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, Correct estimation of surplus, incorrect estimation of splitting rule Proof. 6.1. Set an agent m ? M . µ 0 (F ) = ?. So any Valuation v : F ? {?} ?? R + s.t. v m (?) = u m? is µ 0 -LPU. Let us also set ? f ? F : v m (f ) = 0. Then, ? f ? F : v m (?) = u m? ? v m (f ) = 0, vol.2