwa” Credit Scheme is that Section of the population that cannot get access to credit from the conventional credit system and that the poor veterans would be beneficiaries. The PAP Second Edition of the Revised Technical and Financial Operational Manual (1997) also reveals that the demobilised soldiers (veterans) would be a major category of beneficiaries to the PAP loans. These were very feasible plans and efforts on the part of government to access finance to her veterans through loans so that they could start up income generating projects.

The study findings revealed that all the veterans had applied for loans from the “Entandikwa” Credit Scheme and PAP. However, due to several conditionalities attached to these loans, government’s good intentions for her veterans were not realised
when it came to the actual implementation of these credit schemes on the ground.

The conditionalities included the high interest rates which often discouraged the veterans from applying for the loans. "Entandikwa" Credit Scheme (ECS) loans carry an interest of 16%, in addition to being paid in full a year after disbursement to the beneficiary (Trondsen, 1997). According to the PAP Second Edition of the Revised Technical and Financial Operation Manual (1997) the interest on PAP loans is 22% charged on a declining loan balance. The C.A.O. who is the Chairperson of the District steering committee of the ECS, and a member of the DVAC when interviewed about the veterans' access to the ECS funds remarked:

We were confident from the start that many veterans would benefit from the ECS but unfortunately the interest rates have scared many of them. These interest rates are the same all over the country and we cannot do otherwise.

The CAO's observations were corroborated with those of one veteran, a private by rank aged 30 from an FGD of veterans in Nyakabande Sub-County when he observed:
What investment will I make and make profit with borrowed funds of a high interest rate and moreover I have to pay within one year. I fear the ECS officials to sell my little property when I fail to pay.

The above veteran’s views were expressed by all the individual veterans interviewed and they were further expressed in all the FGDs held with the veterans. These findings show that high interest rates attached to loans of the ECS have undermined government’s measures of accessing her veterans to finance through loans. Consequently the veterans continue to lack funds to start up income generating projects.

On the other hand the study found out that even the few veterans who could afford the interest rate were discriminated against by some officials involved in the approval of the ECS loans. These veterans accused the ECS officials of deliberately ignoring their loan applications on the grounds that no veteran could afford to repay the loan as succinctly put forward by one veteran, a private by rank aged 57 from Nyakabande Sub-county who remarked:-

These ECS officials think that all veterans are too poor to afford a loan. It is true the majority of the veterans are very poor but some of us have some reasonable projects at home. This is why I need this money to improve on those projects. I should be given a chance.
To verify the claims of the above veteran the Sub-county (Local Council III Chairperson) of the veteran’s Sub-county of residence was interviewed about the status of the veteran’s application for the ECS. The Chairperson did not mince his words. He said:

Officials of the ECS Committee in the Sub-county are not yet confident about the veterans’ abilities to repay the loans. If experienced civilians with sound business fail to pay, what of a veteran who is a starter and inexperienced. We are still studying them.

These findings are similar to those in Luwero and Mukono Districts presented in a baseline survey by VOCA (1997) where of all the veterans, interviewed, three quarters complained that they were being discriminated by most credit institutions.

The study further revealed that the lengthy and complicated procedures of some loan lending agencies have frustrated government’s efforts of accessing finance to her veterans and hence the latter’s failure to engage in income generating activities. It was reported by all the individual veterans interviewed and in all the FGDs of the veterans and civilians that the procedures for loan acquisition from agencies like PAP are very tedious and discourage those willing to apply for the loans. One veteran, a sergeant by rank, aged 52 from Nyakinama Sub-county had this to say:-
When I visited the PAP office in Kisoro Town, the officer in-charge read to me a lengthy list of the requirements needed to qualify for a loan. The requirements were too many ... I immediately gave up.

The Sub-county Chief of the sub-county where the above veteran comes from did not have a different view of the PAP's procedure either.

He remarked:

The beauracracy in PAP is too long and discouraging. Most veterans cannot meet those requirements. They better try elsewhere.

These findings are similar to those of Luwero District presented in a baseline survey report by VOCA (1997) where it was reported that some NGO's have very strict criteria that have at times kept away veterans from benefiting from their services. Appendices H and I outline some of the requirements of the PAP before one is accessed to a loan. These are indeed very stringent and lengthy procedures which most veterans cannot fulfill.

The study findings further showed that the requirement of well prepared and appraised project proposals by the loan lending agencies has made it difficult for the veterans to acquire loans from these agencies – and hence their failure to start up income
generating projects. The Chairperson Local Council V who is also a member of DVAC noted:

The majority of NGOs who have programmes running in the district target such disadvantaged groups like the veterans. But these veterans cannot afford the expenses to document their ideas for funding. Without a project proposal no-one can fund them.

The above view shows that veterans have failed to access loans because they cannot afford the consultancy fees of preparing project proposals.

A similar view was expressed in an FGD of civilians in Nyakabande Sub-county where one of the participants, a prominent farmer and business man said:-

I had to pay UShs 200,000 to an agriculture expert to prepare for me a proposal which I want to sell to EDF for funding. Veterans cannot afford to pay the UShs 200,00 and therefore cannot get a proposal for funding...

Colleta et al (1996) reveals that individuals and communities can have access to the funds of the EDF Micro projects programme if the project they wish to be funded is economically and socially viable, monitorable among other conditionalities. All these conditionalities require technical expertise for proposal writing which the veterans cannot afford to contract.
It was found out during the study that most of the loan lending agencies preferred to deal with groups of individuals and individuals within groups instead of individuals on a one to one basis. This is because the groups would act as guarantors for the individual and the group members would be held liable in the event of an individual defaulting. However, the study findings revealed that most veterans were not in favour of joining the groups either with other civilians or veterans alone because they feared to lose their meagre savings as one veteran, a private by rank aged 34 from Busanza Sub-county put it:

How do I join a group to be a guarantor of others with my very little money at my disposal? To me it cannot make sense. May be in future when I get extra money to spend elsewhere. As of now I will struggle alone so that I have no one to blame for my failures.

The above sentiments were similarly shared by most of the individual veterans interviewed and by the majority of the veteran participants in the FGDs.

The views of the veterans were corroborated with those of the DISO who is also a member of the DVAC. He remarked as follows about the veterans disdain for group formation Visa vis loan acquisition:-
What I have noted during my one year of service in Kisoro District is that these veterans are selfish. They do not want to join groups of other civilians or other veterans to work together..., they will find it difficult to get loans from PAP and ECS. This was the same problem in Rukungiri District where I was before I was transferred to Kisoro.

The CAO who is a member of the DVAC and the District Steering Committees of the ECS and PAP, concurred with the DISO when interviewed about the veterans' prospects for loans from PAP and ECS. He pointed out:-

PAP and ECS loans are given mostly to groups because they have to be guaranteed by group members and we want as many people as possible to benefit. If veterans are to benefit they have to join existing groups or form theirs. Group formation is the most plausible answer to access these loans.

The findings above have amply articulated the tendency of the veterans of Kisoro District to prefer to engage in individual ventures as opposed to joint ones. Similar findings are cited by a report on the baseline survey by VOCA (1997) in Mukono and Kabarole Districts where most veterans also preferred to work individually with their families as opposed to forming groups.

This individualistic tendency as opposed to the pillars of group formation of the PAP and ECS has definitely made the veterans
not to acquire loans hence being unable to engage in income generating projects. Colleta et al (1996: 266) while commenting on the criteria of accessibility to the ECS loans reveals that:

Loans, ... can be extended to both groups and individuals although the former option is preferred to increase the multiplier effect.

Such a situation renders the veterans with very minimal chances for loan acquisition.

4.5.2 Accessing Employment Opportunities to Veterans

The study findings revealed that government has no deliberate set out policy as regards accessing employment opportunities to veterans. The provision of employment to the veterans is a matter that government has largely divested itself from and it has largely remained an issue of personal initiative and ingenuity on the part of the individual veterans. With regard to the reasons why government could not find employment for her veterans who qualify to work in other government departments and public bodies, the UVAB Public Relations Officer had this to say:

The demobilisation of the NRA was part of the wider scheme of reducing public expenditure and it affected all public institutions and it is still going on. As of now it is impossible to re-deploy the veterans in the government departments and public bodies.

Coupled with the above, the RDC of Kisoro District advanced a similar view. He said:-
With the present scheme of privatisation and divestiture going on government is not the major employer of her citizens and this also applies to the veterans. Apparently, government has no policy to re-employ the veterans.

These findings indicate that government as of now has no capacity to re-employ her veterans in its public sector.

The situation discussed above has therefore rendered the government unable to access jobs to her veterans who qualify for employment in the public sector yet it would have been an easier alternative because this is where government has control.

However, some attempts are still being made. The study findings revealed that veterans who have the relevant qualifications were being assisted to acquire employment in the District Administration in case of availability of vacancies. The C.A.O. who is a member of the DVAC and the head of the public service in the district when interviewed about the veterans' prospects for employment said:

Vacancies regularly exist in the district due to retirement, deaths, old age. When filling these vacancies veterans who qualify are given some priority. Already the district is employing twelve veterans.

This information was verified in the staff pay roll of the district. Of the twelve veterans, two are drivers, one is a teacher, one is an
accounts assistant and eight are Local Administration Police personnel.

In all the veterans' FGDs, it was reported that most of their colleagues who have the required qualifications have been assisted to acquire jobs in the district administration. This assistance given to the veterans by the district administration during the recruitment of personnel was further confirmed by a veteran from Nyarusiza Sub-county, a lieutenant by rank, aged 43. He said:-

Most of our colleagues who have applied for jobs at the district headquarters have succeeded. It is surprising that they beat other civilians during the interviews ... we did not expect it to be so.

This exclusive assistance given to the veterans of Kisoro District to secure employment is not new in Uganda. After the second World War (1939 – 45) the Ugandan Protectorate government assisted her veterans in a similar manner. According to the Civil Re-absorption Progress Report (1947) the government issued a directive that ex-servicemen be given preference in appointment to any vacancy in government service for which they qualified and its reported that 1,503 ex-servicemen secured employment through the Civil Re-absorption Office.

However, in order for the veterans to continue enjoying such preferential employment treatment in the district they must have
the entrance to compete for the jobs in form of the required education training. If UVAB does not resurrect its education and vocational training programme for the veterans then they will have no access to the employment opportunities in the district.

It is important to note that employment is a key factor to successful economic, social and political re-integration of the veterans into civilian life. Employment provides the veteran with the financial means to purchase assets like land, cater for one's self and family when sick, upgrade one's skills through further education and training and at the same time boldly socialise with the society members in social and political circles.

The study further revealed that UVAB is continuously playing its role of advocacy and lobbying for the veterans to secure employment in the private sector. The RIPM reported that UVAB has intensified its network with the private sector so that the veterans who qualify would be absorbed in their private bodies. However it was established from the RIPM that the private sector where veterans are on demand is mainly the security agencies where the veterans' military skills are seen as the most appropriate remedy to the rapid urbanisation going on in the country with its associated evils like robbery, burglary among others. When asked why UVAB has not largely succeeded in
placing the veterans in other private organisations the RIPM had this to say:-

Veterans can favourably compete in the security industry because this is their domain. In other fields they can be beaten by more experienced people ..., as for security veterans are the elites and indeed they are dominating the private security firms.

The DVPO verified the claims of the RIPM above when he revealed that of the twenty veterans who had been recommended to various private security firms in Kampala to work as guards none had been rejected.

In all the FGDs with the veterans, it was reported that their only consolation should all efforts to acquire employment fail was to join the private security firms because this is where their skills are highly marketable. One veteran, a corporal by rank aged 30 from Nyarusiza Sub-county remarked:-

I know we are needed by all organisations in Kampala and other towns for guard duties because we are better than the police. My friends have already been recruited. If I fail to get employment elsewhere I will just go to Kampala and get employment within one day.

These findings show that there is a ready market for employing the veterans in private security firms though some veterans see it as last resort. It is evident therefore that UVAB has assisted the veterans to easily find employment where their skills are highly
envied. This advocacy and lobbying role for the veterans by UVAB was also reported by Mondo (1997) that UVAB has established a rapport with some employers who have taken on the veterans especially in private security firms.

This theme investigated what measures government had undertaken to access the veterans of Kisoro District to finance, income generating projects and employment opportunities as a way of re-integrating them into civilian life. The findings of the study have revealed that government availed cash to the veterans in terms of a transitory safety net package, established a pension and gratuity scheme for the veterans, trained some few veterans in business management, advised veterans to acquire loans from the loan lending agencies like ECS and PAP. However government's efforts have not been very successful due to the inadequacy of the transitory safety net package, the delayed payment of pension and gratuity, lack of enough funds to train most veterans in business management skills, high interest rates and the lengthy frustrating procedures of the loan lending agencies, lack of project proposals for funding by the veterans' and the veterans individualistic tendency to work alone as opposed to the requirements of group formation by the loan lending agencies hence being unable to acquire loans. As for employment, the structural adjustment
programmes of reducing the size of the public sector have rendered government unable to redeploy her veterans who qualify to work elsewhere in the public sector. It is only Kisoro District Administration and the private security sector that have offered some employment to the veterans though some veterans see the employment in private security firms as not very attractive and hence a last resort.

The accessing of finance, income generating projects and employment opportunities to the veterans still remains a daunting challenge for which government has not provided an adequate answer hence slowing down the pace of government in the re-integration of her veterans into civilian life.

4.6. Counteracting Community Stigmatisation of the Veterans.

The focus of this theme was to find out what measures government had put in place to counteract community stigmatisation of the veterans of Kisoro District in its attempts to re-intergrate them into civilian life.

4.6.1 Public Relations Programmes.

During the study it was found out from the UVAB Public Relations Officer that demobilisation of the N.R.A. (now UPDF) was
the first official mass demobilisation of the army by any government in Uganda since 1962 when Uganda acquired her independence. The demobilisation of the army was therefore a new phenomenon in the lives of many Ugandans. According to the UVAB Public Relations Officer, UVAB carried out massive sensitisation campaigns in form of seminars with district leaders, district tours to meet with the communities so that the demobilisation programme could be explained and to seek for community support in the re-integration of the veterans into civilian life. DVPOs were appointed in all districts of Uganda to carry out public relations to promote good relationship between the civilians and the veterans; to assist the veterans to resettle and re-integrate into civilian life in consultation with district officials, NGOs, local chiefs, opinion leaders and the entire civilian populace. Radio programmes to publicise the programme were also introduced on several radio stations so that the civilian population could receive the veterans with a positive spirit. DVACs were also formed in all districts throughout the country to oversee the implementation of the VAP in their respective districts and to advise UVAB on any weaknesses in the implementation of the VAP and also to make proposals for rectifying them. Veterans were therefore received in communities that had prior knowledge of their arrival.
The study findings revealed that the veterans had been encouraged by their relatives to join the NRA bush war because of the support that the then NRA guerillas enjoyed in the area of study. One would have expected that on returning home the veterans would have been received as heroes right away. However, as the study found out this was not the case. The veterans were received with some latent resistance manifested by labelling them as “army out casts and retrenches”

Asked why this was so, the participants in all the civilian FGDs reported that the communities had developed a misconception about the veterans that their behaviour had been negatively influenced by other poorly behaved army factions that had been integrated in the NRA. One participant in a civilian FGD in Kisoro Town Council Succinctly put it;

If you eat, live and work with a thief, chances are high that you will be influenced to become a thief also.

In view of such remarks the veterans were received with some suspicion in their localities.

The study findings however revealed that the KDVCAC conducted several sensitisation tours throughout the district to allay the fears of the communities about the veterans. The sensitisation
campaigns proved successful and by the time of this study the veterans were enjoying cordial social relationships with other civilians in their localities. One veteran, a private by rank, aged 30 from Nyakabande Sub-county clearly put it:

In the beginning I experienced some silent suspicion from the community, but now I have no problem with the people in my village. I am seen as a liberator by my villagemates and I enjoy their guidance in my day to day life.

The above veteran’s views were corroborated with those of the Local Council V Chairperson who noted:

Communities are no longer having any resentment and suspicion about the veterans. Veterans are now totally accepted in their localities.

The study further revealed that the veterans of Kisoro District have exploited the existing community goodwill in their localities to consolidate their social acceptance into their communities. Veterans have behaved well and shown the desire to co-operate with the rest of the civilians.

In all the civilian FGDs only two cases of deviant social behaviour by the veterans were cited. Veterans were reported to be well behaved, living peacefully with the community, respectful to the local leaders and other civilians, freely attending community social functions, and law abiding. That is why the community members
were not treating them with suspicion and also they were now being trusted by the local leadership.

The findings in the civilian the FGDs were further corroborated with the individual veterans’ interviewed. One veteran a private by rank, aged 57 from Nyakabande Sub-county had this to say:-

I have no problem with the community, I am disciplined and this is why I have peacefully settled at home. The way one handles himself is the way he is received.

In the same vein another veteran, a Lieutenant by rank aged 43 from Nyarusiza Sub-county remarked:

There is no social function in my area to which I am not invited. This is because I freely mix with people, eat with them, attend funerals and other social obligations, I am generally well behaved in the community.

Colleta et al (1996) notes that in Uganda and Ethiopia veterans accelerated their acceptance into their communities by displaying will power, submission and discipline in their respective localities. The study findings also revealed that the veterans have acquired political acceptance in their respective localities. At least each of the twelve local district officials interviewed admitted that in his or her area there was at least a veteran on a Local Council Committee. These officials acknowledged that the country wide exposure that the veterans received while in the army was seen as an important input to their localities and that is why the civilians
often elected the veterans to be members of the Local Council Committees.

It was even more interesting when the study found out that veterans had the capacity to compete for high political offices like the one of sub-county (Local Council III) Chairperson. The Local Council III Chairperson of Chahi Sub-county clearly revealed the might of the veterans' political influence in the communities. He said:-

I competed with one veteran for the Local Council III Chairpersonship, he was the third out of the four candidates but the margin of votes was not very big. He is gaining more and more popularity. If I do not work hard he can beat me next time.

This is a clear manifestation of political acceptance of the veterans by the civilians.

The concern of this theme was to investigate what measures government had put in place to counteract community stigmatisation of the veterans of Kisoro District. The study findings have revealed that government instituted a massive public relations machinery through sensitisation tours of the civilian population, setting up DVACs, appointing DVPOs, conducting radio programmes on veterans aimed at ensuring that the civilian population receives the veterans in a positive context.
The veterans were therefore, released from the army into a well sensitised civilian community about their plight.

The findings have revealed that the veterans of Kisoro District have been socially and politically accepted into their localities by the civilians and at the same time the veterans have also learnt how to live in the community and participate in the social and political activities of the communities. Community stigmatisation of the veterans is therefore no longer a challenge to government as it struggles to re-integrate her veterans of Kisoro District into civilian life.
CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This Chapter presents the summary of the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the study.

5.2 Summary.

The study has revealed that government put in place several interventions to assist the veterans get re-integrated into civilian life. These interventions included a resettlement programme for landless veterans, an educational/vocational training programme to enable the veterans acquire locally marketable skills, a health care fund for the chronically sick veterans and financial assistance to the disabled veterans to improve on their health status and assist them set up income generating projects, assisting the veterans to acquire finance and thus engage in income generating projects and self-employment and counteracting community stigmatisation of the veterans through various public relations programmes. However, most of these interventions were constrained by several factors and therefore government is still faced with numerous challenges on its way to fully re-integrate her veterans into civilian life.
The study has revealed that due to shortage of funds UVAB has not undertaken the resettlement of the landless veterans of Kisoro District. These veterans are therefore still constrained by the shortage of land and cannot therefore engage in large scale agricultural production to enable them have surplus products for sale to boost their economic status. This category of veterans therefore is still grappling with economic re-integration.

The study has further disclosed that the educational/vocational training programme that was meant to equip the veterans with locally marketable skills to enable them acquire employment in the formal sector and also to make the veterans self-employed did not meet the intended objectives. Due to shortage of funds, all eligible veterans have not been trained, even those trained were not availed with tools to create their own employment and hence became job seekers. Further, the training periods were too short to enable the veterans master the skills hence rendering them less competent than other practitioners already on the labour market. Irrelevant training in disciplines that are already saturated on the labour market and lack of the required academic qualifications by the veterans to join the training institutions also featured prominently in this programme. All these short comings made the vocational/educational training programme achieve very dismal
success and therefore economic re-integration of the veterans through this intervention has been negligible.

The study findings further revealed that the health care fund set up by government to cater for the chronically sick veterans has been persistently insufficient, unreliable, on and off and hard to access by all the would-be beneficiaries. The health problems of the chronically sick veterans have rendered them unable to engage in productive economic activities hence their failure to get economically re-integrated into civilian life. As for the disabled veterans, the funds they received from government to set up income generating projects have instead been used for medication purposes – hence being unable to engage in economic activities.

With regard to accessing finance, income generating projects and employment opportunities to the veterans, the study revealed that government established a pension and gratuity scheme for the veterans, trained some few veterans in business management, advised veterans to acquire loans from loan lending agencies like ECS and PAP. However, government’s efforts have not been very successful due to the delayed payment of pension and gratuity to the veterans, lack of enough funds to train most veterans in business management skills, high interest rates and lengthy frustrating procedures of the loan lending agencies, lack of project
proposals for funding by the veterans and the veterans' individualistic tendency to work alone as opposed to the requirements of group formation by the loan lending agencies hence being unable to acquire loans. As for employment, the structural adjustment programmes of reducing the size of the public sector have rendered government unable to redeploy her veterans who qualify to work elsewhere in the public sector. It is only Kisoro District Administration and the private security sector that have offered some employment to the veterans.

With regard to community stigmatisation of the veterans the study has revealed that this is no longer a challenge to government. The intensive public relations campaigns that government put in place to ensure that the veterans were accepted by their communities have been successful. This has been accelerated by the exemplary behaviour that the veterans have exhibited in their localities. The veterans have achieved political and social re-integration into civilian life but economic re-integration still eludes most of them.

5.3 Conclusions

In view of the findings of the study in the preceding chapter, the researcher made the following conclusions.
Successful re-integration of the veterans into civilian life is a complex and long process requiring a multi-pronged approach and various forms of support. Re-integration into civilian life can be broadly categorised into two interrelated elements; social-political and economic re-integration. Under the social-political re-integration a veteran and his family are fully accepted into the community by its members and at the same time the veteran and his family learn how to live in the new community and also fully participate in the community's civic functions. Economic re-integration is where the veteran and his family have establishment a viable economic base for themselves and can afford to earn a living independent of outside financial resources at least commensurate with the conditions in their localities.

Government put up measures to ensure that her veterans of Kisoro District smoothly get re-integrated into civilian life. However, measures may be put in place but the extent to which they address the intended objective can be a daunting challenge. Through her interventions, government has succeeded in achieving social and political re-integration of the veterans of Kisoro District into civilian life. However, her measures to foster the veterans' economic re-integration have not yielded much fruit
and the majority of the veterans are still grappling with economic re-integration.

In all therefore, government is still faced with a serious challenge of economically re-integrating the veterans of Kisoro district into civilian life which has to be overcome if it is to achieve the desired goal of a holistically well re-integrated veteran.

5.4 Recommendations

The recommendations being advanced are derived from the empirical findings of this study. It is anticipated that government will use the recommendations to take appropriate action in the areas where her efforts of re-integrating the veterans of Kisoro District into civilian life are ineffective.

1. The study revealed that due to shortage of funds UVAB has not been able to resettle the landless veterans of Kisoro District. The study established that the logistics and operations involved are too expensive for UVAB to resettle all the landless veterans at a go country wide. However, most of these operations arise as a result of UVAB's over-centralised nature of the resettlement programme. All the operations and overhead expenditures involved are no longer pragmatic to the problem yet they are making the
whole programme unnecessarily expensive. All what the landless veterans need is land. It is therefore recommended that the resettlement fund be decentralised to district level. At district level, the DVACs would appraise the cases of the landless veterans, priorities them and then handle cases in order of priority. Under this arrangement the DVACs would undertake the purchase of land for the landless veterans from individuals in other parts of the country and get the veterans resettled there. Under this decentralised approach of land acquisition the veterans' rights over land in terms of ownership will be guaranteed and therefore their morale for agricultural production will be boosted unlike in the gazetted resettlement schemes where the veterans have no land ownership rights. The funds saved would then be used for more land purchases for the veterans.

2. It is also evident in the study that the educational/vocational training programme was planned without due regard to the demands of the labour market and training needs of individual veterans. Veterans therefore received irrelevant training and ended up being jobless and therefore received irrelevant training and ended up being jobless.

Therefore it is recommended that the resettlement fund be decentralised to district level. At district level, the DVACs would appraise the cases of the landless veterans, priorities them and then handle cases in order of priority. Under this arrangement the DVACs would undertake the purchase of land for the landless veterans from individuals in other parts of the country and get the veterans resettled there. Under this decentralised approach of land acquisition the veterans' rights over land in terms of ownership will be guaranteed and therefore their morale for agricultural production will be boosted unlike in the gazetted resettlement schemes where the veterans have no land ownership rights. The funds saved would then be used for more land purchases for the veterans.
seekers. They also received no tools after the vocational training and they did not receive ample training to compete on the labour market. It is therefore recommended that for future training programmes a thorough market study on the demands of the labour market be made before designing the training programmes. Further, a training needs assessment for individual veterans be made so that the veterans join specific institutions to equip them with the necessary skills instead of forcing them to join institutions simply because they are the ones available.

3. Refresher and upgrading courses should be a major component of the training programme so that the veterans trained can always cope up with the ever changing demands of the labour market.

4. Vocational education with no tools renders the recipient of the education unable to create self-employment yet it is the pillar of vocationalisation. This is what the veterans are experiencing. It is therefore recommended that government must set aside funds to procure tools to give to the veterans being trained in vocational institutions so that they can create their own employment. This is a better way of benefiting from the vocational training programme instead
of prospecting for formal employment in a tight and competitive labour market like that of Uganda.

5. The study revealed that some veterans are too old and others do not possess the required academic qualifications to join the conventional education/vocational training institutions. It is recommended that for such veterans, government should promote the informal sector apprenticeship training programme. This programme would be manned by master craftsmen in the localities of the veterans and thereby moving training close to the point of production and employment.

6. The study revealed that the existing health care fund that government set up to cater for the chronically sick veterans has been persistently insufficient, on and off, unreliable and hard to access by all the would be beneficiaries. It should be noted that a veteran suffering from a chronic disease like tuberculosis needs continuous treatment till he or she recovers and government has no short cut to such a situation. It is therefore recommended that the enhanced health care fund be ideally made a permanent feature of the re-integration programme. The funding for this component should be increased given the high costs involved in treating
the chronic diseases. If the chronically sick veterans are not given the required treatment early enough it will mean prolonged sickness and therefore inability to engage in gainful economic activities hence their inability to economically get re-integrated into civilian life.

7. The study has shown that the funds given to the disabled veterans to start up income generating projects were instead used by these veterans for the more pressing demands of medication. Government does not have enough funds to handle the physical rehabilitation of these veterans and at the same time avail them with funds to start up income generating projects. The researcher therefore recommends that government networks with NGOs engaged in several areas of community based rehabilitation so that the veterans with physical impairments are incorporated into the programmes of those NGOs. This measure could assist the disable veterans not to divert the funds meant to set up income generating activities to the pressing needs of medication.

8. The physical rehabilitation of a disabled veteran to make him overcome his or her physical impairment and thereby be able to engage in gainful economic activities is an
expensive venture which consumes considerable incomes of
the family of the disabled veteran. The recommendation
made here therefore is that credit schemes like
"Entandikwa", PAP and others should consider the existence
of a disabled veteran in the family as one of the criteria for
selecting the beneficiaries. The study has revealed that
there is tremendous family will and support to assist the
disabled veterans get re-integrated into civilian life. Such a
preferential measure of access to loan funds would reinforce
this family will and support.

9. The study revealed that the financial requirements of the
veterans' re-integration have been left to UVAB alone to
meet. It is too dear a task for UVAB to execute alone. It is
therefore recommended that Kisoro District Administration
sets aside some funds in its budget for veterans' re-
integration activities.

10. Availing capital to the veterans through pension and
gratuity is a key issue to enable the veterans start income
generating projects. The researcher therefore recommends
that government expedites the payment of the veteran's
pension and gratuity. This should be followed by intensive
training of the veterans in business management skills so
that they invest their pension and gratuity funds in viable income generating projects. After acquiring business acumen, the veterans can then be assisted to acquire loans from loan lending agencies like PAP and ECS. District government based staff would then assist the veterans to develop project proposals and also to form groups so that they can access the loans from the loan lending agencies.

11. In cases of veterans who wish to join formal employment ranks, government should send them for further training so that they acquire highly enviable skills to propell them through the tight and competitive labour market.

All in all, the successful re-integration of the veterans by government into civilian life is a case of human rights for the veterans. It is the case of the right to lead a descent life after being a soldier. Government is called upon to intensify her efforts and lobby the NGOs, district, civil society and all other stakeholders to ensure that she successfully re-integrates her veterans into civilian life. Short of that, the trauma and bitterness of war may send the veterans to re-organise and start war again or even join the many rebel factions that are currently fighting government.
5.5. **Suggestions for further Research**

1. Given the limited resources (financial, human and time) at the researcher's disposal the study was only conducted in one district of Uganda yet all districts in Uganda have UPDF veterans. A similar study could therefore be conducted in other parts of the country.

2. Some veterans passed away after returning home, some are survived by widows and families. Future research should focus on the coping mechanisms of the veterans' widows and their families.
REFERENCES


Uganda Veterans Assistance Board Data Unit, 1998, Kampala, Uganda.


APPENDIX A

Recurrent Expenditure for Selected Ministries.

1986/87 - 1990/91 (% of total).

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<thead>
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The Republic of Uganda.

APPENDIX B

Development Expenditure for Selected Ministries.

1986/87 - 1990/91 (% of total).

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The Republic of Uganda.

Appendix C. THE LOCATION OF KISORO DISTRICT IN UGANDA

APPENDIX D

INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

1. What is government's Policy on Veterans?

2. What measures has government made to smoothly re-integrate the veterans into civilian life? How successful have these measures been?

PROBES

What assistance has government extended to the veterans in the following areas?

- Provision of land to the landless veterans
- Equipping the veterans with locally marketable skills through education and vocational training.
- Health care for the chronically sick and financial assistance to the disabled veterans.
- Accessing finance, employment and income generating projects to the veterans.
- Counteracting community stigmatisation of the veterans.

3. What are the indicators of re-integration of a veteran into civilian life? To what extent has government succeeded in re-integrating the veterans into civilian life?
4. Do you have any suggestion as to how government can improve on its measures to re-integrate the veterans into civilian life?

5. If yes, what are the suggestions and why do you suggest so?
INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR 25 VETERANS OF VARIOUS ARMY RANKS

1. Personal data
   (i) Sub-county of residence
   (ii) Sex
   (iii) Age
   (iv) Rank at the time of demobilisation from the army.

2. Why were you demobilised from the army?

3. Since you were demobilised, what assistance has government extended to you to enable you get re-integrated into civilian life?

PROBES
- Provision of land to the landless veterans
- Equipping you with locally marketable skills through education and vocational training.
- Health care and financial assistance (in case of chronically sick and disabled veterans).
- Assisting you to access finance, employment and income generating projects.
- Assisting you to Counteract community stigmatisation.
- Was the assistance adequate and did you receive it on the scheduled time?

- How did you utilise this assistance?

4. What do you consider for a veteran to say that he or she has been re-integrated into civilian life? Give reasons for your answer.

5. Do you have any suggestions to government as to how it could improve on its measures to re-integrate the veterans into civilian life? If yes, what are the suggestions and why do you suggest so?
APPENDIX F

FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION GUIDE FOR VETERANS

TOPIC 1

Since you were demobilised from the army what assistance has government extended to you to enable you get re-integrated into civilian life?

PROBES

- Provision of land to landless veterans.
- Equipping veterans with locally marketable skills through education and vocational training.
- Health care to the chronically sick and financial assistance to the disabled.
- Assisting you to access finance, employment and income generating projects.
- Counteracting community stigmatisation of the veterans.
- Was the assistance adequate and did you receive it on the scheduled time?
- How did you utilise this assistance?
TOPIC 2

Generally, what is your view about government's efforts to re-integrate the veterans into civilian life?

PROBES

- As veterans what would you consider in order to say that a veteran has been fully re-integrated into civilian life?

- Has government succeeded in re-integrating the veterans into civilian life? Give reasons for your answer.

TOPIC 3

As Veterans, do you have any suggestions to give to government in order to improve on its efforts to re-integrate you into civilian life?

If yes, what are the suggestions?

PROBE

- Why do you give those particular suggestions?
FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION GUIDE FOR CIVILIANS IN SUB-COUNTIES.

TOPIC 1
Do you have veterans in your sub-county?

PROBE
- What do they do to earn a living?

TOPIC 2
Since the veterans returned home, what assistance has the government extended to them to enable them get re-integrated into civilian life?

PROBES
- Provision of land to the landless veterans.
- Equipping them with locally marketable skills through education and vocational training.
- Health care to the chronically sick and financial assistance to the disabled.
- Assisting them to access finance, employment and income generating projects.
- Counteracting community stigmatisation of the veterans
- Was the assistance adequate and did the veterans receive it on the scheduled time?
- How did the veterans utilise this assistance?

**TOPIC 3**

How would you describe a veteran who has been fully re-integrated into civilian life.

**PROBES**

Has government succeeded in re-integrating the veterans into civilian life? Give reasons for your answer.

**TOPIC 4**

Do you have any suggestions to government in order to improve on its measures to re-integrate the veterans into civilian life?

**PROBES**

If yes, why do you suggest so?
APPENDIX H

CRITERIA FOR IDENTIFYING INDIVIDUALS AS BENEFICIARIES TO BENEFIT FROM PAP

The following criteria will be used to identify individual beneficiaries:

a) Must be a known resident with a house and assets in the area.

b) Must be willing to attend training and utilize the available extension staff services.

c) Must be willing to sign a loan agreement with PAP or intermediary Entity (IE)

d) Must be willing to give PAP or IE postdated cheques according to the repayment schedule.

e) The members of the immediate family must be supportive towards the micro-project activities in which the individual is involved.

f) Must be honest, reliable, hardworking with a sound mind and good health and within an age limit of 18 – 65 years.

g) Must not have another outstanding loan which may make it difficult for the borrower to service the loan.

h) Must not try to get a loan through a group/Cooperative Society/CBO, at the same time.
i) Must have saved at least 20% of the loan requirement in his/her account in a financial institution, which may be put on PAP's/IE's higher interest earning account until the loan is repaid. Individuals should progressively save beyond the 20% even after acquisition of the loan.

j) Must produce an up-front contribution of 20% of the loan requirement in cash or kind in addition to 20% savings as specified above.

k) Must display clear conception of the micro-project one intends to undertake.

l) Must be certified by Area Local Councils (LCs) and Chiefs as a bonafide resident of the area.

m) Must be guaranteed by two members of the community, who have properties of substantial value and are resident in the area. The guarantors must attend the meeting of guarantors just before the loan is advanced.

n) The next of kin must sign a document indicating that he/she accepts to take over the assets and liabilities of the applicant.

o) The micro-project must be her/his primary activity.

APPENDIX I

CRITERIA FOR SELECTION OF INDIVIDUALS WITHIN COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES AND CBO's TO BENEFIT FROM PAP

The Credit Scheme Policy requires that for the individual within a group to participate in the project, one must fulfill the following rules and regulations:

(a) Must be a fully paid up member of a group/Cooperative Society/CBO.

(b) Must be known by the group/Cooperative Society/CBO Committee Members to honest, respectable, trustworthy, credit worthy and a hardworking person (a person of proven honesty and who is industrious with a record of keeping financial obligations).

(c) Must attend regular group/Cooperative Society/CBO meetings organized by the group/Cooperative society/CBO.

(d) Must have a sound repayment plan and agree to repay his/her portion of the loan on timely basis and have a regular savings regime with the group/Cooperative Society/CBO.

(e) Must attend relevant training workshops organized by PAP and the group/Cooperative Society/CBO.
(f) Must not be a member to more than one group/cooperative Society/CBO that intends to get a loan from PAP.

(g) Must agree to pledge his/her savings in the group/Cooperative Society/CBO.

(h) Must have saved at least 10% of his/her loan requirements in the registered group/Cooperative Society/CBO account with a financial institution and must continue saving progressively during and after the acquisition of the loan.

(i) Must be willing to initially save 2% in the community fund account, after which savings in this account should be progressive as in (h) above.

(j) Must be able to manage the micro-project efficiently and use the loan for the purpose for which it is intended, while following technical advice from field staff or the IE.

(k) Must be willing to supervise and monitor loan use of other members of his/her mini-group.

(l) Must be ready to operate the micro-project as the primary activity.

(m) Must sign Form PAP/6, the promissory note to pay the loan in full to PAP through the group/Cooperative society/CBO or the IE.