Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation
Master Thesis

L’expérience consciente est-elle indubitable ?

Abstract : What is more certain than the existence and the nature of our conscious experiences? It seems so indubitable that we find suspicious any questioning of their reality. Nonetheless, these experiences are problematic: they don’t fit easily in a materialist theory of the world. To reconcile these discordant perspectives, the reductive materialism offers an account of our conscious experiences in suitable terms for a materialist description of the universe. In this essay, we will argue that this reconciliation is unbearable, leaving us facing a dilemma: either include non-materialist properties in our world theory, or, despite its obviousness, dismiss the very existence of the conscious experiences. In order to solve this dilemma, we will focus on the nature of doubt and certainty. A clear characterization of theses notions will allow us to evaluate their epistemic values. If the conscious experience is indubitable, does that mean that its existence must be taken as an essential premise for any serious description of the world?
Document type :
Master Thesis
Complete list of metadata

Cited literature [14 references]  Display  Hide  Download
Contributor : Faculté Des Humanités Université de Lille Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Friday, September 20, 2019 - 11:22:08 AM
Last modification on : Thursday, January 9, 2020 - 11:59:00 PM
Long-term archiving on: : Sunday, February 9, 2020 - 12:50:56 AM


Files produced by the author(s)


  • HAL Id : dumas-02292804, version 1


Sylvain Montalvo. L’expérience consciente est-elle indubitable ?. Philosophie. 2019. ⟨dumas-02292804⟩



Record views


Files downloads