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Natalie Palmquist

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The Humanitarian-Development Nexus in Protracted Crises

*A Case Study of WASH programming among Internally Displaced
Persons in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo*

Master's Thesis by Natalie Palmquist

2nd Year Master of International Development Studies (IDS)

Institute d'Urbanisme & Géographie Alpine - Université Grenoble Alpes

Supervisor: Cristina Del Biaggio | Jury Member: Kirsten Koop

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² Jenna D. (AL), Zach J. (TX), Colin S. (FL), Christine K. (Sweden), Tommy B. (PA), Anna C. (AZ)

Abstract

As our world experiences more and more protracted crises characterized by unstable governments, heightened armed conflict, mass population movements, and a destabilized natural environment, there is a need to better understand the interplay between actors working in this complex context. Protracted crises often invite the interventions of both humanitarian and development actors, creating what is known as the humanitarian-development (H-D) nexus. The following research analyzes the H-D nexus through a specific case study of water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) initiatives among internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The case study is investigated through an exclusively qualitative analysis of interview and survey data from humanitarian and development practitioners working in either the DRC or other related protracted crises around the world. In conclusion, the study unveils some of the greatest challenges within protracted crisis response including: restrictive funding, frustrations with coordination, roadblocks to effective localization, and disillusionment towards long-term impact. In so doing, it adds to the larger academic, institutional, and field practice conversations surround the conceptualization and implementation of the H-D nexus within protracted crises.

Key Terms: humanitarian-development (H-D) nexus, protracted crisis, complex emergency, internally displaced person (IDP), water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH)

Résumé

Alors que notre monde connaît de plus en plus de crises prolongées caractérisées par des gouvernements instables, des conflits armés exacerbés, des mouvements massifs de population et un environnement naturel déstabilisé, il est nécessaire de mieux comprendre l'interaction entre les acteurs travaillant dans ce contexte complexe. Les crises prolongées invitent souvent les acteurs de l'humanitaire et du développement à intervenir, créant ce que l'on appelle le lien entre l'humanitaire et le développement (H-D). La recherche suivante analyse le lien H-D à travers une étude de cas spécifique sur les initiatives en matière de l'eau, de l'hygiène et de l'assainissement (EHA) parmi les personnes déplacées à l'intérieur du pays (PDI) en République démocratique du Congo (RDC). L'étude de cas est analysée par le biais d'une analyse exclusivement qualitative des données d'entretiens et d'enquêtes menées auprès de praticiens de l'humanitaire et du développement travaillant en RDC ou dans d'autres crises prolongées dans le monde. En conclusion, l'étude dévoile certains des plus grands défis de la réponse aux crises prolongées, notamment : le financement restrictif, les frustrations liées à la coordination, les obstacles à une localisation efficace et la désillusion quant à l'impact à long terme. Ce faisant, elle alimente les conversations académiques, institutionnelles et de terrain qui entourent la conceptualisation et la mise en œuvre du lien H-D dans les crises prolongées.

Mots clés : lien entre l'humanitaire et le développement (H-D), crise prolongée, urgence complexe, personnes déplacées à l'intérieur du pays (PDI), de l'eau, de l'hygiène et de l'assainissement (EHA)

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Acronyms

ALNAP	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance
AEDR	Water Access and Development in the DRC
BHA	Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (USA)
BMZ	Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (Germany)
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EMI	Engineering Ministries International
EWB	Engineers Without Borders
FFP	Food for Peace
H-D	Humanitarian-Development
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IHN	International Humanitarian Nonprofit ¹
INGO	International Nongovernmental Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
OCDI	Congolese Organization for Integrated Development
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OFDA	Offices of US Foreign Disaster Assistance
PI	Personal Interview
PMT	Program Management Team
PSR	Practitioner Survey Respondent
UGA	University of Grenoble Alps
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
USAID	US Agency for International Development
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WSR	WASH Survey Respondent

¹ International Humanitarian Nonprofit (IHN) is the pseudonym for the organization with whom I interned.

Chapter 1 | Introduction

Imagine living in a protracted crisis, often defined as five or more years where your family, your neighborhood, and your country face an acute breakdown of stable governmental structures, steady exhaustion of livelihood opportunities, increased exposure to disease, and heightened risk of death (HC 2015). For much of the global population today, these extreme living conditions are a daily reality. Whether caused by multi-decade wars or extreme weather events, the 21st century finds itself wrestling with more and more protracted crises than ever before (OCHA 2020b). In 2020 “over one billion people (16% of the world’s population) [lived] in countries experiencing a protracted crisis. The number of countries experiencing protracted crises rose from 13 in 2005 to 31 in 2019, and [they are now] home to half the world’s people living in extreme poverty” (DI 2020). Therefore, as the number and duration of crises increase, we must seek to understand how individuals, governments, and international organizations engage within them.

Protracted crises are characterized by increased physical suffering and acute risk of death, to which international humanitarian organizations are often quick to respond. Originally designed by Henry Dunant in the late 1800s to care for wounded soldiers coming off a battle field, the humanitarian system of today is devoted to reduce suffering, save lives, and uphold human dignity within diverse contexts including man-made crises and natural disasters (ALNAP 2018). Since protracted crises are often exacerbated by nature, and often occur in places already experiencing extreme poverty, they also attract many development actors who are working towards systemic improvements of government structures, economic systems, and social engagement to reduce poverty and support fundamental human rights. The space where these two types of actors overlap is known as the *humanitarian-development (H-D) nexus*.

Recognizing the array of actors doing work within the nexus, this research engages with protracted crises explicitly from the humanitarian practitioner’s point of view, supported by occasional input from development actors. The research is focused further by a specific case study of water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) programming among internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The selection of topic and case

study location was driven by both my previous field of study, Civil Engineering, and a summer internship completed with an organization to be referred to as IHN.¹

My previous studies had me heavily engaged in the field of water and sanitation. I have worked for civil engineering design firms doing storm water management in my home country of the United States. I have also volunteered with Engineering Ministries International (EMI) designing sewer plans for a hospital reconstruction in Uttar Pradesh, India, and with Engineers Without Border (EWB) constructing small gravity fed water distribution lines in Kabaya, Rwanda. Through these experiences, I became well engaged in the development side of WASH programming, focused on providing improved water systems in areas otherwise underserved. Meanwhile, my summer internship exposed me to WASH services from a humanitarian perspective while introducing me to the specific study region of Eastern DRC.

Having been entrenched in a complex crisis for over 25 years, the DRC – and specifically Eastern DRC – is a good example of an area where the work of humanitarians and development practitioners overlap extensively. As an international humanitarian organization, IHN deployed emergency services to the area in 2003 and has since set up a permanent service location in Bunia, the capital city of the northeastern Ituri province. My original internship assignment to the Bunia office opened my eyes to the prevalence of humanitarian services in the region, leading me to select Eastern DRC as a case study location for this research.

Eastern DRC continues in a protracted crisis which can arguably be traced back to Belgian colonial rule which prefaced the nation's history of war and devastation leading right into the 21st century. The DRC currently counts 5.2 million IDPs – second highest in the world next to Syria (EC 2021, 1). This mostly conflict-induced displacement is currently ongoing, as 1.2 million of these IDPs were displaced just recently in the last 6 months leading up to January of 2021 (OCHA 2021b, 22). Meanwhile, the nation's WASH infrastructure is not adequately servicing its general population, much less appropriately handling the added stress of displaced people. In fact, the DRC is often criticized for having some of the poorest water and sanitation conditions in Africa, despite being exceedingly rich in the hydro-resources embedded within its lush rainforest climate (World Bank Group 2017). Because of these combined situational

¹ A selected pseudonym for the organization with whom I interned, discussed further in [Chapter 2](#).

characteristics, the case study subject of WASH programming among displaced persons in Eastern DRC offered a rich focal point through which to view the H-D nexus and understand how it functions within a protracted crisis.

Most recently, the concept of the H-D nexus was revitalized during the proceedings of the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit, where UN Secretary General António Guterres gave a call for action, “We must bring the humanitarian and development spheres closer together from the very beginning of a crisis to support affected communities, address structural and economic impacts and help prevent a new spiral of fragility and instability” (OCHA 2017, 5). This declaration relaunched many conversations around inter-organizational collaboration, localization, and general structural reform. This research then, by gathering practitioner perspectives on the subject, links the realities of humanitarian and development intervention on the ground to the theoretical conversations happening at institutional and academic levels. The study employs an exclusively qualitative research strategy, relying heavily on interview and survey data for analysis and conclusions.

Ultimately this research redefines the H-D nexus from the practitioner point of view. In so doing, it highlights the negative effects of donor restrictions, conflicting intervention strategies, and limited localization efforts on healthy transitional programs within protracted crises. The research presented in this study adds to an existing 2016 analysis on WASH programming in the DRC made by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI). Also based on practitioner interview data, the ODI report discusses similar issues such as improving complementarity among actors, reinventing WASH coordination mechanisms, and adapting new funding strategies for more effective programming within the DRC (Mosello, Chambers, and Mason 2016).

This research goes beyond the ODI report by incorporating data from practitioners working in protracted crises around the world and using that data to enrich the understanding of the Eastern DRC context. Although the study is specifically contextualized to the DRC, it presents valuable insight into H-D nexus programming that can be applied to diverse contexts. As previously stated, protracted crises are expected to increase in years to come (OCHA 2020b). To provide insight into these future crises, this research offers a deep analysis of a specific context (Eastern DRC) at a specific point in time (2021) which can serve to inform future analysis of protracted crisis interventions around the world.

Chapter 2 | Internship Overview

2.1 Presentation of Internship Organization

The following research was performed while completing a summer internship with an international humanitarian nonprofit organization which will hereafter be referred by the pseudonym IHN.¹ Founded over fifty-years ago, IHN is a faith-based humanitarian relief organization established to address the needs of disaster and emergency victims by working alongside local churches and other evangelical organizations (IHN 2021, citation omitted) IHN employs approximately 1,500 staff members at its headquarters in the USA and has an additional five international offices in Australia, Canada, Germany, Korea, and the United Kingdom. The organization also establishes field offices in countries where they have had a long-term service presence including Iraq, Bolivia, Colombia, Myanmar, Niger, South Sudan, and the DRC.

IHN works in multiple diverse sectors such as U.S. Disaster Relief, spiritual discipleship, global medical service provision, and international crisis response. These varied programs are united by the organization's common leadership and unapologetically faith driven purpose of sharing the Gospel of Jesus Christ by going where others would not go to take care of the needs that are present (IHN 2021, citation omitted). Even with strong cultural unity however, each department operates quite independently. As a result of this independence, my experience with the organization was rather exclusive to my internship role under the International Crisis Response Unit, internally referred to as *Projects*.

My title within Projects under the Program Management Team (PMT) was: Monitoring and Evaluations (M&E) Intern. In this role, I worked for a team of four at headquarters who sought to advise the M&E operations of the international field offices around the world. Our team acted as consultants in the design of needs assessments, the writing of program monitoring surveys, the collection and analysis of program indicator data, and the planning of learning events. Meanwhile, each field office had their own M&E manager who took our advice from headquarters with the intention to apply it to the local culture and context as they saw fit. A large

¹ International Humanitarian Nonprofit (IHN) was an organization name created expressly for this paper. Due to unspecified legal restrictions, IHN had to turn down the opportunity to sponsor the following research and asked not to be a main topic of my final submission. I have chosen to keep them anonymous in order to honor that request.

portion of our work involved the creation and management of organization wide activity and results indicators. In the humanitarian world, indicators are gauges used to measure various needs or services provided to a community. At IHN we separate indicators into activity and results indicators; *activity* indicators measure the direct services provided (i.e. the number of wells drilled or number of food items distributed) while *results* indicators measure an intended impact of an intervention (i.e. percent decrease in diarrhea cases within a community, or percent decrease in acute malnutrition rates). Consulting on the creation and use of these indicators involved intensive coordination with respective sector Technical Advisors, including those in Agriculture, Livelihoods, WASH, Nutrition, Food, Health, Ministry, and Shelter, Protection, Education, and Cash & Voucher.

Our final role as the M&E team involved coordinating award compliance and aligning our organizational indicators to those of award organizations, most notably the United States Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA). BHA is a relatively new adaptation of USAID humanitarian funding. “In 2020, the BHA was established to streamline USAID humanitarian responses, bringing together the vast expertise and resources of the former USAID Offices of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and Food for Peace (FFP)” (BHA 2021). The merger of two former USAID awarding agencies came with difficulties. As two separate departments they are currently struggling through aligning their award strategies, funding expectations, and finalizing formats for application requirements. As these newly merged departments work through these changes, it is followed by paralleled adaptation on behalf of organizations such as IHN who regularly receive funding from USAID. To facilitate this transition, one of my main intern tasks was to create new templates for BHA funding applications.

2.2 Internship Timeline

2.2.1 Plan for Field Work in Bunia, DRC

Originally, back in March of 2021, IHN assigned me a role as Operations Intern in their Bunia, DRC field office (see *Figure 2.1*) (Al Jazeera 2020b). It was my placement in this location that birthed questions related to the humanitarian-development nexus. Having been entrenched in a complex crisis for over 25 years, the DRC – and specifically Eastern DRC – is a good example of an area where the work of humanitarians and development practitioners overlap

extensively. Therefore, my intention was to investigate the humanitarian-development (H-D) nexus through a case study of Bunia, DRC. The H-D nexus being very a broad topic, I wanted to streamline my research by selecting a specific intervention type and a focus population for analysis.

I am a civil engineer by trade; therefore, I am very interested in water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) initiatives and most specifically clean water supply. I also recognized that water services are necessary in both life-saving humanitarian programs and long-term sustainable development which was confirmed through my research (see [Section 6.1](#)).



Figure 2.1 Bunia, DRC (Al Jazeera 2020b)

Therefore, the WASH sector was identified as an intervention type through which to observe the dynamics of the H-D nexus in Bunia.

Next, I wanted to select a focus population. The question then became, which vulnerable populations in Bunia would be targeted by both humanitarian and development workers? Considering the nature of the crisis in the DRC and the large number of conflict driven population movements, internally displaced persons (IDPs) seemed to be an appropriate focus group for my case study. The DRC counts 5.2 million IDPs within the country – the second highest in the world next to Syria (EC 2021, 1). In Bunia alone, OCHA cites almost 180,000 IDPs and an additional 2,000 returnees. It is approximated that 86% of these IDPs integrate directly into the city through host families while another 14% live in official refugee camps coordinated through UNHCR or IOM (OCHA-RDC 2021; OCHA 2021b, 22). Considering the link between IDPs and the H-D nexus and the amount of both humanitarian relief and development programming that is focused on IDP service, I chose IDPs as a specific interest group for my case study.

In summary, when I was planning for a summer of service in Bunia, DRC, my research was to focus on the H-D nexus from the perspective of WASH programming among IDPs. I prepared a mostly qualitative study consisting of interviews and field observations. I was going to complete in-person interviews with WASH service providers in the area, and take the opportunity to attend the WASH Cluster meetings to observe the state of coordination among different agencies. I planned to visit at least one IDP camp to personally observe the WASH infrastructure available to IDPs and complete interviews with residents to uncover their ideas for durable solutions. I also intended to incorporate transect walks into my research strategies, a participatory exercise, where I “walk through different areas of the neighborhood, interviewing passers-by and drawing a map with observations” (parCitypatory 2017). These would have included an IDP lead transect walk through a camp site and a WASH practitioner lead transect walk (or drive) around the city.

Each of these activities were intending to ultimately feed into a deeper understanding of the H-D nexus in protracted crises, specifically noting how the challenge was faced in Bunia, DRC. Unfortunately, due to a natural disaster and increased travel risks, my plans were rerouted.

2.2.2 Transition in Service Location

My travel itinerary from D.C., United States to Bunia, DRC took me through Goma in the province of North Kivu. Situated on the outskirts of Virunga National Park, Goma is home to Mount Nyiragongo, one of Africa’s most active volcanoes (See *Figure 2.2*) (Rauppa 2015) (Rafferty 2021).

On the 22nd of May 2021, right before the start of my internship, Mount Nyiragongo erupted for the third time in 50 years (Andrews 2021). The volcanic eruption caused widespread damage: 3,629 houses and 7 schools were destroyed; 32 people were killed and 230,000



2.2 Mount Nyiragongo (Rauppa 2015)

people were displaced (Salazar 2021). Ash covered the city for days and left the airport non-operational until the 6th of June (Garda World 2021). Meanwhile, there were increased security threats in the city of Bunia as the Ugandan military entered into the Ituri Province to assist in offensive action against rebel groups (Reuters 2021). Furthermore, during this time there were increased COVID-19 cases across east Africa (Biryabarema 2021). Because of these combined risks, my organization made the decision to keep me in their stateside headquarters for my summer assignment.

As my final internship placement, I was given a position in M&E under the PMT within the Projects department. This team gave me a global perspective of the work IHN is completing around the world but it did not provide a special focus on WASH or displaced persons.

2.2.3 Researching the Global Practitioner's Perspective

Because of my new internship placement, I had a very different set of personnel and resources available to me than originally planned. I had to shift my research accordingly. Rather than stepping closer into my case study of Bunia, I took one step back to view protracted crises more generally from a practitioner's point of view. My daily duties allowed me to work very closely with IHN's technical advisors of every sector including: Agriculture, Livelihoods, WASH, Nutrition, Food, Health, Ministry, and Shelter, Protection, Education, and Cash & Voucher. These contacts offered me a platform from which to start asking the questions about practitioner views on the H-D nexus and operating within protracted crises. From this position I was able to get a more holistic view of programming within protracted crises that were not specifically related to but could feed into my research on the DRC. Meanwhile, data that was collected on the DRC was not limited to Bunia but expanded to include the whole of the Ituri and North Kivu provinces generally referred to in this research as Eastern DRC.

At this transition point, I was no longer asking questions specific to WASH or displaced persons but instead targeting the general practitioner's perspectives on the H-D nexus. Considering the circumstances, this was a natural choice; though many of my coworkers were not specifically working with displaced persons or WASH, they were working within the H-D nexus, so they were able to answer more general questions relating to program implementation within protracted crises.

Chapter 3 | Research Methodology

3.1 Data Collection

The following research was driven exclusively by qualitative data including interviews, practitioner surveys, and personal observations. There were a total of two sets of interviews and two surveys completed for future analysis. The initial literature review led to the selection of candidates for the first set of interviews to be referred to as *Personal Interviews (PI)*; these interviews then informed the questions included in the two online surveys 1) *WASH among Displaced Persons in Eastern, DRC* and 2) *Practitioner Perspective on the H-D Nexus*; and finally, the questions selected for the second interview set, to be referred to as *Survey Follow-Up Interviews*, were directly informed by emerging themes from the survey responses. The shift in research location contributed significantly to the diversity of my data sources, but this ultimately left me with a rich data set for analysis.

3.1.1 Interview Set #1: Personal Interviews

During the initial stages of research, after identifying WASH among IDPs as my specific focus for the Eastern DRC case study, I began to reach out to relevant practitioners for the *personal interviews*. These interviews were held with various authors, practitioners, and displaced persons whose names I uncovered during the literature review process. I was interested to speak with individuals who had insight into one of three areas: WASH, IDPs, or the H-D nexus, and I sent emails to interview candidates accordingly.

The personal interviews followed an open-ended question format which was highly personalized to the interviewee and their area of expertise. Eight to ten questions were prepared beforehand for each interview. Once an interview medium, date, and time were selected, the questions were then sent to the interviewee for preparation. During the actual interviews, I remained flexible to incorporate follow-up or tangent questions where relevant. Personal interviews started at the beginning of the research and continued all the way through until the end of my internship. There were ten (10) interviews conducted between April 16th and July 16th

of 2021,¹ totaling seven hours and ten minutes (07:10). See Table 3.1 for the details associated with each personal interview, including name and qualifications of interviewee, main topic, medium, and length (see [Appendix A](#) for additional interview descriptions). For reference purposes, these interviews will be cited using the code (PI #: Name) shown in the upper right hand corner of each interview description.

Table 3.1 Personal Interview Details

Personal Interview #1	
Name: Sarah Roseland*	Code PI 1: Roseland
Title: Senior Director of Humanitarian Capacity	Date: January 14, 2021
Organization: Serve International*	Length: 50 minutes
Main Topic: Humanitarian Aid	Medium: Video Call (Zoom)
Personal Interview #2	
Name: William Bakunzi	Code PI 2: Bakunzi
Title: Peer researcher and Congolese refugee	Date: April 16, 2021
Organization: Nakivale Settlement in Uganda	Length: 32 minutes
Main Topic: Displaced Persons	Medium: Voice Message (WhatsApp)
Personal Interview #3	
Name: Benjamin Liringa ¹ and Mandy Goksu ²	Code PI 3: Liringa
Title: ¹ Founder and Managing Director ² Sr. Director of Strategic Partnerships	Date: April 19, 2021
Organization: ¹ AEDR (Access En Eau et Development) ² Water4	Length: 45 minutes
Main Topic: WASH in Bunia, DRC - Development Focused	Medium: Voice Call (Zoom)
Personal Interview #4	
Name: Kilian Kleinschmidt	Code PI 4: Kleinschmidt
Title: Former Director of Za'atari Refugee Camp	Date: April 22, 2021
Organization: UNHCR	Length: 59 minutes
Main Topic: Displaced Persons	Medium: Video Call (Zoom)
Personal Interview #5	
Name: Patrick Lamson-Hall	Code PI 5: Lamson-Hall
Title: Project Manager and Urban Planner	Date: May 14, 2021
Organization: NYU Marron Institute of Urban Management	Length: 41 minutes

¹ This is excluding the January 14th interview which was completed for research on Community Participation in Disaster Response but was later incorporated into this dataset.

Main Topic: Displaced Persons – Development Programming	Medium: Video Call (Skype)
Personal Interview #6	
Name: Jeremiah Kiraho*	Code: PI 6: Kiraho
Title: WASH Field Technical Advisor for DRC	Date: May 17, 2021
Organization: IHN*	Length: 27 minutes
Main Topic: WASH in Bunia, DRC	Medium: Video Call (Skype)
Personal Interview #7	
Name: Émilie Bhanja Otuma	Code: PI 7: Otuma
Title: WASH Programmer	Date: June 11, 2021
Organization: MedAIR	Length: 45 minutes
Main Topic: WASH and Displaced Persons	Medium: Video Call (WhatsApp) - French
Personal Interview #8	
Name: Erin Gilchrist	Code: PI 8: Gilchrist
Title: Previous Program Development Officer	Date: June 15, 2021
Organization: Warzone Initiatives	Length: 47 minutes
Main Topic: Development in Complex Emergencies	Medium: Voice Call (Zoom)
Personal Interview #9	
Name: Carrie Scott*	Code: PI 9: Scott
Title: Program Director	Date: July 15, 2021
Organization: Water Organization* - Goma, DRC	Length: 48 minutes
Main Topic: H-D Nexus in Eastern DRC	Medium: Voice Call (Zoom)
Personal Interview #10	
Name: Griffon KAYUMBA FALAY	Code: PI 10: FALAY
Title: WASH Technical Specialist	Date: July 16, 2021
Organization: ODCI** - Mambasa	Length: 36 minutes
Main Topic: WASH programming in DRC	Medium: Video Call (Zoom) - French

*Name of person and/or organization has been changed.

**ODCI - Congolese Organization for Integrated Development.

3.1.2 Survey #1: WASH among Displaced Persons

Alongside the personal interviews, during the initial research stages, I began a deeper investigation into the WASH sector among displaced persons in Bunia. To that end, I prepared an online survey through Google Forms (translated to both English and French) for WASH service providers in Bunia, DRC (see [Appendix B](#)). I used contacts from the personal interviews,

notably Benjamin Liringa and Jeremiah Kiraho who work for the WASH sector in Bunia, to assist in the development and distribution of the WASH survey. At my request they kindly shared it with a few of their colleagues and other WASH contacts. When I was unable to get to the field myself, they continued to assist by passing the survey along to WASH service providers outside of their city. In the end I received responses from Bunia, Goma, Mambasa, and Kirumba which offered a more holistic view of WASH practices in Eastern DRC.

The *WASH among Displaced Persons* survey received sixteen (16) responses in total - one (1) response in English and fifteen (15) responses in French. The survey was open for responses for approximately two months from May 20th to July 20th, 2021. In order to respect the participants, all survey responses have remained anonymous; for reference purposes, the survey will be cited using the code WASH Survey Respondent (WSR #). French survey responses have been translated using [DeepL Translator](#) for direct citation.

3.1.3 Survey #2: Practitioner Perspective on the H-D Nexus

As previously mentioned, the change in my internship location led to a slight shift in my research question – rather than stepping closer into my case study of Bunia, I took one step back to view the H-D nexus more generally from a practitioner’s point of view and expanded my case study to include other cities in Eastern DRC. With my new internship position at IHN headquarters, I was working with individuals who were actively engaged in protracted crisis programming but who did not necessarily have specific expertise in Bunia, WASH, or displaced persons. Taking that into consideration, I expanded my research to a more global perspective of the H-D nexus. To step into this new angle, I prepared a second Google Forms survey to be distributed among any humanitarian or development practitioners working within the H-D nexus (see [Appendix C](#)). Influenced by the emergent themes of the personal interviews already collected, this survey prodded into the ways practitioners engage in the H-D nexus and the realities of inter-organizational coordination and service transition on the ground.

The survey was distributed using a snowball sampling (OSU 2010). I first sent it to each of the sector technical advisors at IHN and to other personal contacts with the humanitarian service sector; then, I requested that participants share the survey to at least three (3) other relevant practitioners. Unfortunately, this method still did not produce enough responses for developing conclusions. So, in an effort to get a larger data sample, I began to personally reach out to service

practitioners via Linked-In. I did not devise strict selection criteria for those contacted, which is listed as a limitation to the quality of this research.

Using Linked-In Premium, I searched for individuals employed by organizations whose names had appeared during the earlier stages of research including: IHN, Mercy Corps, Save the Children, World Vision, Tearfund, MedAIR, and World Relief. From those employee lists, I searched the words *humanitarian* and *emergency* to find relevant profiles of people who had worked in protracted crisis situations. I paid special attention to practitioners who had experience in the DRC or east Africa but also sent my survey to individuals working in Somalia, South Sudan, Yemen, and Syria. Anyone working on humanitarian or development service within a complex crisis situation was considered relevant to my survey. Continuing with the snowball method, these practitioners too were prompted to forward the survey on to other relevant actors.

The survey was open for responses for approximately one month from June 25th to July 22nd, 2021. In the end I received thirty-six (36) responses all of which were provided in English. Although I intended to gain perspective from both development and humanitarian practitioners, a large majority of the respondents represented the humanitarian perspective as over 55% (20/36) work for exclusively humanitarian/disaster response organizations while another 40% (14/36) work for dual mandate organizations.² As with the previous survey, in order to respect the participants, all survey responses have remained anonymous; for reference purposes, the survey will be cited using the code Practitioner Survey Respondent (PSR #).

3.1.4 Interview Set #2: Survey Follow-Up Interviews

At the end of the Practitioner Survey, though responses could remain completely anonymous, they were given the option to share their contact information so that I could follow up with more in-depth interviews. Unlike the personal interviews completed in the beginning of the research process, these interviews followed a rigid structure where the same questions were repeated to each interviewee. These interviews were a means of enriching the data collected in the surveys to uncover more detail behind the responses provided.

Early interpretation of survey responses influenced the structure of the interview follow-up questions. Based on the first 15 survey responses, emergent themes were identified by

² Dual mandate organizations are those who work in both the humanitarian and the development sectors.

observation, and selected for further investigation. The first three questions in the interview continued general inquiry into the H-D nexus, then the final three questions focused on the three emergent themes from the initial respondents: 1) partnering with local organizations and adapting to the local context, 2) frustrations with non-flexible funding, and 3) desires for long-term outcomes (see [Appendix D](#)) In the end there were six (6) follow-up interviews completed for this portion of data collection between July 13th and August 12th totaling five hours and forty-nine minutes (05:49). For reference coding purposes, these interviews follow the same naming convention of the survey respondents with the addition of a given pseudonym provided in Table 3.2 (PSR #: Name).

Table 3.2 Survey Follow-Up Interview Details

Follow-Up Interview #1	
Name: Paul Hunt*	Code PSR 10: Hunt
Title: Project Coordinator	Date: July 13th, 2021
Location: Kirumba, DRC	Length: 1 hour 42 minutes
Main Topic: Humanitarian Programming in the DRC	Medium: Video Call (Zoom)
Follow-Up Interview #2	
Name: Kyler Roberts*	Code PSR 11: Roberts
Title: Food Assistance Technical Advisor for IHN*	Date: July 14th, 2021
Location: Iraq, Syria, and Ethiopia	Length: 49 minutes
Main Topic: Food Assistance Programming	Medium: In Person (Voice Recorder)
Follow-Up Interview #3	
Name: Samuel Ellison*	Code PSR 5: Ellison
Title: Program Manager	Date: July 21st, 2021
Location: Turkey and Jordan	Length: 45 minutes
Main Topic: Traditional Humanitarian Response Strategies	Medium: Vice Call (Zoom)
Follow-Up Interview #4	
Name: Samantha Sullivan*	Code PSR 32: Sullivan
Title: Program Quality Coordinator	Date: July 23rd, 2021
Location: Goma, DRC	Length: 56 minutes
Main Topic: Humanitarian Programming in the DRC	Medium: Vice Call (Zoom)
Follow-Up Interview #5	
Name: Bryan Wallace*	Code PSR 33: Wallace
Title: Regional Manager – N.E. Africa with IHN*	Date: July 29th, 2021
Location: Sudan, South Sudan, and DRC	Length: 47 minutes

Main Topic: Ethics of Humanitarian Assistance	Medium: In Person (Voice Recorder)
Personal Interview #6	
Name: George Carter*	Code: PSR 15: Carter
Title: Philanthropic and Nonprofit Consultant	Date: August 12th, 2021
Location: Global Consultant	Length: 50 minutes
Main Topic: Alternative Funding Models	Medium: Video Call (Zoom)

*Name of person and/or organization has been changed.

3.1.5 Personal Observations and Other Data Sources

The final data source to be noted within the data collection methodology is personal observation. I spent ten weeks of the summer working full-time for an international humanitarian nonprofit, IHN. This experience provided a brief insider perspective into the functionings of a typical organization, the external processes that influence its operations, and the motivations behind the work being done within the H-D nexus. As an intern, I was assigned two main projects for the summer 1) updating the program results indicators and general strategic framework to better monitor IHN's international programs and 2) developing templates for the new Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance (BHA) Emergency Applications based on the 2021 guidelines (BHA 2021) as described in [Section 2.1](#).

My first task, as previously explained, gave me a chance to meet with each of the technical advisors from various service sectors (Agriculture, Livelihoods, WASH, Nutrition, Food, Health, Ministry, and Shelter, Protection, Education, and Cash & Voucher). These meetings gave me insight into the clustered approach to be discussed in [Section 4.2](#), and offered me a base from which to understand the desire for and complications surrounding long-term impact in humanitarian assistance (see [Section 7.4](#)). Meanwhile, my second task involved intensive research into the BHA guidelines, whose funding restrictions and complicated application process were mentioned by multiple interviewees, explained in [Section 7.1](#). This task offered me a base from which to understand the practitioner experience in regards to funding applications, and see a glimpse into the frustrations of submittal preparations for any large governmental funding agency.

Other relevant data sources included informal conversations with colleagues, presentations given by executive members of IHN, and exposure to organizational documents - which will be cited as (Informal Conversation: IHN Staff 2021), (IHN Presentation 2021), or (IHN Internal Document 2021) respectively. During the summer I was able to attend two virtual Goma, DRC WASH cluster meetings on July 6th and July 30th, 2021. Considering the recent eruption of Mount Nyiragongo as described in [Section 2.3](#), both meetings were heavily focused on service provision to the 230,000 persons displaced by the volcano. They were held in French, so any quotations from the meeting have been personally translated. Despite the fact that much of this paper is focused on conflict driven displacement in protracted crises, these meetings offered me insights into how the DRC WASH cluster responds to natural disasters as well.

3.2 Data Analysis

The data collected were split into two categories: 1) data pertaining to the global practitioner perspective of the H-D nexus, and 2) data pertaining to WASH systems among displaced persons in Eastern DRC. These data sets were analyzed together allowing the first to illuminate the second and vice versa. In the end, all data collected was analyzed through a qualitative thematic approach.

Qualitative analysis is a form of study especially valuable for assessing complex real-world contexts. It often brings together diverse accounts of collective experiences, which cannot typically be expressed numerically, in order to develop new concepts or evaluate organizational processes (Hancock, Ockleford, and Windridge 2009, 6). The research presented in this study offers a cross between these two goals, as it both reshapes the existing concept of the H-D nexus and evaluates general organizational processes amid protracted crises (see definition of protracted crises and H-D nexus in [Section 4.2](#) and [4.3](#)). Thematic analysis was employed to identify repeated concepts within the data. While some studies establish a rigid thematic structure before data collection, such as a predefined list of expected key terms (Hancock, Ockleford, and Windridge 2009, 32), this study identified emergent themes along the process of data collection. Themes in the personal interviews informed which questions were selected for the practitioner surveys, and the survey responses informed questions selected for follow up interviews. Such a strategy can impact the thematic analysis if it artificially perpetuates early

themes into the rest of the data, however in my case, it also allowed for a more holistic perspective on the themes at hand.

Though some of the survey questions were numerical in nature, there was no statistical analysis completed during this research; all emergent themes were identified by researcher observation rather than thematic coding. The decision to employ a less formal analysis method was made based on time allotment and research experience. Being that the research was to be completed in a specific, six-month time-frame, and that I had no prior experience with thematic coding techniques or software, the simpler observation method was chosen.

3.3 Research Limitations

3.3.1 General Limitations

Three of the greatest limitations to my research were 1) the inability to analyze my host organization directly, 2) the inability to travel to my case study location, and 3) the sudden transition of work location. Ideally, I would have been able to focus my research on the practices and operations of one organization which could have produced more coherent and insightful findings. Unfortunately – do to legal restrictions – IHN was unable to sponsor my thesis therefore requiring me to execute a separate research project alongside the work of my internship. While my daily duties and some of the tasks assigned to me were partially related to the H-D nexus, a thesis developed around my internship rather than next to it would have been more informed.

The inability to travel to my case study location posed a great limitation as well. Being on the ground would have better informed my understanding of the situational context while offering me a platform for more focused conversations with people actually living in my case study location. While I was able to connect with a few staff members of nongovernment organizations (NGOs) working in Bunia, my inquiries were less informed and my data harder to process without a personal experience of the place. This limitation offers an area for future improvement in relation to this research. To improve this research, it could eventually be cross-examined against a field based study.

Finally, the quick transition of field location and the difficulties associated with the change impacted the quality of the proceeding research. Research steps taken during the transition period

(such as the creation of the *Survey #2: Practitioner Perspective of the H-D Nexus*) were not as well planned or executed as those I had been preparing for my time in Bunia. The quick transition pulled me away from my focus on WASH and IDPs, which brought my research into a more generalized space. This left the findings more generalized than they would have been if a clear research plan and direction had been maintained throughout the process.

3.3.2 Survey, Interview, and Analysis Limitations

The main conditions limiting the survey research were time-frame and practitioner connections. The time-frame allotted to this study did not allow for representative surveys but instead left snowball sampling, a specific form of convenience sampling, as the most viable options. Snowball sampling is a method of gathering research subjects by starting with a specific and small group who then recommends future subjects for data collection; the first few interview subjects would provide names of other potential interviewees who would in turn provide additional interviewees and so on, causing the group to grow like a snowball (Cohen and Arieli 2011, 424). The technique is helpful in collecting information from networks of people who are otherwise difficult to access due to social/political status, technical/bureaucratic obstacles, or closed social groups (Cohen and Arieli 2011, 427). It is, however, prone to selection bias and validity limitations by virtue of excluding research subjects who are not part of the social network accessible to the researcher (Cohen and Arieli 2011, 428). Meanwhile, in my particular case, it was not incredibly effective in gathering large numbers of responses. Though survey participants were asked to forward the survey on to relevant professionals, there were few who went beyond completing the survey themselves. It is possible that a shorter survey or an incentive for sharing the survey could have garnered more responses. Unsurprisingly, it is common for such snowball sampling strategies to be limited by “willingness of subjects to participate” in the distribution or continuation of the research (Cohen and Arieli 2011, 428).

When the snowball sampling method was not generating as many responses as expected, I began forwarding the survey to Linked-in connections, in an effort to increase the data count. However I did not use a very rigid selection criteria in choosing whom to message. This lack of systematic rigidity is a major limitation in the findings and future studies would be advised to focus their data collection by some criteria such as employment organization, country of service, or role in the humanitarian or development system.

The limited respondent pull and time-frame also made it difficult to dry-test the survey for suggestions. With more time and respondents at my disposal, I would have done a dry-run for all surveys, requesting the first 5 to 10 participants to give feedback on questions and length of survey before opening it up for official data collection. However, with limited connections to possible survey respondents and limited time for multiple iterations, I was unable to execute a proper dry-run on either of my two surveys and all available responses were included as final data points.

Though no formal dry-runs were executed, some survey respondents did provide feedback which was incorporated into the survey. For example, the fourth respondent in the practitioner survey said it would be valuable to include a definition of collaboration before asking questions about collaboration in the field. Seeing the value in the suggestion, I added a definition into the question set despite the fact that it was unavailable to the original four respondents. In other cases, however, suggestions were determined to have too great an impact on the data and were therefore not included. For example, also in the practitioner survey, I included the question “When a community is facing a protracted crisis (war, famine etc.) for longer than 5 years, which actors are more important in *caring* for the community?” (emphasis added). One respondent commented that he had not often heard the phrase “caring for the community” and believed it to be erroring towards a paternalistic mindset. As I reflected on the feedback, I agreed that a different word choice would have been more appropriate, but if I changed the wording half way through data collection it would have improperly skewed the responses and impacted the quality of the data. Therefore, the original wording was maintained throughout the data collection process.

Meanwhile, the interview data was limited by my experience in qualitative research practices. The quality of interview data is reflected in the avoidance common pitfalls such as ‘excessive researcher bias’, ‘leading questions’, and ‘lack of formality or structure’ (Kvale 1994, 148–49). Unfortunately, during the initial research phase as a first time researcher, I noticed myself making some of these errors. First, I asked leading questions to the interviewees which built upon my existing biases as a researcher, and second, I my initial interviews were minimally structured, often asking off topic questions that did not relate back to the larger themes of

protracted crises or the h-d nexus. These issues were intentionally mitigated during the second stage of Survey Follow-Ups.

Finally, the data analysis was limited to observational analysis rather than statistical processing. Again, with more time and a greater data set I could begin statistical analysis on the information collected, however, without representative samples I cannot make any statistically significant claims. I can only observe responses and expound on themes while acknowledging that the data collected does not necessarily represent a larger population.

3.4 Researcher Positionality

In social and educational sciences, qualitative research cannot be detached from the researcher themselves (Holmes 2020, 2). On the contrary, a researcher's world view, including their personal history, position in society, beliefs concerning the foundations of truth or knowledge, and personal assumptions about human nature will affect the researcher's engagement with their subject matter, their research context, and their research participants (Holmes 2020, 1–2). This natural influence on the research process is known as researcher positionality and requires reflection on behalf of the researcher to properly inform the findings and limitations of a given analysis. This reflexive process adds value to research because, far from being a roadblock, “our own biases shape the research process, serving as checkpoints along the way” (Bourke 2014, 1). With proper reflection we gain insight into our research and develop ideas for how to approach the subject matter from different angles in future studies (Bourke 2014, 1).

To discuss my positionality in relation to this research, I want to explain first that I am an engineer. My background in engineering obviously influenced my research topic selection, directing me towards WASH programing, but it also had an even deeper effect on my research process. To be an engineer is to be a problem solver. As someone used to writing lab reports and submitting truss analyses or differential equation solutions with the final answer fitting squarely into a box, social science research was a new endeavor for me. I found myself in a space where there were no boxes to fill or final answers to underline, but rather incredibly intricate political, social, and economic conditions to just analyze. Under the advice of my supervising professor, I was constantly reminded that we are not “solving” but “framing” the problems. If there were clear cut answers to the situations I've endeavored to understand, they likely would have been

found already. Yet, this solution oriented mindset, which I've been developing over years of study, still pushed its way into my research. Even the selection of my research subject: practitioners, though influenced by internship placement, was also a product of who I have experience engaging with and asking questions to. During my interviews with them, I found myself naturally clinging to action items and probing further into best practices and practical solutions rather than questioning their underlying theories of change or humanitarian philosophies. By the end of the research process, I grew significantly in my ability to appreciate the complexity of multifaceted programming dynamics with rich historical contexts, but I know the engineering side of me still reveals itself in the coming pages.

Another aspect of my positionality that is important to this research is a personal connection to Rwanda. I have been on the African continent six times in my life and each time was to visit 'the land of a thousand hills.' Working mostly in the Western Province of Ngororero on water pipeline installations with Engineers Without Borders (EWB), I had the chance to travel to Gisenyi and drive right past the border with Goma, DRC, but I never crossed. As you will read in this research, the political and conflict history of the DRC is deeply tied to Rwanda relations, so my ties to that country have an effect in how I report the context. I was in Rwanda when I first learned the full story of the 1994 Genocide; I heard about political relations between Rwandans, Ugandans, and Congolese from a strictly Rwandan point of view; and I experienced East African culture from an exclusively Rwandan context. My experience with the research location is therefore limited to regional knowledge, rather than a personal understanding of the exact case study area.

Finally, my Christian faith also played a role in the execution of this research. Though I was unable to dive deeply into the dynamics of faith-based organizations within the H-D Nexus, a research topic that could be a whole PhD in itself, my internship with IHN connected me to many Christians working in the space of humanitarian assistance. Though I did not ask any explicitly religious based questions (aside from one demographics assessment inquiring if people worked for an organization with 'no,' 'some,' or 'strong' religious affiliations), five (5) out of sixteen (16) interviewees from three different organizations shared faith-based reflections during their interview. Their freedom to discuss was likely kindled by the like-mindedness they assumed we shared by nature of the fact that I too was working with an openly Christian

organization. Through their willingness to share, I discovered that our faith in Jesus Christ is our mutual motivation for our work: me in my writing about the H-D nexus in protracted crises and them in their navigation of complex humanitarian systems which are much larger than themselves. We believe our Lord Jesus engaged with complex political situations (John 18:19-39), welcomed sojourners (Matthew 25:35), and found ways to serve those who were sick, poor, or homeless (Luke 4:18), which is why we find ourselves involved in these same endeavors. My religious positionality does not have an explicit impact on the findings of this research because, as explained previously, faith-based institutions were not a focus of my study. However, it did have an effect on the contacts I made, the way I engaged with the subjects of my research, and it served as the motivation through which I wrote the coming pages.

Chapter 4 | Emergence of the H-D Nexus

4.1 A History of Humanitarianism

It can be argued that humanitarianism, in its formal sense, began with Henry Dunant, the original architect of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) during the late 1800s (ICRC 2010). In witnessing the horrors of the battle of Solferino in 1859, Dunant was moved to lobby for a system that would better respond to the medical needs of war victims. The structure he presented was an ethical innovation because he insisted that all soldiers be cared for regardless of political or national affiliation. In 1862, to promote his plan of organized national societies who would serve such a purpose, he published a book entitled *A Souvenir of Solferino* and used it to campaign his ideas within his home town of Geneva. This initiated a series of political assemblies which culminated into the first Geneva Convention in August of 1864. Attended by just a dozen countries, this convention adopted Dunant's ideas into a legal framework obligating nations to provide services to all soldiers irrespective of affiliation. These contributions to immediate response efforts within warzones made Dunant the recipient of the first Nobel Peace Prize in 1901 (ICRC 2010), and served as the initial spark for global humanitarian interventions.

Now a complex and diverse set of global initiatives, humanitarianism or humanitarian assistance can be difficult to define. The Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance (ALNAP), an organization committed to unifying humanitarian efforts, defines humanitarian assistance as the collection of actions intended to “save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity during and after man-made crises and disasters caused by natural hazards, as well as to prevent and strengthen preparedness for when such situations occur” (ALNAP 2018). In current discourse, the term humanitarian assistance is often shortened to humanitarian aid, and sometimes considered interchangeable with the humanitarian relief and disaster relief (UN 2014). When comparing Dunant's establishment of the ICRC with ALNAP's latest definition of humanitarian assistance, one can already see how the sector has evolved over time, from a service provided in wartime to a service supplied in all situations where human life is at risk, including non-war related man-made crises and natural disasters. As the sector grew, it eventually adopted a set of unifying principles essential to the work of any humanitarian

organization: *humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence*. By 1991, these four principles were adopted as an official resolution at the UN General Assembly, reflecting Dunant's original vision to serve all persons regardless of affiliation (Bagshaw 2012). Thirty years later, the principles are still influential today, as evidenced by their citation among those interviewed for this research (see [Section 6.2](#)).

While the four humanitarian principles have remained consistent over time, humanitarian action has also adopted unofficial principles such as responsibility, efficiency, sustainability, and resilience as it evolved towards meeting new needs and working in new crises (Manset, Hikkerova, and Sahut 2017). In a 2017 research submission to the French publication, *Gestion et Management Public*, three professors from the University of Geneva, IPAG Business School in Paris, and IDRAC Business School of Lyon contributed an in-depth study on the evolution of humanitarian principles. Based on a review of historical trends paired with interviews of current practitioners, the authors produced the following overview of humanitarian services over time (see *Table 4.1*) (Manset, Hikkerova, and Sahut 2017, 85).

Table 4.1 History of Humanitarian Action

(Manset, Hikkerova, and Sahut 2017, 85)

DEFINITIONS	CHARACTERISTICS AND PRINCIPLES	TEMPO-RALITY
Purist Humanitarianism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Characteristics: of a religious and intellectual order, assistance to the poorest, protection of civilian populations and relief to the victims of epidemics or natural disasters Specific principle: charity 	Until the 19 th century
Modern Humanitarianism	<p>“Modern, Phase 1”</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Characteristics: direct and immediate, saves lives. It is centred on the beneficiary of the aid. This humanitarianism is sometimes qualified as naive, disorganized, or inefficient, but also as philanthropic and emotional. (Warner 1999) and (Schroeder & Varga 2005). Fundamental principles: humanity, neutrality, independence and impartiality 	From 1863 to the 1960s
	<p>“Modern, Phase 2”</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Characteristics: evolution of modern humanitarianism, which witnessed an opposition between the immediacy of the aid and the sustainability of the action. Change of target/objective of humanitarian action from the individual in need to the protection of human rights, to the maintenance of peace, and therefore by extension, of society (Ericksson 1996) and (Schroeder & Varga 2005). Specific principles: strategy (political), sustainability, responsibility Other principles: all the previous principles 	From the 1960s to the 1980s
	<p>“Modern, Phase 3” (or “Spectacular”)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Characteristics: highly-mediatized, spectacular. It uses the media as witness and goes beyond politics. Birth of No-Borders, reaffirmation of principles Specific principles: strategy (political), neutrality, independence, impartiality, information and witnessing Other principles: all the previous principles 	From the 1980s to the 1990s
State Humanitarianism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Characteristics: instrumental to policy (“humanitarian war”), becomes the extension, the tool to act in a geo-strategic manner. It is also accused of normativism due to its density and propensity for hyper-standardization Specific principles: strategy (political), intervention, pragmatism, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability Other principles: all the previous principles 	From the 1990s to present
Peer Humanitarianism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Characteristics: Back to Basics: ethics and solidarity. “Peer-to-peerisation”. This implements the conscience of each individual but also of the collective, it analyses the particularity of the situation, the approach is systematic addressing both the meaning and the issues of the aid, and affirms the fundamental principles of the aid (Mattei 2014), in opposition to political instrumentalisation Specific principles: resilience, sustainability, predictability Other principles: all the previous principles 	In progress

The overview provided by Manset and colleagues is a helpful reference for recognizing that the concept of humanitarianism has never been stagnant; it has been constantly evolving, eventually morphing into the large humanitarian system known today.

Considering the Covid-19 pandemic as well as other global disasters and man-made conflicts, in their most recent *Global Humanitarian Overview*, OCHA predicted there would be

“235 million people needing humanitarian assistance and protection” by the end of 2021 (OCHA 2020a). “This number has risen to 1 in 33 people worldwide” they explain, “a significant increase from 1 in 45 at the launch of the Global Humanitarian Overview 2020, which was already the highest figure in decades” (OCHA 2020a). Observing from a financial perspective, Angus Urquhart from Development Initiatives reported that support for humanitarian aid grew 30% between 2014 and 2018 (See *Figure 4.1*) (Urquhard 2019). The exact number of organizations working in the humanitarian space – which have influence over these dollars – is difficult to pin down, but the number is significant; one estimate said there are “9,903 international humanitarian organizations in the United States alone... employing [at least] 19,211 people, and earning more than \$17 billion in revenue each year” (Hurd 2021).




Figure 4.1 Growth in Humanitarian Spending from 2014 to 2018 (Urquhard 2019)

The quantitative growth of the humanitarian sector has naturally instigated a qualitative change as well; operations have increased so much since the sector’s inception that it is no longer possible to describe it in simple terms. In their 2018-2021 Inception Report, ALNAP appropriately defines humanitarian action as a fluid part of an ever changing system (ALNAP 2021). They specify that such systems are *non-linear* (their behaviors cannot be easily predicted), *emergent* (they are constantly developing new characteristics over time), and *nested* (they are inseparable from the smaller systems – like organizations – which exist within them, or the larger systems – such as international policies – into which they feed) (ALNAP 2021). That

being said, ALNAP does provide a working definition of the humanitarian system as: “Entities which are operationally or financially related to each other and share common overarching goals, norms and principles in humanitarian action. These include: national and international NGOs conducting humanitarian activities; UN humanitarian agencies; the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement; host government agencies and authorities; regional intergovernmental agencies; multilateral agencies; government aid agencies and other offices that provide humanitarian funding and coordination” (ALNAP 2021).

4.2 Humanitarianism in Protracted Crises

As the humanitarian system expanded its reach far beyond immediate war response, one of its most prominent areas of engagement in the 21st century has been within *protracted crises*. A protracted crisis can be defined as “situations in which a significant portion of a population is facing a heightened risk of death, disease, and breakdown of their livelihoods” (HC 2015). According to Development Initiatives, an organization “harnessing the power of data and evidence to end poverty, reduce inequality, and increase resilience”, in 2020 “over one billion people (16% of the world’s population) [lived] in countries experiencing protracted crisis. The number of countries experiencing protracted crisis rose from 13 in 2005 to 31 in 2019, and [they are now] home to half the world’s people living in extreme poverty” (DI 2020). Protracted crises are often defined by duration/longevity, conflict, weak governance or public administration, unstable livelihood systems or poor food security outcomes, and a breakdown of local institutions (HC 2015). Nowadays, humanitarian action is so heavily intertwined with protracted crises that Development Initiatives directly linked the two together in their definition. They say, “protracted crisis countries are defined as countries with at least five consecutive years of UN-coordinated humanitarian or refugee response plans,” making two different concepts – the crisis and the response – nearly inseparable from one another (DI 2020).

Protracted crises, which are expected to increase rather than decrease in years to come (OCHA 2020b), often grow out of what are considered *complex emergencies*. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), “*complex emergencies* are situations of disrupted livelihoods and threats to life produced by warfare, civil disturbance and large-scale movements of people, in which any emergency response has to be conducted in a difficult political and security environment” (WHO 2021). Within complex emergencies, traditional emergency

responses are often limited by constantly increasing service needs or constantly deteriorating security conditions. “Such ‘complex emergencies’ are typically characterized by: extensive violence and loss of life; displacements of populations; widespread damage to societies and economies; the need for large-scale, multi-faceted humanitarian assistance; the hindrance or prevention of humanitarian assistance by political and military constraints; significant security risks for humanitarian relief workers in some areas” (IFRC 2021). Though the distinction between these two terms is not always clear, for the purpose of this research, complex emergencies are the collections of destabilizing events which, over an extended period of time, develop into a protracted crisis. Eli Stamnes, researcher for the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs warns that humanitarian action alone is not sufficient within the space of a protracted crisis. These “crises are long-term,” she said, “this impedes development and compromises opportunities for national capacity building because the urgent supersedes the important” (Stamnes 2016, 2).

Since being involved in the space of complex emergencies and protracted crises, the humanitarian system has seen significant reforms. For example, the *Cluster System*, which is now a significant mechanism of humanitarian coordination, was not adopted until after the 2005 Humanitarian Response Review (Russell and Tennant 2014, 303). This review, directed by the United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) and Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), called for reform in multiple areas including “humanitarian leadership, funding, and coordination” which led to the development and adoption of the ‘cluster approach’ (Russell and Tennant 2014, 303–4). Essentially, the cluster system organizes humanitarian responses around “the main sectors of humanitarian action e.g. water, health and logistics [etc.]” (OCHA 2021a). As with any new approach there was certainly concern about its implementation. Notably, being that the system was originally established and is still operated by the UN’s IASC, some significant stakeholders including Médecins Sans Frontiers and ICRC opted out of this cluster scheme to maintain neutrality (Russell and Tennant 2014, 304). Though the cluster approach has been adopted as general practice in most humanitarian responses worldwide, many frustrations with the system still exist and are discussed in future chapters (see [Section 7.2](#)).

4.3 The Humanitarian-Development (H-D) Nexus

Over ten years after the discussed Humanitarian Response Review, at the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit, UN Secretary General António Guterres gave a new call to action, “We must bring the humanitarian and development spheres closer together from the very beginning of a crisis to support affected communities, address structural and economic impacts and help prevent a new spiral of fragility and instability... To achieve this, we need more accountability, on the level of each individual agency carrying out its mandate, but also its contribution to the work of the United Nations system and of the system as a whole. A strong culture of accountability also requires effective and independent evaluation mechanisms” (OCHA 2017, 5). This statement was made to the audience of a world exacerbated by protracted crises (e.g. Syria, DRC, Somalia, Sudan, Afghanistan, and Yemen) and growing weary of the short-term nature of humanitarian programming within extended conflicts.

His statement was a summary of the UN’s recently established platform labeled the *New Way of Working*, which could be seen as the reframing and formalization of the concept known as the *humanitarian-development (H-D) nexus*. Defined as “the transition and overlap between the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the provision of long-term development assistance,” the H-D nexus is especially important in protracted crises (Lie 2020, 1). The *New Way of Working* is the UN’s attempt to harness that interface of service provision, calling for “humanitarian and development actors to work collaboratively together, based on their comparative advantages, towards ‘collective outcomes’ that reduce need, risk and vulnerability over multiple years” (JSC 2021). The nexus, as redefined by the *New Way of Working*, saw diverse support across humanitarian, development, and state actors actively participating in conflict situations, and claimed not to threaten but strengthen the core humanitarian principles by employing them for long-term impact in vulnerable communities (OCHA 2017, 4, 7).

Since the UN is arguably the strongest single organizational force for dialogue shifts and behavior change amongst globally operating service organizations, its support for the transition into nexus dialogue quickly gained popularity. It stimulated initiatives such as the *Grand Bargain*, which was designed as a partnership “between the big donors and humanitarian organizations in humanitarian aid” jointly committing to “get more means into the hands of people in need and to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the humanitarian action”

(IASC 2021). The original idea even grew into what is now known as the *triple-nexus*¹ which incorporates peace-actors as its third arm (ICVA 2018, 1). “Humanitarian relief, development programmes and peacebuilding are not serial processes,” argued Oxfam in a 2019 Discussion Paper, “they are all needed at the same time” (Oxfam 2019).

However, as the nexus conversation grew in popularity and began its evolution into the triple-nexus, many critics began to surface. In an article published in the *Journal of International Humanitarian Action*, Jon Harald Sande Lie, PhD in social science and senior research fellow for the Research Group on Global Order and Diplomacy, offers a clear summary and important critiques towards the nexus conversation (Lie 2020). He reminds his readers that even four years after the 2016 World HD Summit “the nexus remains widely debated, poorly adopted and highly contested” (Lie 2020, 2). He claims that despite its aims to remain faithful to humanitarian principles, the nexus “drives and reflects changes in the humanitarian realm by expanding and contracting the humanitarian space,” encouraging humanitarian actors to engage in conflict prevention and political diplomacy for the sake of collaboration (Lie 2020, 2). Barry Munslow, Professor Emeritus at Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine, had a similarly strong critique saying that, “While [the nexus] is understandable from an organizational coherence standpoint, it compromised the humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence core humanitarian principles, as development work means working with governments who may be one party to a conflict. The coherence agenda in effect weakened the humanitarian healthcare response capacity” (Munslow 2019, 358).

Responding to these critiques, Eli Stamnes says, humanitarians cannot separate themselves from the natural politics of development programming. They may want to, but “In the field... the lines are not as clear-cut... response, recovery and development tend to take place in parallel. Moreover, prevention and recovery are increasingly seen as central parts of humanitarian action, thus causing some overlap with development action” (Stamnes 2016, 1). Essentially, the actors within the nexus are so interwoven that one cannot simply reject the idea and continue programming as usual. There are risks associated with prioritizing either type of action; “Where long-term development goals are prioritized across the whole system, there is a risk that

¹ This research will only use the framework of the H-D nexus, though I would encourage a deeper incorporation of the triple-nexus in future studies.

immediate humanitarian needs do not receive adequate responses... On the other hand, prioritizing humanitarian assistance across the response (as happens in many protracted and cyclical crises) risks failing to strengthen local systems to accountably provide essential social services, and prevent and prepare for future crises” (Oxfam 2019). These differing opinions presented through the literature prove there still needs to be dialogue over the issue.

Paul B. Spiegel, Director of the Center for Humanitarian Health at John Hopkins University, argues for the necessity of the conversation due to shifting historical realities that do not allow for humanitarians to practice the way that they used to (Spiegel 2017, 1). From this stance, he acknowledges the importance of the question, “How can humanitarian action transition into long-term development, and how can development actors implement resilient programmes that prepare communities for future emergencies?” (Spiegel 2017, 2–3). According to Spiegel, who was also the previous committee director for UNHCR, the reality is that “the humanitarian system is no longer fit for purpose and needs to be changed,” and “the development of countries will be negatively affected if humanitarian emergencies are not addressed in a complementary manner with development assistance” (Spiegel 2017, 1).

4.4 Understanding Internal Displacement

As previously defined, protracted crises are often characterized by “large-scale movements of people” or “displacements of people” (WHO 2021; IFRC 2021). Often times these people are displaced within their national borders and, rather than assuming the label of refugee, are instead considered Internally Displaced Persons (IDP). To be informed on the current practices of IDP care, one ought to be familiar with OCHA’s *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement*, which defines IDPs as “persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violation of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border” (OCHA 2001, 7). IDPs often fall among the list of *vulnerable people groups* in humanitarian and development interventions alongside: children and adolescent, women and girls, persons with disabilities, refugees and asylum-seekers, LGBTI persons, and older persons (OHCHR 2021b). IDPs are considered vulnerable, especially when fleeing from conflict,

because, “they remain at high risk of physical attack, sexual assault and abduction, and frequently are deprived of adequate shelter, food and health services” (OHCHR 2021a).

Therefore, the principles go on to address rights and guarantees to be secured for IDPs including (among others): initial protection from displacement, equal rights and non-discriminatory services after displacement, proper legal status, ensured liberty of movement within and outside of their country, and the right to minimum provision of basic necessities including food, water, housing, clothing and medical services (OCHA 2001). Being that IDPs have not traveled across international borders, they note that, “national authorities have the primary duty and responsibility to provide protection and humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons within their jurisdiction” (OCHA 2001, 8). Internal displacement is especially relevant to our study as it is one of the most prominent characteristics of the ongoing crisis in the DRC, who counts 5.2 million IDPs within its borders – the second highest in the world next to Syria (EC 2021, 1). According to OCHA, 1.2 million of these people have been displaced within the last 6 months leading up to January, 2021 (see *Figure 4.2*) (OCHA-RDC 2021), “mostly because of armed conflict (87%), sometimes because of land and intercommunity conflict (11%), and occasionally because of natural disasters (2%)” (OCHA 2021b, 22).




Figure 4.2 The Evolution of Population Movements (in the last 24 months) (OCHA 2021a)

Another reading which provides a deeper analysis of the care of displaced persons is the *Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies* (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al. 2014). Edited by Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and colleagues, the handbook discusses existing paradigms in forced migration response including submissions on IDPs and the humanitarian-development nexus. In his chapter entitled “Internal Displacement”, Walter Kälin explores the universal challenges for IDP care. He exposes the gaps between what the media portrays and what the

reality is for the life of an IDP, and he discusses the dynamics between IDPs and host communities. Specifically relevant to the DRC, which has been entrenched in a complex crisis for over 25 years (see [Chapter 5](#)), he reminds us that “typically, internal displacement caused by armed conflict last often very long and continues beyond actual hostilities.” Unfortunately this reality is not unique to the DRC as, “protracted displacement, where the process of finding durable solutions for IDP’s is stalled and people remain in displacement for 5, 10, or even 20 years or more exists in at least 40 countries” (Kälin 2014, 164).

In contrast to media portrayals of IDP camps, “in most countries affected by internal displacement, the majority of IDP’s stay with host families, live in informal settlements, squat on public buildings, or manage to live on their own in rented houses or apartments” (Kälin 2014, 165). This is certainly true of the DRC where 86% of IDPs are being sheltered by host families and only 14% are living in camp-like settings (OCHA 2021b, 22). This direct integration of IDPs into a community then leads him to argue for more large scale intervention strategies which address displacement-affected communities rather than targeting the displaced themselves, “for instance, upgrading infrastructure such as water and sanitation or local health and education services,” acknowledging that “host communities and communities expected to reintegrate IDP’s once return becomes possible are also affected by the effects of internal displacement” (Kälin 2014, 168). As mentioned in the *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement*, integration into the economy and back into a life of dignity requires multiple levels of provision including physical security, social inclusion, and adequate access to basic necessities such as food, water, housing, clothing and medical services (OCHA 2001). Therefore, there is great value in researching how and where these services are provided to IDPs and host communities within protracted crisis situations.

4.5 Relevance of WASH Initiatives

According to Anita Ramesh and colleagues, faculty of Infections Tropical Diseases at the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine, “In humanitarian crises, WASH are amongst the principal challenges—particularly in the acute and early recovery phases, when diarrheal disease has been found to account for nearly 40% of deaths in camp residents and 80% of deaths in children under two years of age” (Ramesh et al. 2015, 2). Therefore, while any of the previously listed general provisions (food, housing, clothing, or medical services) required for a

life with dignity among displaced persons could serve as a focal point for a review of the H-D nexus, this research will focus on the provision of WASH services. Water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) is the label for a collection of initiatives well known by those in both the humanitarian and development sectors. These initiatives constitute all projects relating to the promotion of good hygiene practices, the supply and treatment of drinking water, and finally the proper management and disposal of waste. A great resources for understanding these initiatives and their role specifically in humanitarian response is the Sphere Handbook which, since 1997 has been combining the Protection Principles, the Humanitarian Charter, and the Core Humanitarian Standard into an informed reference document for humanitarians (Sphere Association 2018, 4).

The creators and contributors of the Sphere Handbook commit themselves to a rights-based approach to humanitarian response, deriving their standards from “the principle of the right to life with dignity” (Sphere Association 2018, 6). In that vein, they established a “voluntary code for quality and accountability” among humanitarian actors consisting of “minimum standards” for program implementation intervention (Sphere Association 2018, 8). In an attempt to avoid the universalization of the standards they share an express qualification, “It is not a ‘how to’ guide but a description of what must be in place as a minimum for people to survive and recover from crisis with dignity” (Sphere Association 2018, 8). The Handbook outlines standards for four main categories: WASH, Food Security and Nutrition, Shelter and Settlement, and Health. They are sure to include WASH specific standards because they view WASH programs as “a practical expression of the right to access water and sanitation in humanitarian contexts” (Sphere Association 2018, 92).

Water supply is the source of life for all people and hygiene capabilities are essential for protecting that life from disease and death; unsurprisingly then, the lack of adequate WASH provision can be devastating. According to the World Bank Group, “a lack of access to WASH services is estimated to be responsible for 20 percent of total deaths and disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) in children under 14” (Andres et al. 2018, 2). The causes of death are often water borne diseases which, even when they do not lead to death are a major impingement on bodily health. Three such diseases include diarrhea, cholera, and typhoid which, according to Centers

for Disease Control and Prevention, collectively infect over 15 million people annually (CDC 2021).

Other tragic diseases are also linked to low quality WASH services; for example, the prevalence of “parasitic worms... such as *Ascaris lumbricoides* (819 million people as of 2010), *Trichuris trichiura* (465 million), and hookworm (439 million).” Meanwhile, there are 41 million people infected with Trachoma, the world’s leading cause of blindness which also results from poor hygiene and sanitation (CDC 2021). The methods through which WASH services protect against disease are displayed clearly in is known as the “F-diagram” – labeled as such for its depiction of barriers against fecal contamination, the most common perpetrator of waterborne illness (see *Figure 4.3*) (Tilley et al. 2014, 9966).




Figure 4.3 “F-diagram” (Tilley et. al 2014, 9966)

WASH services are necessary on both sides of the nexus, during emergency relief when water accessibility is unstable and within community development when water access is available but too far away or generally unsafe to drink. It should not be assumed, however, that all WASH programming leads to better functioning WASH services. The success of specific interventions and program models in actually rendering water, sanitation or hygiene more available to the public can and should be critically analyzed (Ramesh et al. 2015) especially within the complications of a protracted crisis.

A valuable collection of WASH resources for humanitarian and development programmers can be found at the Water Engineering and Development Centre (WEDC) of Loughborough University (WEDC 2021). The center helps connect WASH practitioners around the world through its annual conference. As a contribution to the 39th conference in 2016, Andrew Armstrong, a researcher at the University of Oxford International Graduate School, surveyed WASH practitioners who work in development-oriented relief and recovery (Armstrong 2016). His research discovered essential factors enabling sustainable WASH provision in crisis situations and broke them down into categories including: functional sustainability factors, institutional sustainability factors, social sustainability factors, and financial sustainability factors (Armstrong 2016, 4). He uses these essential factors to argue for the implementation of development-oriented WASH practices as soon as possible, even during humanitarian response situations (Armstrong 2016, 5).

This same research was repeated in a more in-depth, context-specific manner by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) who reported on *Improving WASH Service Delivery in Protracted Crisis: The case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo* (Mosello, Chambers, and Mason 2016). A helpful resource for those working in the WASH industry within the DRC, the ODI report collected personal interview data with practitioners in Eastern DRC and used them to evaluate the existing practices of caring for people in crisis situations. It specifically calls out the importance and occasional failure of WASH coordination mechanisms, while critiquing the government for its minimal involvement in WASH programs and confronting INGOs for their lack of active collaboration (Mosello, Chambers, and Mason 2016, 23). It also highlights the difficulties of collaborating well across humanitarian and development programming due to contradicting strategies, including expectations around community contributions (Mosello, Chambers, and Mason 2016, 34). These debates over best practices and service methodologies are very important in the discussion of the H-D nexus, and the ODI report offers a great analysis of those concerns. The research to be presented in the following pages, which also examines practitioner perspectives on WASH programming in the DRC, offers a continuation of the ODI study, and exposes that these concerns are still prevalent in 2021, five years after ODI's original publication.

Chapter 5 | Setting the Stage

5.1 DRC General Context

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), sometimes known as Congo-Kinshasa in reference to its capital city, is the second largest country on the continent of Africa. Spanning along the equator from the Atlantic Ocean on the west coast of the continent towards the region known as East Africa, it covers 2.3 million sq. km – twice the land area of Western Europe (CIA 2021). It is home to a mostly tropical climate that is humid and hot in the equatorial river basin, cooler and dry in the highlands of the south, and cooler and wet in the highlands of the east. The country holds many natural resources between its borders including cobalt, copper, niobium, tantalum, petroleum, industrial and gem diamonds, gold, silver, zinc, manganese, tin, uranium, coal, hydropower, and timber (CIA 2021), and contains a significant portion of the Congo Rainforest, the second largest tropical rainforest of the world (Malhi et al. 2013, 2). Currently the most relevant to the nation's resources list is coltan. "Coltan is an abbreviation for colombite-tantalite from which the precious metals columbium and tantalum are extracted. Tantalum is twice as dense as steel and can capture and release an electrical charge, which makes it vital for capacitors in portable miniaturized electronic equipment such as mobile phones. Of the known global tantalite reserves, 80% are found in the DRC" (Carmondy 2016, 12).

The DRC has a current population of 101.8 million people, 45.6% of whom are urbanized. The nation is home to more than 200 ethnic groups, the majority of which are Bantu; "the four largest tribes Mongo, Luba, Kongo (all Bantu), and the Mangbetu Azande (Hamitic) make up about 45% of the population" (CIA 2021). There are five main languages spoken in the country; French is the official language while Lingala, Kingwana, Kikongo, and Tshiluba are also spoken by large portions of the population in their respective regions (CIA 2021). The country's government is currently lead by Félix Tshisekedi from the nation's capital, Kinshasa. Tshisekedi became president in January of 2019 through a controversial election, where sceptics suggested Tshisekedi made a deal with the otherwise incumbent Joseph Kabila who, after nearly 20 years of leadership, came in third when the ballots were counted (BBC 2021). Nevertheless, considering previous power struggles, this election was marked as the "first peaceful transfer of power" for the DRC in its 60 years since independence (UN News 2019).

5.2 The Nation's History

In the pre-colonization era, before the 19th century, much of the land currently known as the DRC was controlled by the Kingdom of the Kongo. The Kingdom's first known cross-continental contact was with Portuguese traders who, in the interest of the slave trade and enrichments from natural resources, began lucrative exchanges between Africa and Europe. As European trade and colonization practices expanded on the continent, the Kingdom of the Kongo gradually lost power and land to disputing colonizers who were each trying to secure more rights to land, resources, and slaves (McKenna 2007).

In 1875, King Leopold II of Belgium – who would become known as the one of the cruelest colonial leaders on the African continent – began his exploration of central Africa. He was so driven towards the goal of securing a colony for his nation that he inscribed it onto a paperweight when he was only twenty four years old: “*Il faut à la Belgique une colonie.*” (Belgium must have a colony) (Van Reybrouck 2010, chap. 1). To that end, on June 1st, 1885 Leopold II established the Congo Free State (whose borders enclosed more or less the same land area which is known as the DRC today) over which he had a separate kingship, making him exclusive sovereign ruler over the expanse of land it encompassed. This was in contrast to other European territories in Africa, leadership over which was usually shared by respective monarchs, parliaments and political cabinets (Van Reybrouck 2010, chap. 2). Under the guise of bringing “civilization” to central African people, the King's exclusive rule was characterized by cruelty. “Estimates vary, but [under Leopold's Rule] about half the Congolese population died from punishment and malnutrition. Many more suffered from disease and torture. Among those who weren't killed, many were punished by having a hand and/or foot amputated.” His hard-handed reign lasted for almost 25 years until international pressure forced the king to cede his exclusive power over to the country Belgium (Crooks 2021).

The “Belgian Congo” remained a colony for another 50 years until gaining independence on June 30th, 1960. Though the independence of the African nation state was originally a diplomatic agreement, it was followed by a five year power struggle between two coalition government members: President Joseph Kasavubu and Premier Lumumba. This was eventually ended by a *coup d'état* lead by Mobutu Sese Seko who assumed the presidency in 1965 – during which he changed the name of the nation to the Republic of Zaire (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2020).

Mobutu's leadership was known for its "endemic governmental corruption, mismanagement, and neglect [which] led to the decline of the country's infrastructure, while Mobutu himself reportedly amassed one of the largest personal fortunes in the world" (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2020).

During the Cold War, Mobutu's anti-communist alliance garnered him much support from the western powers and "in the late 1970s, Mobutu's Zaire received half of all American aid to Africa" (Carmondy 2016, 4). Though eventually by the end of the Cold War his corrupt rule had become an embarrassment to most Western governments, there was a point when US President Nixon "claimed that the US could learn about economic management from Mobutu" (Carayannis 2003, 240; Carmondy 2016, 35). Meanwhile, "as Zaire's economy crumbled and public servants' salaries collapsed, Mobutu had extorted them to 'steal a little, in a nice way' to survive" as he continued to "[plunder] billions of dollars from the country and oversee its economic ruin" (Carmondy 2016, 35).

5.2.1 War and Armed Conflict

Though the history of DRC's conflicts can go as far back as Mobutu's assumption of the presidency, a notable turning point happened 40 years later with the devastation of the 1994 Rwandan Genocide. After 800,000 Rwandan Tutsis were systematically killed over the course of 100 days, millions of fearful Tutsi and moderate Hutu targets fled to Zaire (DRC) to seek refuge (BBC 2019). One month after the start of the killings, a Tutsi rebel group headed by the current Rwandan president, Paul Kagame, took over the previously Hutu lead capital, putting an end to the 1994 genocide; but Kagame's success sparked a new wave of displacement as over 2 million Hutus also fled across the border for fear of retribution from the newly established Tutsi government (ECI 2021). This grand scope of border crossings was the stimulus for the First and Second Congo Wars, sometimes more appropriately referred to as the African World Wars (Rufanges and Aspa 2016, 6).

To simplify a very complex conflict, in 1996 Rwandan forces, with the aim to "root out the remaining perpetrators of the genocide" allied with Ugandan troops to invade the DRC (ECI 2021). This mission also had a larger political aim to overthrow Mobutu's Presidency which was achieved in May of 1997 (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2020). Mobutu being hated by surrounding countries and his own populous, the second agenda garnered support from other surrounding

countries including Angola, Burundi, and Zaire’s local anti-Mobutu alliance (Rufanges and Aspa 2016, 6; Carayannis 2003, 240) In less than a year these combined forces progressed from the east side of the country all the way to the capital city of Kinshasa in the west where Mobutu ceded power to opposition leader Laurent Désiré Kabila, ending the First Congo War (see *Figure 5.1*)¹ (ECI 2021). However, Kabila lost favor in the eyes of his Rwandan and Ugandan supporters when he started making demands on their continued occupation of the eastern parts of the country. August 2nd of 1998, the growing political tensions broke out into the Second Congo War (Carayannis 2003, 242).




Figure 5.1 Progression of Troops during the First Congo War⁵

What started as a conflict between Kabila’s new government and Rwandan forces supported by Congolese rebel groups, quickly engaged alliances of other surrounding nations. Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, Sudan and Chad came in as supporters of Kabila’s Congo, while Burundi stepped in to assist the Rwandan and Ugandan stimulation of Congolese rebel insurgencies

¹ Online Image Citation Provided as: Johnson: Kongo, Kriege, Korruption und die Kunst des Überlebens. Brandes & Apsel, Frankfurt am Main, 2009.

(Carayannis 2003, 243). It is now estimated, that the African World War, involving at least nine countries at its height, accumulated a death toll of 5.4 million people throughout the conflict (Rufanges and Aspa 2016, 6).

While the war was obviously motivated by political power struggles and ethnic tensions, there were underlying economic drivers to the conflict which are still in motion today. It is often argued that “conflict this time around was largely about control of the strategic material coltan used in new ‘heartland’ technologies of the information age, such as mobile phones” (Carmondy 2016, 3). As previously mentioned, 80% of the known coltan reserves in the world are found in the DRC (Carmondy 2016, 12) and in 2009 the International Relations and Security Network of Switzerland reported that, “For over 10 years, companies in industrialized countries have purchased Coltan despite war and lawlessness in the DRC... [which is] not the only cause of the Congolese war, [but] it has been a core problem with neighboring countries, Rwanda in particular... Even though Rwanda possesses small reserves of Coltan within its own boundaries, in 2008, it earned US\$19.2 million from Coltan sales, with an increase of profits of 72.1 percent compared to the previous year” (Totolo 2009).

The end of Second Congo War was initiated by the signing of multiple bilateral agreements between Kinshasa, Kigali and Kampala in 2002. These agreements called for all Rwandan and Ugandan troops to be pulled out of the country. Unfortunately, “withdrawal of foreign troops, created a power vacuum in the east, and a significant increase in violent, anarchic conflict between ever smaller groups that have become significant actors in the more illicit activities in that region” (Carayannis 2003, 247). The war was not officially over until July 2003, when the Congolese established a transitional government made up of representatives from the internally warring factions; the new leadership structure added four vice-presidents to Kabila’s office representing two main rebel groups, the unarmed opposition, and civil society respectively” (Carayannis 2003, 248). Kabila remained in power until the recent and relatively peaceful transition to the current Tshisekedi administration established in 2019 (UN News 2019). However, violent militia activities and associated crises have continued, most notably in the eastern provinces.

As of 2020, Human Rights Watch counts 130 armed groups active in South Kivu, North Kivu, and Ituri (to be referred to as the eastern provinces) and offers a list of the significant

actors including: “the mainly ethnic Lendu association of militia Cooperative for the Development of Congo (CODECO); the largely Ugandan Allied Democratic Forces (ADF); the Nduma Defense of Congo-Renové (NDC-R); the largely Rwandan Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and allied Congolese Nyatura groups; the Mazembe and Yakutumba Mai Mai groups; and several Burundian armed groups” (HRW 2021). The violence continues to perpetuate itself through overlapping political, financial, and ethnic agendas of the various militia groups. Human Rights Watch cites the Kivu Security Tracker, saying in 2020 “assailants, including state security forces, killed more than 1,500 civilians and kidnapped for ransom more than 570 others in North Kivu and South Kivu,” they continued to explain how, “violence escalated in parts of Ituri province, where killings have been unrelenting” (HRW 2021). Naturally these violent attacks have been perpetuating the displacement of many civilians. Currently, there are an estimated 4.7 million IDPs between the eastern provinces alone, comprising 90% of the total displacement within the country (1.81 M, 1.70M, and 1.19M in North Kivu, Ituri, and South Kivu respectively) (OCHA-RDC 2021).

5.3 Eastern DRC – Geographical Context

Stepping away from conflict history in the area, it is important to explore the case study location geographically. The provinces to be analyzed within this study include Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu located along the eastern border of the DRC (see *Figure 5.2*) (Al Jazeera 2020a). These provinces share significant borders with Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi to the west, along which you will find Lake Albert, Lake Edward, and Lake Kivu in Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu respectively (see *Figure 5.3*) (Sabuhoro 2017, 2).



Figure 5.2 Eastern Provinces of the DRC (Al Jazeera 2020a)

The region, which passes over the equator in North Kivu, is mostly a tropical rainforest climate and home to the natural conservation area of Virunga National Park (VNP). VNP is part of the Greater Virunga Transboundary Landscape, an important global conservation area, home to the protracted mountain gorillas and believed to contain more endemic and endangered species than any other eco-region in the world (Sabuhoro 2017, 1). This park also encompasses a chain of six volcanos to the south (Hitimana et al. 2006, 11); one of which is mount Nyiragongo of Goma whose recent eruption cause widespread damage and impacted the opportunity for field research (see [Section 2.2](#)).




Figure 5.3 Virunga National Park (Sabuhoro 2017, 2)

The three provinces cover 193,000 square kilometers of mostly rural land shared between 14.4 million people (population density of 74.7 per km²). This population is gathered into approximately 16 large villages and cities across the region including: Mambasa and Bunia in Ituri, Kirumba and Goma in North Kivu, and Idjwi and Bukavu in South Kivu (DB-City 2021). The populations of the capital cities: Bunia, Goma, and Bukavu are 723 thousand, 670 thousand, and 1.1 million respectively (World Population Review 2019). The sparse population distribution across the a vast rural area with small pockets of clustering cities becomes relevant later on when we review how the territorial characteristics of Eastern DRC impact the applicability of the H-D nexus (see [Section 6.2](#)).

5.4 General Economy and WASH Conditions

Unsurprisingly, the history of the DRC including: colonialism, dictatorial leadership, war, and resource grabbing has not been favorable to the country – especially not to its general populace. The DRC currently ranks 175th out of the 189 countries evaluated through the Human Development Index (HDI). Though it is difficult to understand a nation's needs based on a single metric, the HDI attempts to offer a quick comparative tool between nations, “assessing their long-term progress in three basic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, access to knowledge, and a decent standards of living.” To do so, it measures average life expectancy, years of schooling, and Gross National Income (GNI) per capita and arranges these into one value for intercountry comparisons (UNDP 2020, 2). According to this measure, the DRC has constantly progressed in each of the three indications since the year 2000, now, reporting an HDI of 0.480 (see Figure 5.4) (UNDP 2020, 3).




Figure 5.4 Trends in DRC's HDI 1990-2019 (UNDP 2020, 3)

Since the HDI has a minimally nuanced evaluation for poverty levels, of higher concern is the proportion of multidimensionally poor individuals in the country. The Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) completes a deeper analysis than the HDI by evaluating a greater number of variables. The MPI evaluation includes three categories: 1) Health, 2) Education, and 3) Standard of Living; which are then broken into 10 sub-variables such as nutrition, years of schooling, housing, sanitation, and drinking water to name a few (OPHDI 2018, 3). According to the 2018 UNDP evaluation, 64.5% of the DRC's population is multidimensionally poor; while another 17.4% are vulnerable to multidimensional poverty (UNDP 2020, 6). Consequently, based on the CIA population estimate of 101.8 million people living in the DRC, there are approximately 65.7

million individuals living in multidimensional poverty, and an additional 17.7 million individuals in danger of falling into multidimensional poverty (CIA 2021). The impoverished conditions experienced by the majority of the DRC’s population do not lay a good foundation of for tax revenue or infrastructure development.

The DRC is home to “50 percent of Africa’s surface water reserves and almost a quarter of the continent’s internal renewable water resources... in spite of plentiful hydro-resources, access to safe drinking WASH remains low in the DRC, both in absolute terms and relative to regional averages” (World Bank Group 2017, 12). Citing UNICEF and the World Health Organization, in 2017 the World Bank found that, “Improved water facilities were available to only 52 percent of the DRC’s population, while less than 29 percent had access to improved sanitation and only 3 percent of households had handwashing facilities with soap” (World Bank Group 2017, 13). Percentages relating to water access vary significantly between urban and rural zones, while sanitation is equally low quality across the board (see *Figure 5.5*) (World Bank Group 2017, 18). The graphs shown in *Figure 5.5* highlights this variance, disaggregated by water service types (improved, basic, and safely managed), and by sanitation service types (improved and improved with handwashing facilities).² It is from this foundation of generally poor WASH services that we begin our investigation into WASH capabilities available to nexus practitioners within Eastern DRC context.




Figure 5.5 DRC’s Water and Sanitation based on SDG Tiers (World Bank Group 2017, 18)

² The listed desegregations are WASH categories established by WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Program where: *Improved Water* = Protected source accessible at 30 minutes roundtrip; *Basic Water* = Protected source accessible in less than 30 minutes round trip; *Safely Managed Water* = Protected source located on premises and free from fecal and chemical contamination; *Improved Sanitation* = Pit latrines with slabs shared between two or more households. Found from [WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme for Water Supply || Sanitation and Hygiene \(JMP\)](#).

Chapter 6 | The Nexus as Defined by the Data

6.1 The Nexus from a Global Practitioner's Perspective

The more the term H-D nexus is put to use by different service actors, the more varied the definition of the term becomes. Therefore, I set out to understand the nexus as defined by my research participants, gauging the value and implications of the term within their current practice. In the Practitioner Survey, respondents were asked the question “What does the term humanitarian-development nexus mean to you?”



Figure 6.1 Defining the H-D Nexus

Combining their various definitions generated a set of key words shown in *Figure 6.1*. There were clear themes of *connection* between the two sectors of humanitarian and development work, *transition* from one discipline to the other, a focus on *long-term impact*, and a clear recognition of the *complexity* of emergency situations. Some practitioners cited the UN’s *New Way of Working*, recognizing that the term itself was heavily perpetuated through that initiative (PSR 8, PSR 11).

As previously argued through the literature review, the overlap between humanitarian and development services is especially evident within protracted crisis situations. This reality was confirmed when most survey respondents could not rank one service type as more important than the other in a protracted crisis. In question 7 of the survey, respondents were asked which type of actor is more important in caring for a community facing protracted crisis for longer than 5 years. Almost 60% of respondents marked a three (3), indicating both actors serve an equal role

in protracted crises (see *Figure 6.2* where 1: humanitarian actors are more important and 5: development actors are more important)

7. When a community is facing a protracted crisis (war, famine etc.) for longer than 5 years, which actors are more important in caring for the community?

36 responses




Figure 6.2 Practitioner Survey - Question 7 Summary

One respondent described this as a “two-pronged approach to protracted crises,” where “urgent humanitarian needs [are] addressed in the short-term, [while] long-term strategies and actions... occur side-by-side for affected populations to start building resilience” (PSR 31). Another respondent agreed and went even further to explained the value of combining the two strategies, “You can’t improve the crisis without both - because there will be areas where needs spike and are severe and a purely humanitarian/emergency response is required ASAP; but there may be a need at the same time (in other areas or dynamics of the crisis) to work with state actors and networks of community based organizations to try to improve good and inclusive governance so that when the needs are no longer urgent, people can start to reestablish their livelihoods” (PSR 32).

Protracted crises were then marked as the perfect place for the nexus conversation, “[Protracted crises] is where the nexus operation really comes in handy. While emergency actors ensure the prevention of loss of life, development actors can plan for long terms solutions. It is critical that both sets of actors sit together to plan interventions and share data and information, with the suffering of the communities as the center” (PSR 24). Among the general agreement

that holistic approaches are important, there were also specific warnings against non-integrated interventions, especially during a humanitarian response.

“Humanitarian interventions, if not implemented through a systems approach can undermine local systems such as markets, social cohesion and governance,” explained respondent 16, “In protracted crises, incremental and holistic approaches are needed” (PSR 16). Another respondent said that, even though they selected a three (3) for equal importance, they would “slightly lean towards development actors taking the lead, since they are looking for more longer and sustainable solutions” (PSR 6). These responses clearly express how both actors have a role to play within a protracted crisis, while also highlighting that lack of consideration for long-term impact can lead to program failure.

Nonetheless, despite their mutually important services, most practitioners still claim the distinction between humanitarian and development work is important; when asked the question “Should there be a distinction between humanitarian and development work?” a majority of respondents (22/36) agreed, selecting a four (4) or five (5) indicated that the distinction is necessary (see *Figure 6.3*, where 1: No, it is best to consider them one in the same and 5: Yes, the distinction is very important).

5. Should there be a distinction between humanitarian and development work?

36 responses




Figure 6.3 Practitioner Survey - Question 5 Summary

The difference between humanitarian and development work was described clearly by PSR 29, “Humanitarian (relief) aid provides for the immediate needs (food, shelter, water, etc.) of beneficiaries. Development aid provides tools, resources, skills, etc. for the sustainable success

of beneficiaries, including livelihoods, long-term food security, etc.” (PSR 29). Within the survey, many practitioners who were distinguishing the two service types often used the same criteria: 1) level of urgency and 2) length of intervention. According to some respondents, humanitarian work should be limited to “12 to 18 months after a crisis,” “one year or less,” or only “weeks or months” (PSR 15, PSR 17, PSR 14). This use of time frame to distinguish between the intervention types is common place, even in Eastern DRC. Émilie Bhanja Otuma, an Ituri resident who worked for MedAIR and Oxfam in emergency WASH programming said, “Normally we do emergency work for three to six months. Maximum six months of a response. However,” she continued, “there is constantly a turn-over of IDPs. With the security situation, sometimes we do not respect the six month rule” (PI 7: Otuma).

This is where the overlap and distinction between the two fields becomes more complicated. As shown by question 7 (*Figure 6.2*), there is a desire to see both humanitarians and development programs serving within communities, but question 5 (*Figure 6.3*) reveals that the two service types remain clearly distinct from one another. The goal then is to understand how these two seemingly opposing realities interact. In a follow-up interview, Bryan Wallace the Regional Manager for North East Africa at IHN said, “I would consider myself a humanitarian [rather than a development worker]. But I think there’s often a false dichotomy, especially in complex humanitarian crises. Like in Sudan and South Sudan, there might be a rapid onset emergency oftentimes caused by war, or natural disaster, but because they tend to be lower income countries, with less infrastructure, and less sustainable governance in place, it quickly becomes a development issue” (PSR 33: Wallace).

This rapid progression from crisis into development and the inability to distinguish between the two types of programming was also highlighted by Kilian Kleinschmidt, previous director of the Za’atari refugee camp in Jordan. “I think this division into humanitarian and development and constantly talking about the nexus and where the nexus is and so on is actually dangerous because it’s very difficult to define.” He continued with an example, “If you have a displacement situation [or a similar] crisis, then it’s about life saving measures in the very beginning, but the moment you start to work on education and some skill development, it is development as such already” (PI 4: Kleinschmidt). It is out of these kinds of critiques that the conversation for the

nexus began. However, as Kleinschmidt said, discussion around how and where the two sectors overlap could inadvertently exacerbate the difficulties of an already complex situation.

6.2 The Nexus from a DRC Practitioner’s Perspective

The DRC is currently housing many humanitarian and development NGOs, not in small part due to the 25 years’ worth of armed conflict it has experienced. Carrie Scott, a long term resident of the DRC and current Program Director for a WASH oriented humanitarian organization in Goma said she is grateful she can remember a time in the country before the fighting. “I came here in 1988, [at which point] you could pretty well go anywhere and do anything that you had to do. You didn't have to think about anybody with a gun, and that's completely gone now.” At that point in time “there were no NGOs - like no NGOs” she repeated for emphasis (PI 9: Scott). However, she only experienced that state of peace for a few years. “I was here when the genocide took place next door,” she explained referring to the 1994 event in Rwanda, “I was here when refugees came across and I was here for one more year while they were here.” (PI 9: Scott). As previously mentioned in [Section 5.2](#), the Rwandan Genocide had a huge influence on conflict progressions in the DRC, so it is not surprising to find that humanitarian efforts increased around that time.

“At that point [in regards to NGOs] everybody and his brother showed up. It was just crazy,” Scott continued, “of course, that's why the Sphere standards were set, because everybody showed up and just did their own thing and there were no standards to go by” (PI 9: Scott). Upon hearing this statement, I was reminded that the Sphere standards were in fact developed in 1997, which fits into Scott’s stated timeline. These standards have since become a staple in humanitarian response efforts as explained in [Section 4.5](#). Some interviewees approached them with strong critiques saying the standards boil people down to simple numbers and calculations, adding to the callousness of a response, and that they limit the creativity of humanitarians to think beyond the minimum towards more durable solutions (PI 4: Kleinschmidt). However, the standards also offer a clear baseline, acting more often as a floor supporting the efforts of humanitarians rather than a ceiling holding back innovation; and they provide a minimum measure for life-saving water, food, and shelter requirements (PSR 11: Roberts, PI 7: Otuma).

Looking past the historical progression of humanitarian and development services in the Congo to its current state, it is important to note how geography divides the programming. “The

type of project is dependent on the context,” explained Griffon KAYUMBA FALAY, a Congolese WASH Technical specialist working for the Congolese Organization for Integrated Development (OCDI), “in DRC there are territories currently in conflict and there are post-conflict territories. In post-conflict places we can focus on resilience which is part of development programming; while in conflict areas, we focus on the emergency responses” (PI 10: FALAY). So even though there are plenty of humanitarian and development actors in the region, their programming might not overlap due to the sheer size of the land and height of needs. Scott echoes this idea in her explanation of the local geography:

“The thing about Congo is, it's the size of Western Europe, it's half the size of the United States, it's the size of Ontario, Quebec... whatever scale you want to use that speaks to the most. You can take the whole country of Rwanda and fit it into North Kivu province and North Kivu would still be larger. There are no roads going across the country, even the main road going north and south is in terrible repair, and you can have bandits. So with the huge distances, and not very concentrated demographics, occasionally, we'll have things in the same place but it's more the exception than the rule... [the locations where we are doing humanitarian versus development interventions] are very often separate. They might be in the same province but that really doesn't mean anything when the province is the size of a country” (PI 9: Scott).

This territorial separation offers a new perspective on the overlap of the nexus within the DRC. Even within the same province, you can have very distinct zones calling for humanitarian responses while others call for development or resiliency programming. According to FALAY, three out of five Ituri territories are in dire need of humanitarian assistance most of which are rural. The other two territories are home to slightly larger cities, which could benefit more from resiliency building than emergency response (PI 10: FALAY). This observation was confirmed by an informal conversation with an IHN colleague who had just moved to Bunia, Ituri. “Being in Bunia is like being in a bubble,” he said, “there are a lot of security threats around the city and displaced persons coming in, but while you are in the city you feel safe” (Informal Conversation: IHN Staff 2021). So while humanitarian assistance continues to rural villages of the DRC, practitioners in the cities like Bunia or Goma might be able to take a step back to focus on development programming from the safety of the cities. This is assuming that the DRC is ready

to engage with the nexus conversation and begin transitional programming between humanitarian and development assistance.

Perhaps surprisingly, two interviewees currently based in the DRC do not believe this is case. Samantha Sullivan, who has been working for the past three years as a Program Quality Coordinator for a humanitarian organization in Goma, said “working in a context that lends itself most clearly to humanitarian action” which is why the perspectives of the nexus are relatively new for her and for the DRC (PSR 32: Sullivan):

“It could be that in the Congo we are shifting more to the H-D nexus... but that approach is new, even for donors... I'm a linguist and [as such, I know] you can't define something that doesn't exist. You can't give it a name until you actually have the experience or the object in front of you... [So the nexus is still new in the DRC because] you have really, really aggressive civil wars; you have all the conflict from Rwanda; you still have the interesting border dynamics that create for weird refugees on both the western near Angola and especially the eastern side of the DRC; you have populations that are expelled... You have all these tiny little crises always popping up, and you're trying to put band aids on everything, [in which case] there's just not a lot of spaces where you can put the nexus. You just don't have a safe space; you don't have a stable space.” (PSR 32: Sullivan).

The ways in which these types of security issues practically impact long-term planning is further expounded on in [Section 6.2](#) of this chapter, and this perspective was not isolated; Carrie Scott a fellow DRC humanitarian also shared very similar views with Sullivan. Within her survey response Scott said “The Nexus has, in a way come at a bad time [for the DRC] since the humanitarian need is so great” (PSR 4) and then expounded on this idea in an interview:

“I think it was about three years ago, there started to be training available about Nexus, and I attended several of those held in Goma. At the time I really felt like ‘Wow, they're really onto something. This is really, really good... it's a great idea.’ They recognized that we were dealing with a system that does [silo our services]. If you are development, than you are development; if you are humanitarian, then you are humanitarian; if anybody is even trying to do peace, that's just another kettle of fish. But then they also recognized

that, to get those types of organization together – three very different ways of working, all of them important, but very, very different – was going to be a challenge... Now since then, we've dealt with Brexit, we've got COVID... It's really hard to find funding right now, so what's happening very unfortunately is, a lot of people are just treating this as the last thing to tick off. So [for an award] you've got 1000 words in a particular section to describe what you're doing, and somehow you've got to work in the word *Nexus*. It doesn't mean you're doing anything that is even remotely close to what the idea of Nexus actually is, but you've got to have the word in there... And that's very sad, because I think it's a great idea” (PI 9: Scott).

She went on to explain that many organizations in Eastern DRC are simply trying to “keep their heads above water” (PI 9: Scott), to maintain their existing programming for addressing an overwhelming amount of need, so the thought of really engaging with the nexus right now is barely on their radar. “If you go back to the humanitarian plans for DRC,” Scott continued, “you'll see how much we say we need to reach the people that are in need. Then at the end of the year, you see the contributions don't even reach 50%. So it's that type of atmosphere that we're working in right now” (PI 9: Scott). Evidently, there are contextual barriers in the DRC still making nexus conversations difficult, but that does not mean they will not continue to be introduced. Returning to Sullivan, she ended her statements on the nexus with a slightly more optimistic outlook. “From my personal and professional experiences,” she said, “I think it is a very positive thing that [the nexus] is coming to the DRC. I do think it's slightly premature, but there is never a perfect time for anything” (PSR 32: Sullivan).

6.2.1 Government Partnerships

Cycling back to the question of whether humanitarian or development actors are more important in caring for the community during a protracted crisis, one respondent pushed back on the question saying, “Ultimately, the governing structure of the country is the most important actor to ensure that communities are provided for” (PSR 1). This reality is especially important when considering services to IDPs who are, according to the *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement*, primarily the responsibility of their respective national government (OCHA 2001, 8). Ideally, national and local governments in the DRC would be the drivers of humanitarian and development programs within the community.

Therefore, when outside actors do come in for external support, effective programs require an extra level of coordination. Sharing his experience working on city expansion programs in Global South countries, Patrick Lamson-Hall explained how local government buy-in is key to the success of a project. “Ideas that come in from the outside often have trouble getting real political traction which means they can’t attract resources,” he explained. “So everything that we try to do is about promoting local ownership of ideas... We usually come into the country through the national government and then spend most of our time working with local governments” (PI 5: Lamson-Hall). This kind of collaboration is necessary with humanitarian programs as well, but it often requires extra precautions to ensure neutrality in the process. “I find that principles of neutrality, impartiality, and independence allow for quite easy testing of what we're implementing,” explained Paul Hunt who spent the last three years working on health programming in Kirumba, North Kivu, “when we're designing projects, or when we're approaching a partnership with local authorities, health authorities or something, we can consider how that lines up with humanitarian principles and then see if it passes the test, in a sense, or if we're compromising some area, and then consider whether those compromises are acceptable or not” (PSR 10: Hunt).

This brings us back to the distinct difference between humanitarian and development actors. While development actors such as Lamson-Hall often work closely with governing officials, humanitarians sometimes lean on the principles of neutrality, impartiality, and independence before agreeing to partner with non-neutral governing institution (see [Section 4.1](#) and [Section 4.3](#) for more information on the humanitarian principles). Echoing Hunt’s concerns from an IHN perspective, Bryan Wallace noted how humanitarians need to be aware of their boundaries in regards to development programming. “We have to recognize our limits,” he said, “and recognize that there are times when it really is up to governments, and up to local communities themselves to come together and find solutions to the problems that are at hand” (PSR 33: Wallace). According to Wallace, development must be grounded on a few key elements including: lack of conflict, stable governance, and firm economic and financial system; until then humanitarians “can do a tremendous amount of good in terms of providing financing needed for countries to develop” but they will not be the source of the development (PSR 33: Wallace). Within the context of the DRC, this need for a stable governmental platform seems far-off for

some who say “the government here has certainly neglected its responsibilities to an incredible level” (PI 9: Scott).

6.2.2 WASH Programming

Protracted crises, as previously explained, are often defined by the weak-governance structures found in the DRC. WASH programming in particular is a clear example of this complication within the region. Jeremiah Kiraho, the WASH technical advisor for IHN in Ituri, thoroughly explained the lack of government supervision within the sector. “Here in DRC, we don't have the Ministry of Water... [WASH programming is housed] at the Minister of Health, under the Ministry of Environment. So we don't have any specific ministry, or any specific department, which is dealing with water” (PI 6: Kiraho). This presents complications because, “when you go to the Minister of Health offices... they don't have the technical capacity... You cannot get qualified people in those offices, because their main domain is health. So when it comes to the issue of water, it is a bit neglected” (PI 6: Kiraho).

As previously hypothesized, WASH programming in the DRC is cross-sectoral between humanitarian and development services. When asked “Do WASH services belong in the humanitarian emergency sector or the development sector?” with the clear explanation that a four (4) indicates WASH as belonging equally in both sectors, 13 out of 16 survey respondents (80%) selected four (4) (see *Figure 6.4* where 1: WASH belongs only in the humanitarian/emergency sector and 7: WASH belongs only in the development sector).

Les services WASH appartiennent-ils au secteur de l'urgence humanitaire ou au secteur du développement ? (4 indiquant que les services WASH appartiennent indifféremment aux deux secteurs)

16 responses




Figure 6.4 WASH Survey - Question 14 Summary

This large consensus provides evidence that WASH is truly an overarching discipline that cannot be siloed into one sector or another. “WASH services belong to both contexts” explained respondent 9, “because water, hygiene and sanitation are the key organs of human life for a healthy environment” (WSR 9). “It is for both: emergency and development,” echoed respondent 3, “In the humanitarian emergency sector, [WASH services are] targeted more at IDP movements, natural disasters, or epidemics like cholera, shigellosis, Ebola, or Covid-19. For the development sector, WASH services are very important to support population stability and community development” (WSR 3). Another respondent laid out the preparatory role he thinks humanitarian WASH programs should play in the sector, “With the nexus strategy, the emergency should lay the foundation for development” (WSR 2). In the DRC, however, official government institutions are almost never the ones taking over humanitarian programming.

“[Here in Eastern DRC] I would say the issue of WASH is left to NGOs. There is not even any project which has been done by the government” (PI 6: Kiraho). This quote was corroborated by a diagram shared in the Goma WASH cluster meeting showing a stark contrast between the numbers of NGO versus government programs within the area. As seen in *Figure 6.5*, out of 49 WASH Cluster implementation partners only 1 is a state institution (in orange); the

remaining 48 are either UN Agencies (in light blue), International NGOs (in teal) or National NGOs (in yellow) (Cluster EHA 2021, 2).




Figure 6.5 WASH Cluster Implementing Partners (Cluster EHA 2021, 2)

The lack of government support for infrastructure in the DRC is undeniable, and some practitioners cautiously note that stepping into such a setting as an INGO can produce unhealthy government dependency from the onset. “[Humanitarian programming] can have the knock-on effect of government depending on this 'humanitarian' support and not really bothering to help their communities, because help is coming from outside” (PSR 6). Though this caution is important to consider, it is unlikely that humanitarian action in the region is the main cause of poorly supported government WASH programming. Though there are a few organizations providing WASH services in the country, the needs far outweigh the response and the country is constantly being called out for low quality infrastructure (World Bank Group 2017). A more heavily weighing factor is likely security issues in the area. Kiraho again reflecting on the difficulties of doing long-term WASH programming in Ituri said, “I think first of all, we need the government good will, we need good structures, we need to ensure that is no corruption, and that the issue of conflict is minimized. In case of conflict, the water systems are never going to be finalized” (PI 6: Kiraho).

6.2.3 Security Issues and IDP Infrastructure Strains

Kiraho was not alone in his assertion; among WASH practitioners surveyed, security concerns were widely accepted as one of the largest issues for infrastructure planning. When asked why WASH infrastructure is in its current state, most survey respondents pointed directly to conflict related strains on the system. “This protracted humanitarian crisis is compounded by a fragile state context in which the government is unable to effectively address the needs of civilians who face constant shocks, including violence, expropriation, and displacement,”

explained WASH survey respondent 6. “A recent resurgence of violence has reignited regional insecurity,” he continued, “causing large and cyclical displacements, exacerbating human rights abuses, and preventing conflict-affected communities from rebuilding their livelihoods. These wartime events are at the root of pitiful human crises in the livelihoods sector in general and the WASH sector in particular” (WSR 6). While explaining the source of poor infrastructure, 8 out of 15 respondents made a direct reference to the security situation, some citing it as the primary reason for low quality WASH services, “despite the immense freshwater resources [the region] faces a major drinking water challenge... [because] water point facilities were destroyed during the conflict and war” (WSR 8). In cases where NGOs have been able to provide services, there is often the worry of further destruction or abandonment. “The main problem is the non-perpetuation of... projects carried out by the humanitarian community due to the instability of the population, which is forced to abandon everything (latrines, springs, etc.) in case of an attack” (WSR 12). As is the case within protracted crises, these complications are nothing new. For the past 20 years, Eastern DRC has experienced the destruction of infrastructure as a natural consequence of the continued conflict. “Since 2002, WASH... facilities put in place are often destroyed and there is always this infernal cycle of construction and destruction” explained another Eastern DRC based WASH Practitioner (WSR 2).

Meanwhile, constant population movement perpetuated by the conflict acts as another primary factor of low service provision. “Movement of the population in internal displacement creates huge needs in water, hygiene and sanitation. IDP camps are always full. New camps continue to be created following the numbers of IDPs that increase from day to day. Some of the IDPs live with host families and these increase the need for WASH infrastructure” (WSR 10). If these population movements could be predicted, better infrastructure planning could take place; having proper estimates of population is very important for real project planning. This was explained well by city-planner Lamson-Hall discussing how his team at the Marron Institute for Urban Management approaches planning for city growth. “All you really need is a topographic map with a reasonably good resolution... you need some forecasts of future urban population growth - which you can usually get from the census and if not, you can concoct them with the city officials, and then you need historical information on how the city has grown in the past” (PI 5: Lamson-Hall). Unfortunately with the constant population movements in the DRC, the last two numbers can be hard to determine, even with the help of city officials. Lamson-Hall cites

this as a major roadblock, “The problem that I’ve seen with people who are displaced and moving into cities is that they don’t get counted. This input that I’m talking about – knowing how many people are coming to your city – unless it’s a really organized systematic effort to keep track of it – they are not reflected in the data for like ten years until the next census. That’s hugely problematic” (PI 5: Lamson-Hall). This is the exact problem being dealt with in Eastern DRC where projecting growth and tracking movements is very difficult. In rural areas surrounding the cities, there are new people “abandoning their villages every day” (WSR 12) then this displaced population begins to “live in non-habitual areas” (WSR 13) that are hard to predict, so WASH infrastructure planning is incredibly strained.

These layered difficulties are common symptoms of protracted crises. As previously argued, the Congolese government should be more involved in the infrastructure planning process but even if they were involved, the lack of security and continued armed conflict is likely to exacerbate planning and construction efforts. Meanwhile, humanitarian and development NGOs are seeking to supplement non-existent governmental services and within those efforts run into a plethora of obstacles for long-term development planning which will be discussed in [Chapter 7](#).

Chapter 7 | Emerging Themes and Concerns

7.1 Money Hunting: Funding Programs in Protracted Crises

At the closing of our interview Kleinschmidt gave me a warning. “You will see,” he said, “the moment that you get into a humanitarian agency, you will be locked into that logic of ‘Let’s hunt money!’ ‘How can we have money for next year?’ funding proposals... It’s all around that” (PI 4: Kleinschmidt). Ironically, when I started my internship with IHN, the first task assigned to me was the creation of new templates for BHA funding proposals. The search for funding is not inherently bad; all programs need money to operate. However, the process by which funding is secured within the humanitarian system is worth examining.

7.1.1 Funding Flexibility

When asked in light of the H-D nexus to list three changes one would like to see adopted within their service sector, 16 of 28 question respondents (57%) listed humanitarian funding reform (8 survey respondents left the question blank). Respondents listed hopes for things like “improved funding mechanisms,” “easier access to funds that can be flexible and more multi-year funded initiatives that are dual emergency relief and development,” and “increased funding link-up [with] major governmental donors funding humanitarian and development partners, facilitating transition, partnership, etc.” (PSR 7, PSR 1, PSR 10). Some respondents identified it as the largest issue in the sector. “So much is about funding. If countries would just honor their commitments and give us longer-term funding it would solve a lot” (PSR 4). The flexibility – or lack thereof – within funding schemes was the main concern. As long as donors are trapped into a siloed mindset, separating humanitarian and development funding into different categories, creating effective transition within the nexus will remain a challenge.

Paul Hunt, who has served three years as a humanitarian project coordinator in Eastern DRC agrees with the majority of his peers, “I think one area of improvement [in regards to the nexus] could be donors as a link between humanitarian and development organizations.” Then he explained further with an example from the US government funding systems: “So typically, you might have BHA funding humanitarian responders and USAID funding development practitioners. And, yes, they talk to each other, but I don’t think there’s a level of communication

that can really allow for either complementarity during response or continuation (as in humanitarian actors handing over to a development partner). While [the donors] remain split, it's easier to envisage that practitioners will remain split to a degree as well” (PSR 10: Hunt).

An identical complaint was offered by Kleinschmidt. When considering a hardline distinction between humanitarian and development programming he said, “Obviously it doesn’t help that some donors very much have this distinction as well” (PI 4: Kleinschmidt). He explained how Germany’s international funding is housed in two places, 1) the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 2) the Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). Most development funding is administered through the ministry of foreign affairs while the humanitarian funding is channeled to countries through BMZ. In Kleinschmidt’s experience, this division, which is not unique to the German funding system, caused a lot of difficulties on the field. “When I was traveling with the ministry going to northern Iraq back in 2016,” Kleinschmidt explained, “There were embarrassing moments where we were showing up in a meeting with UNICEF, and BMZ didn’t know all the programs they had financed. They were basically informed by the recipient that there was ‘this and this’ development program [funded] by their ministry; then additionally, they discovered there were other German funded projects that were of course more in the field of emergency” (PI 4: Kleinschmidt). Evidenced by these complaints, the structure of the funding sources themselves offer great hindrance to better transition and collaboration between actors; donors are still the ones driving the projects, so if they are struggling with internal coordination, external collaboration on any level will be a challenge.

Meanwhile, individual humanitarian grants often require extensive reporting which can severely limit the size and type of organizations that can access grant funds. Erin Gilchrist, speaking from her past experience with Warzone Initiatives, explained that when it came to accessing donor support, “particularly with USAID,” the expectations were extensive (PI 8: Gilchrist). “You would have to have [reporting structures] set up from the beginning, and really adhere to their specific way of talking about measurements and indicators and outcomes and all of that... Just trying to take whatever project you were needing funding for and fitting it into that specific bucket” (PI 8: Gilchrist). Warzone Initiatives had a difficult time accessing USAID funds precisely because they were a “small organization” working on transitional “WASH development programming for conflict areas” (PI 8: Gilchrist). Since that type of work did not fit

in any of USAID's funding buckets, Warzone Initiatives was left without any large government grants despite seeking to have more long-term impact in their service locations.

Other examples of non-flexible funding are even more concerning: where rules within the grants themselves functionally inhibit the sustainable designs and transitional programming. Returning to Hunt's interview, he said, "As an example, BHA forbids us from building brick latrines - they have to be made out of planks. And in some context there has to be a plan to decommission them afterwards. So the question is, 'How are we leaving communities more resilient, when they will need latrines for the next 20 years and we're choosing to build latrines that will last five, or that we will take down after one?' It would be helpful if there were higher acceptance of designs that will have a longer term benefit" (PSR 10: Hunt). The data produced many such examples of practitioners feeling strapped to funding regulations and donor timelines. Many of them agreed that if more flexibility and contextualization were allowed on behalf of the donor, then more effective programming could be executed within the nexus.

Meanwhile, donor fatigue is putting further strain on DRC practitioners. "I'm so grateful that there are people that are responding, at least to a fraction of the needs. But if you look at the overall picture... it's getting to be a smaller response, rather than a larger one," Carrie Scott explained. "Donor fatigue must be very, very real" she said, "It's still a hard thing to sell, because it's not on the evening news in countries where people have money to be able to contribute" (PI 9: Scott). So practitioners in Eastern DRC are dealing with both restrictive and limited funding, a combination of stresses that make it difficult to consider how one might better incorporate transitional or nexus strategies into programming. As Scott already explained in [Section 6.2](#), when funding is tight people just start putting nexus terminology into their proposals because they know it needs to be there, not because they are actually doing any truthfully transitional programming (PI 9: Scott). When funding is tight, increased flexibility is even more important and would likely be a welcome change for practitioners interested in transitional programming within Eastern DRC.

7.1.2 Finding a Good Match

Despite general frustrations with donor rigidity, there were some positive donor experiences reported. For example, Hunt explained how in Kirumba, North Kivu there was often alignment between donor expectations and program applicability. "Really," he said, "it's a case of working

with those donors in order to ensure alignment on what their priorities are, and what we believe is important and appropriate as a response... I feel that in Congo, we had a good balance; that fundamentally our responses were appropriate for the context and were also acceptable to our major donors. We were able to respond to chronically vulnerable places and to have that flexibility to launch responses as and when [needs arose]" (PSR 10: Hunt). Similarly, Samuel Ellison who had spent time working with Syrian refugee initiatives as a humanitarian in Jordan and Turkey, had very few complaints when it came to donor expectations. "[The funding system] has not been a major problem for me," he said. "Donor funding can be limiting, but for the most part, for the projects that I've worked on, we were still doing programming that we would have been doing anyway because the donor was a good match. We were looking to do and meet the needs that were present at the moment, the donor was looking to do the same thing" (PSR 5: Ellison). He said from time to time there might be an opportunity to do something adventurous which is met with a lack of donor interest, but overall donor regulations are "not extremely limiting" (PSR 5: Ellison). While both of these interviews did offer examples of positive donor experiences, it is notable that they were positive in situations where the donor funding aligned with short-term planning rather than transitional or long-term programming.

Nonetheless, Ellison went on to explain the value of donor rigidity even in transitional circumstances, "there is a benefit as well to the structure of expectations, because it ensures a general quality of response across all organizations and donors... Everyone is getting a minimum standard of things as opposed to one group doing really exceptional high level service, spending lots of resources per beneficiary, and then another group doing very minimal, small things" (PSR 5: Ellison). Ellison sees this as especially important in protracted crisis situations, where vulnerable populations are generally receiving services for free and there would be ethical concerns if these services were unequal across the population (PSR 5: Ellison).

Aside from finding good matches among government donors, when searching for real flexibility, organizations across the board have an interest in securing private donor funding. Wallace, working for IHN, explained that "the way IHN chooses to operate is to fund itself, using funds that we raise on our own through private donors. [Some of those] funds are tied up in certain restricted buckets, so if we get money from people for WASH, by law we have to use it for that intended purpose, but we still have more flexibility with how we use that funding, how

long we want to use that funding, or where we use it” (PSR 33: Wallace). Samantha Sullivan, interviewing from Goma in the DRC, said she likes to use private dollars to supplement programming where other more restricted funding is present. “When I have a private funder,” she explained, “I really push my HQ teams to see if that person would accept some of the more rejected activities such as family planning, abortion, comprehensive sexual education... any of these hot button sensitive topics. So with our private funding, we've been able to completely compliment some emergency funding, especially in cases where we are limited in what we can do on some health programming” (PSR 32: Sullivan). Even Ellison was quite clear on the value private funding brings to a response. “The easiest money that you'll ever get is private money,” he said, “as opposed to funding from a government, USAID type entity that already has robust rules and regulations and expectations for what type of programming is going to happen in a particular area. [In which case] you can do something that's immediate or long term or a combination of both” (PSR 5: Ellison). Unfortunately, the value of flexibility among private donors pulls away from the previously discussed benefits of strict regulations. If humanitarian efforts were supported solely through private donors, “that would potentially create the wild west of funding,” Ellison said satirically. “God only knows what would end up happening” (PSR 5: Ellison).

According to the interview data, the likeliness of that concerning extreme, where private donors become the most prominent funder for humanitarian programming, is not too high. Most interviewees, aside from those at IHN, reported an 85% to 15% ratio between government funding to private donors respectively (PSR 10: Hunt, PSR 32: Sullivan, PI 9: Scott) Even IHN is closer to that ratio when looking exclusively at its humanitarian response portfolio (see [Section 2.3](#)). As much as Wallace and his team value the flexibility of private funds, they still rely heavily on government support in protracted crises. “The problem is that large scale humanitarian assistance often can't be funded internally. There are rare exceptions,” he explained, “but in complex humanitarian zones like Syria, Yemen, South Sudan... you're just not going to get enough media presence to raise that kind of money. So you need to find funding from elsewhere and that comes through institutions like USAID and the UN” (PSR 33: Wallace).

7.2 Conflicting Strategies: Collaboration across Sectors

Setting aside the restraints associated with donor funding, there are certainly inter-organizational barriers that cause divide within the nexus as well.¹ At the end of my summer internship I made a presentation to IHN staff on the H-D nexus. For the presentation, I designed the Venn diagram, shown in Figure 7.1, displaying ideal mindsets and contradicting strategies amid the nexus (see *Figure 7.1*). Along with this slide, I shared two examples of the conflicting strategies listed (see Example 1 and Example 2).




Figure 7.1 *Ideal Mindsets and Contradicting Strategies in the Nexus*

Example 1: Imagine you are working in Ituri, DRC. You could drill an emergency water supply for an IDP camp for free, but there are also actors with long-term WASH programming in the area whose programs require financial contributions from community members for construction and maintenance. Both of these response types could be valid for the situation. Therefore, understanding how the strategies affect one another if implemented in the same area is very important.

¹ These barriers can also be intra-organizational when working with a dual mandate team who does both humanitarian and development work.

Example 2: Now imagine you are working in South East Asia. Aggressively pushing through legal and administrative barriers might be required for an efficient emergency response. However, this speed focused mentality can lead to burned bridges with government officials or legal agencies who culturally expect a certain amount of relational engagement. This doesn't mean emergency responders should not push through with speed, but when working in places where development is also underway, the long-term impact of our actions must be considered.

These two examples were uncovered during my research process. Example 1, an illustration of inter-organizational strategy conflict, was a complaint shared by Benjamin Liringa, founder and managing director of Water Access and Development in the DRC (AEDR), a well drilling non-profit in Bunia, Ituri (PI 3: Liringa). As an exclusively development organization, Liringa always requires community contributions for his well drilling programs in rural IDP sites around the city. This can be a difficult task in a place saturated with emergency responders who are willing to provide WASH programming for free. While AEDR is trying to instigate more community driven programs, “these international NGOs with an emergency come and say, ‘Oh we’ll do this for you for nothing.’ Then the village tells us ‘You are thieves guys, other NGOs they are coming, they are doing for nothing: you are coming and asking us for local contribution, why are you asking us for local contribution?’... So it is kind of a small fight with the emergency international organizations” (PI 3: Liringa).

The second example was uncovered during an informal conversation with a colleague who had just returned from one of IHN’s international offices in South East Asia. She explained how the permanent office spent years building up their reputation with the national authorities. Then, unfortunately, when one of IHN’s disaster response teams came into the country to respond to a natural disaster, they did not understand nor follow the regional cultural expectations, leaving harsh feelings that had to later be mitigated (Informal Conversation: IHN Staff 2021). Speed of response and the amount of expected community contributions are just two examples of the contradicting strategies that exist between intervention types.

Another place where strategy conflicts can arise is in relation to the definition of vulnerable people groups. As discussed in [Section 4.4](#), it is not uncommon for humanitarian interventions to

attempt to identify the most vulnerable populations within an area. OCHA's list of vulnerable populations includes six (6) categories: 1) children and adolescents, 2) women and girls, 3) persons with disabilities, 4) migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers, 5) LGBTI persons, and 6) older persons (OHCHR 2021b). Yet, these categories, which are intended to expand a response to be more inclusive, can have the adverse effect of narrowing a response in a way that is unaligned with long-term holistic programming (PI 5: Lamson-Hall, PI 3: Liringa, PI 9: Scott, PSR 11: Roberts).

In regards to long-term development programs, city planner Lamson-Hall talked about the value of intervention benefits being accessible to all people in need whether or not they fit into a particular label of vulnerable persons. When you are dealing with displaced persons for example, "every benefit that a refugee or migrant gets, you need to also give to the low income people in that city – people in similar circumstances. You don't open a clinic for refugees; you open a neighborhood clinic. You don't build apartment blocks for refugees; you build more apartment blocks in the city, period" (PI 5: Lamson-Hall). Lamson-Hall was speaking globally, but a similar holistic mindset is necessary in the DRC where needs are widespread, even among people who do not fit into vulnerable person categories.

In rural settings, Liringa explained that many people living in their own homes still feel vulnerable. Due to the conflict, "they can't go for farming very far. So they might find themselves feeling like they are an IDP, even in their own village. Even if they are not running, they can't go to the farming; they can't go anywhere. So the need is really huge" (PI 3: Liringa). The problem from there can escalate; when people who feel vulnerable don't receive the same aid IDPs are being offered, anger and conflict can break out. "Once the IDP [who is being hosted in a certain village] is on the list for receiving benefits, villagers start attacking the IDP and telling them, 'You are getting this because we welcomed you. If we didn't welcome you, you could not get this'" (PI 3: Liringa). Others, as explained by Scott in Goma, might just try to take advantage of the system. "Let's say my organization found some great funding, and we're going to have a project in Goma for IDPs. People are going to say they're an IDP, because they're hungry and they're poor, and they want to have some assistance. And in a city of 2 million people, how are you going to be able to weed out who is really displaced and who lives here?" (PI 9: Scott). This comes back to the issue of donor driven programming which doesn't always

support holistic, context specific approaches. “With any donor that I’ve worked with - they’re just going to push you to always go for the most vulnerable people. You might love to get into a place where there’s extreme poverty for whatever reason, but good luck getting humanitarian money for that” (PI 9: Scott). This findings show mindset shifts will be required for better H-D nexus programing in Eastern DRC. Donors and practitioners working in the area are still employing siloed mindset, viewing humanitarian and development work as two separate endeavors. Some of them recognize conflicting strategies between the two, but most are just beginning to grow their efforts towards better collaborate with one another.

7.2.1 Collaboration among Practitioners

Considering the conflicting strategies between humanitarian and development practitioners, it is not surprising that collaboration² between actors was considered at least “very important” (9/36), if not “extremely important” (27/36) to all survey respondents. Despite the agreement over the importance of collaboration, there was less accord concerning the effectiveness of collaboration efforts in the field. Survey respondent 6 said, “As a whole I do not believe we collaborate enough;” echoing the same thought, respondent 7 said, “We try to [collaborate], but it is not always effective” (PSR 6, PSR 7). The reality is that adequate collaboration takes a lot of “time and effort,” so the effectiveness often depends on the “interests of the actors” (PSR 4, PSR 12). Meanwhile, due to the significant amount of need and the minimal donor resources available within protracted crises, a very strong competitive atmosphere can develop between organizations, exacerbating the issue. “There is not enough collaboration – partly because no one incentivizes collaboration” explained George Carter, a private consultant for international philanthropists who make donations to conflict zones. Instead, the current structure rather incentivizes, “too much competition and siloed action in the field” which pushes actors apart rather than drawing them together (PSR 15: Carter).

In the DRC, humanitarian practitioners are acutely aware of this competitive pressure. “The environment can become more competitive, particularly around the time when funding decisions are being made yearly,” explained Hunt speaking from an Eastern DRC perspective, “You’re good friends with somebody, but you know that if they get funded, you might not [get funded]”

² Collaboration was defined in the survey as, “performing joint actions with another agency by sharing some (not necessarily all) of the following: programming responsibilities, resources, data, staff, materials, equipment, costs, liability, etc.”

(PSR 10: Hunt). Hunt saw this as a significant challenge he hopes the sector can overcome. “[It will take work to get] more towards complementary [programming], rather than seeing ourselves as in competition,” he said optimistically (PSR 10: Hunt). Samantha Sullivan, a fellow DRC practitioner who has worked nearly 4 years in Goma, sees this as a natural result of increasing needs in the area. “It’s basic economics,” she argued, “there’s very little funding for massive need, so you have a supply and demand that basically equates to just massive competition” (PSR 32: Sullivan). This can be a double edged sword which, for better or for worse, drives actors into politically and strategically developing relationships with other implementers. “How do you think competition for funding affects the way you engage with other organizations?” I asked Carrie Scott from her call location in Goma. She replied, “Well, you try to make as many friends as you can. And you try and find people who need you and you need them” (PI 9: Scott).

As previously mentioned, incentivizing collaboration is not out of the question. Turning again to a donor driven solution, three different practitioners cited consortium funding as a way to encourage collaboration among actors (PI 9: Scott, PSR 15: Carter, PSR 32: Sullivan). “BMZ in Germany will sometimes allow organizations to apply in a consortium,” explained Sullivan. “Their model of consortium basically says that they’ll give funding directly to each NGO... It’s very rare to find a donor that will do that, but it does help” (PSR 32: Sullivan). Sometimes these consortium style funding models bring together actors that would otherwise be unengaged; Scott had experience applying to a consortium style grant with actors she otherwise never would have thought to work with, but in the end, as a team they “had a better chance of getting funding and [they] had complementary [programming]” (PI 9: Scott). These examples show there is potential for group funding models to incentivize better inter-organizational engagement, at least among the humanitarian sector.

Despite its occasional lack of effectiveness, and the frustrations created by competitive environments, 86% (31/36) of respondents, most of whom were humanitarians, did report participating in intra-sectoral collaboration with other humanitarian actors. There was a much lower percentage, though still a majority, 64% (23/36) who reported that they also collaborated with development actors. A possible explanation for lower collaboration with development actors is the limited systems available for such efforts. “Humanitarian coordination, at least in Congo, is much more sophisticated than for development organizations” explained Hunt,

“weekly coordination meetings, meetings in clusters. The way that information is shared, creating ‘three-W’ maps³ etc., that’s much better developed for humanitarian actors” (PSR 10: Hunt).

The cluster system, discussed in [Section 4.2](#), is one of the most prominent coordination mechanisms among humanitarian actors. WASH practitioners of Eastern DRC said they really “appreciate the WASH Cluster” which is “effective because it contributes to the adequate orientation of WASH interventions in the DRC” (WSR 6, WRS 15). They gave high praise to the system, calling the cluster “excellent” and “very efficient,” “especially in the coordination of humanitarian actors” (WSR 10, WSR 3, WSR 2). I caught a glimpse of this during my participation in the WASH cluster calls and group chat, who were in the process of communicating over the Mount Nyiragongo’s eruption response. They shared links to the latest ‘three-W’ maps,⁴ updates on the latest response developments (including videos of the most recent water pipeline installations), and dispersed simple news stories on surrounding security threats or transportation detours.

For all of the cluster system’s benefits, there are still frustrations with its functionality. Liringa was unimpressed with its coordinative efforts, “Personally, I can’t really say [the cluster system is] doing much, because each organization is just doing what they plan... It’s a pity when you see two or three international organizations, they meet in one small village to do the same thing, because there is not any coordination” (PI 3: Liringa). He might be sensitive to the system’s failings because he is the head of a local development NGO; often the last type of organization invited into the cluster system (PI 3: Liringa, PSR 10: Hunt). Hunt explained this failing more fully, “many locally-founded development organizations – in DR Congo at least – attend humanitarian coordination meetings and find that their aims/capacities are not necessarily applicable to more mainstream humanitarian response,” so they don’t feel truly welcomed into the cluster coordination efforts (PSR 10: Hunt). George Carter shared a similar critique on the system, “I think the current cluster system, works to a certain extent, for the UN and for INGOs. But it doesn’t work for local or national NGOs. [Clusters] are always kind of capital based and very top heavy, rather than on the ground in a decentralized system” (PSR 15: Carter). Carter

³ Three W maps are info graphics displaying “Who does what where?” Occasionally, additional information is added to create a four-W or five-W map indicating “Who does what, where, when, and for whom?”

⁴ The July 2021 “three W” map for WASH in the DRC can be found at the following link: [Cluster EHA RD Congo](#)

still believes in the value of the cluster system because, over the course of his fifteen year career, he has seen the chaos of humanitarian coordination without it. He recognizes the system’s lack of local stewardship and its perpetuation of top-down structures but he also knows “you can’t totally scrap the system” (PSR 15: Carter).

Even if it cannot be done away with, continued evaluation and reform of the existing cluster system will be necessary for effective programming. Humanitarian and development actors have to make a special effort invite each other into the same coordination space. Within that space, conflicting strategies and cross sectoral effects on programming ought to be mutually acknowledged. This heightened awareness lays the groundwork for better collaboration across the sectors and allows for more contextualized programming during complex responses. If this is done well, the diversity of approaches brought to the table by each actor can be seen as an asset rather than a roadblock to effective service in protracted crises.

7.3 Power Shifts: Localization and Capacity Building

7.3.1 Hiring Locally and Implementing Local Partnerships

Survey respondent 13 drew the line between humanitarian and development work when “a fast- or slow-onset disaster creates needs within a population that exceeds their *local* capacity to cope” (PSR 13, emphasis added). He said that is the point where “humanitarian relief is critical,” tying effective nexus programming directly to improved local capacities (PSR 13). Another survey respondent said “local community groups, local actors such as churches, trade associations etc. and local NGOs” are the most important in caring for the community during a protracted crisis because “They are always the first to respond and the ones who are still there at the end” (PSR 15: Carter). According to my interviews, localization can take several different forms: 1) hiring local people as organizational staff, 2) implementing through or partnering with local organizations, 3) building implementation capacity within partners, or 4) empowering local organizations and the local population to implement their own programming (PSR 10: Hunt, PI 8: Gilchrist, PSR 32: Sullivan, PSR 15: Carter).

When working in hard-to-reach locations, it is much more common to hire locally than to send international staff to the field (PI 1: Roseland). In fact, interviewees from three different organizations in the DRC estimated that between 90-98% of their frontline staff were Congolese

nationals (PSR 10: Hunt, PSR 32: Sullivan, PI 6: Kiraho). In a country the size of the DRC, the closer the hometowns of the staff are to the zone of operation, the better. “Our organization is 95% Congolese,” explained Sullivan, “but [with how large the country is] someone from North Kivu might as well be from another country when you go one province over, so having local, local people is fantastic” (PSR 32: Sullivan). While they can be an incredible asset to a team, simply hiring locals to implement external programming designed by international actors cannot be considered true localization; a better approach is to bring local partnerships to the table (PSR 10: Hunt).

In response to the question concerning the biggest changes one would like to see in the humanitarian sector, survey respondent 2 said the work of humanitarians “needs to be much more informed by local contextual analysis and it should be conducted in partnership with local organizations” (PSR 2). Most interviewees acknowledged the value of strong partnerships with local organizations and some spoke proudly of their organizations’ involvement with local actors. Erin Gilchrist, explained how local partners were the foundation of their programming: “Warzone Initiates started by directly implementing WASH programs in Somalia using local employees, but then they decided to expand to other countries. With that expansion we worked even more closely with local partner organizations [in our new locations]” (PI 8: Gilchrist). In some situations, this turned into a complete hand over of project leadership to the partners on the ground. “At that point, it felt like we were getting into the territory of just being funders. A lot of times, it was really the partners we were working with who were saying, ‘Here is the need, and here is what we think the solution should be.’ Then we would offer some advice on that, but ultimately it was them driving what we were actually doing” (PI 8: Gilchrist). Looking to an example from the DRC, Samantha Sullivan explained that the international humanitarian team she works with in Goma is always sure to have at least one local partner for any given project. “It’s not always possible,” she clarified, “but I would say [for] about 90% of our programming, we have a local partner” (PSR 32: Sullivan).

Among Christian organizations like IHN, the very first partner to be contacted is always a local Christian church. Wallace, IHN’s regional manager for North Africa said, “I think some of the best places we work are places where there’s a strong church partner. As a Christian organization of our size, we are quite unique. There are only a few other organizations who are

willing to partner with churches at a very local level” (PSR 33: Wallace). The potential effectiveness of this kind of immediate partnership can be found in the sheer number of local participants brought into the response efforts. Fellow IHN staff member Kyler Roberts explained that in a disaster response, “If we have five international staff come on the ground and we make those connections with the [local] churches, our five becomes forty very, very quickly. Then, as we continue to partner with other faith-based organizations, our number grows to eighty.” (PSR 11: Roberts). This is especially valuable in contexts where the Christian faith is already a fundamental part of the community. “In places like the Bahamas,” continued Wallace, “we were able to use the church, which is a central institution in Bahamian society, to have real influence; and the churches were really helpful in distributing non-food items and identifying beneficiaries for reconstruction projects” (PSR 33: Wallace).

Much of sub-Saharan Africa, including the DRC, has a similar religious backdrop; faith-based institutions “constitute an inextricable part of African society” (Agbiji and Swart 2015, 1; Freeman 2012, 2). Yet, despite the prevalence of religious assemblies, it is not common for secular institutions to employ this mechanism of localization. “I think it's fair to say there are a lot of people in the humanitarian world, even among donors, who don't really understand ‘the church’” explained Scott who works for a faith-based organization in Goma (PI 9: Scott). This lack of understanding, she claims, stems from an assumption that faith-based organizations will not stay true to the humanitarian principles of neutrality and impartiality. “Sometimes people who don't understand the church think that, [if you are a faith-based organization], then you are only going to have beneficiaries who are the same as you faith-wise. Of course, that is absolutely not the case” (PI 9: Scott). She sees this as a double standard. While secular organizations are assumed to be neutral, even though they might have their own beneficiary biases, if you are working for a faith-based institution, “you are in a position where you always have to explain your impartiality and neutrality, even though you employ those principles just like any other international NGO” (PI 9: Scott). Whether this additional burden of proof is necessary for faith-based organizations might deserve further investigation, and is a question too large to be tackled in this research. However, the data does make it clear that churches are the first local institution faith-based organizations turn to for partnership; which, in these organizations’ opinion, often provides localization opportunities that are not usually taken advantage of by secular institutions (PI 9: Scott, PSR 11: Roberts, PSR 10: Hunt, PSR 33: Wallace).

With localization being so important to an effective response, staying open to diverse methods of localization is key in protracted crises. Depending on the context, there could be many different types of secular or religiously affiliated organizations with whom to partner during a response. Keeping options open, and recognizing the value diverse partnerships bring to the table are important steps to take in efforts towards community driven programming.

7.3.2 Capacity Building

While establishing local partnerships is valuable, it is only one small step towards localization. Meanwhile it often comes with significant challenges, not the least of which is overcoming the limited capacity of partner organizations. “A lot of people say ‘we need to localize - localize!’” explained Wallace, “But that's assuming that your baseline in every country is the same... that local NGOs have the same capacity as international NGOs, which is [not true]” (PSR 33: Wallace). Speaking from the DRC perspective, Hunt also lists this as a major roadblock to local partnerships. “There is this Catch-22 where organizations don't have capacity, so they're not funded; therefore, they don't gain capacity” (PSR 10: Hunt). In response to this dilemma, many INGOs take on the role of capacity building for and with their local partners. Sullivan’s organization in Goma makes it a priority, “we're not looking for a local partner in a hard to access stone that can carry activities for us. It's about what can we teach that local partner? What can we give to that local partner based on their due diligence based on our initial assessment and the capacity building plan we developed with them?” (PSR 32: Sullivan).

Both Sullivan and Scott listed similar capacity building activities performed by their respective NGOs in Goma including software trainings, techniques on safeguarding data, fraud prevention, book keeping, and policy development (PSR 32: Sullivan, PI 9: Scott). Scott stated the clear aim of these activities, "to see partners graduate from working with us getting funding for them, to the point where they can also go for funding [themselves]. Although that's sometimes a pipe dream,” she qualified, “it has happened with larger partners” (PI 9: Scott). Sullivan explained a similar goal for her organization’s partnerships, “We like to have trust in our partners. We like to work with them and launch a project so that we know that they can be on the ground and act as an implementer. They don't need us every step of the way; we're there if they need it. But the goal is to have a symbiosis; not just have us benefit from them, or have them be our arm in the field. That's what we like to avoid” (PSR 32: Sullivan).

These partnerships, when nurtured correctly, can provide huge benefits to the overall implementation process. First of all, the addition of a partner grows an given team's capacity, even if that partner requires some program specific capacity building; once the necessary capacities are there, they can step in where more hands are most needed (PSR 11: Roberts). Once a partnership with a local organization is solidified, it becomes a relatively permanent capacity added to the INGO. This capacity brings unique and valuable characteristics, such as knowledge of the local culture, local language, local proverbs, and local communication methods all of which are essential for producing contextually relevant teaching materials, programming strategies, and infrastructure designs (PI 9: Scott). That cultural experience is then complimented with higher access to hard-to-reach areas. Samuel Edison, who has served for over three years as a humanitarian in both Jordan and Turkey, spoke plainly saying that, "the access and the appetite for risk for local organizations often are much higher than that of larger international organizations" (PSR 5: Ellison). In agreement with that statement, Sullivan shared a specific story from the DRC where their local partners were the key to maintaining programming during times of heightened conflict. They had she called 'phenomenal;' during a time of increased security threats where Sullivan's organization pulled out a specific village, their partnering organization, who was based out of that village decided to stay. In so doing they were able to continue complete the necessary post distribution monitoring surveys and do a lot of remote coordination. Sullivan hated the fact that their partner had to stay in such dangerous circumstances but, all things considered, she was grateful there was a local team to continue serving the community even after her and her staff had to pull out (PSR 32: Sullivan). This example goes to show how properly framing a program around local partners and working with them to build relevant capacities has incredible value within nexus programming. There are, however, other challenges associated with local partnerships that sometimes go unmentioned.

First, it can be challenging logistically to coordinate well with a local partner; it takes time and resources which, as previously discussed, are growing scarcer among humanitarians in the DRC (PSR 10: Hunt, PI 9: Scott). Due to these challenges, some organizations are simply unable to incorporate a local partner into their implementation plan (PSR 10: Hunt). Another, more poignant problem in the DRC, is the difficulty western institutions face in navigating East African relational culture, especially when it comes to workplace boundaries. Unlike occidental countries, the DRC, and much of East Africa for that matter, does not put a strong barrier

between personal and professional life. Professional partnerships or employment are quickly treated more as familial relationships rather than colleagues, which creates complications when standards for quality or integrity within the workplace are not met (PI 9: Scott, PSR 10: Hunt, PI 10: FALAY, Informal Conversation: IHN Staff 2021). Carrie Scott highlighted this issue with a specific example. “It's like any family,” she explained, “once you're accepted into the family, you can take things for granted. For example, we have one partner that we've worked with for years, but [based on our newest partner assessment and capacity evaluation] tool... [we discovered] we should actually be kicking them out as a partner... In our audit, there were things that were really worrisome. Their rating was in the red” (PI 9: Scott). Scott felt that, unlike a new partner who would be sure to check all the boxes when it comes to fraud prevention, data management, and quality assurance, their long standing partner was taking advantage of the familial relationship they had without considering the professional implications. Scott's organization is still undecided whether to cut them off as a partner or simply add more oversight to their implementations (PI 9: Scott).

Relationships aside, some practitioners question if local partnerships, even when paired with capacity building, are the best we can do when it comes to localization. As it stands, even when local partners are doing all of the implementation, donors and INGOs still have the power over which types of programs and which partners are financially and logistically supported. They still hold the power of accountability as all programs ultimately have to report back to them for continued support, which is not necessarily the fullness of what localization should be.

7.3.3 Truly Localized Responses

Some practitioners are hoping for solutions beyond the “local partnerships” model within protracted crises. “Over the years I have definitely seen how the work in protracted crisis is becoming a much bigger focus,” said survey respondent 6. “It has sparked to me to think, ‘How can we build up local communities for responses and solutions to be found that are more sustainable and owned by the population that has been affected?’” (PSR 6). As previously discussed, program longevity is linked very closely with resident ownership. Unfortunately, partnerships with local NGOs might not create the space necessary to foster community ownership. On the contrary, George Carter sees local partnerships as another way to perpetuate external programming without really localizing. “Part of the danger is, in the desire to appear

that they are localizing, INGOs or the UN or whatever, just contract local organizations in a very top-down authoritarian kind of way saying ‘Okay, we’re no longer allowed to do this ourselves, so we’re going to just tell you exactly what to do and how to do it.’” He cautioned that “if localization just becomes about shifting money and not shifting of actual power and accountability and decision making, then that’s not really localization” (PSR 15: Carter).

While engaging with a humanitarian response, Carter says “it is much easier and more appropriate to listen to how local people on the ground talk about the situation” (PSR 15: Carter). Over the course of his career, he has become frustrated with the minimal ‘listening’ done by both types of interventions. “I think development work at its best is more localized... Humanitarian work, has been talking about localization for years. Then they did the Grand Bargain five years ago, yet very little really has changed because all the incentives are set up to keep donors happy, rather than put crisis-affected people at the center [of a response]” (PSR 15: Carter). Carter’s complaint echoes back to the power of the donor discussed in [Section 7.1](#), but it is relevant in this case as well because donors hold the greatest influence for change towards localization (PSR 15: Carter).

Giving advice specifically to donors who want to have the biggest impact in a protracted crisis, Carter suggests a base of pooled funds at a country level and then recommended a relatively new strategy called Survivor and Community Lead Crisis Response for funding distribution:

“The basic idea is that in any crisis, in any culture, in any country, the first people to respond are immediately the local communities. They’re the ones who will still be there when you leave, whether it’s a small church-based group or other faith-based group, whether it’s a group of fishermen who lost their boats in a tsunami, or whatever it may be, people clumping together to help one another, or neighbors helping one another through trade unions... The [Survivor and Community Lead Crisis Response] approach then, through a larger national NGO says, ‘We’re going to give micro-grants to these local community groups that at the grassroots level who are already responding.’ There’s a bit more to it than that, but it’s basically saying, ‘You turn up somewhere, you find out who’s doing good stuff, and you give them a couple of \$1,000 each. Then you come back a bit later on, give them more money, etc.’ ... It’s a practical way of getting behind what local

groups are already doing and helping them to do more of it, without saying ‘this has to be for education’, or ‘this has to be for health’... and then scale it up over time” (PSR 15: Carter).

The idea of Survivor and Community Lead Crisis Response has been discussed more fully by the Overseas Development Institute who recently published a paper on the subject (Corbett, Carstensen, and De Vicenz 2021). The approach is specifically aiming towards, as Carter said, “shifting of actual power and accountability and decision making” back into the hands of the community (PSR 15: Carter). With Carter’s interview being the final interview for my data collection, I was unable to follow up with other respondents to hear specific examples of such direct community engagement. However, Hunt, who works in Eastern DRC, shared a very unique example of the community involving themselves voluntarily during a humanitarian response to an Ebola outbreak. “There was a dance group that approached a member of our INGOs staff in Beni, North Kivu,” he explained. “They said, ‘We would like to be involved in the response and to contribute. Can you help us to choreograph a routine that brings awareness about Ebola?’... Then ultimately, when our INGO was hosting question and answer sessions, they would join... People would come for the questions and answers but also for the free spectacle of some really skilled dancers... and really, it was the initiative of Beni’s youth that drove that” (PSR 10: Hunt).

Though this was a small example, it is a clear display of the value of localization. These young people were using the skills they had to contribute to health messaging in a way that was especially relevant to their community and their culture, through a means that may have been significantly more effective than traditional INGO health messaging strategies. This particular form of participation did not cost any additional funding (PSR 10: Hunt), but if there were an allotment of funds provided through a Survivor and Community Lead Crisis Response model, it could have multiplied these dancers’ efforts around the region. In any case, his example shows the value of innovation and thinking outside the box when it comes to localization.

As it stands, externally directed responses far outweigh locally instigated programs in the DRC. Still saturated with INGO’s, the most common form of ‘localization’ in the eastern provinces to employ locals under INGO supervision or execute programs through local partners. These methods are incredibly limited in their power for strengthening a community. If donors,

humanitarians, or development workers in the DRC want to see lasting change, they will have to consider adopting new strategies that put Congolese residents at the center of their response efforts, trusting them with their own accountability structures and giving them the decision making power.

7.4 Thinking Long Term: Hopes for Sustainable Outcomes

Ultimately, each of these emergent themes: donor reform, strategy alignment, and localization, are grounded in a desire for long-term impact in situations of protracted crisis. Referring back to the practitioner survey, 23 out of 36 respondents used the word *long-term* to describe the H-D nexus and the value it brings to humanitarian and development programming. Related terms such as *sustainability* and *resilience* were mentioned by 14 and 6 respondents respectively. Almost all of the practitioners interviewed believed working towards long-term solutions was essential, and a few of them shared opportunities they had to work on such programs.

7.4.1 Implementing Long-Term Programming

Pulling from an example in Iraq, Kyler Roberts shared of a time when IHN was able to redirect World Food Program funding, normally allotted for food distributions, towards the construction of permanent irrigation canals (PSR 11: Roberts). Through this program IHN used emergency funds to invest in long-term infrastructure supporting the local food system. Just 10 kilometers down the road they continued with standard food distribution processes as necessary, but the new irrigation canal and its subsequent produce was ultimately a much more sustainable solution than continuing distributions indefinitely (PSR 11: Roberts). Such long-term implementations are possible in Eastern DRC as well. Paul Hunt, calling from Kirumba, North Kivu, reported a very similar project, completed by his team in the WASH domain.

Kirumba is located very close to Lake Edward, a place that often reports endemic cholera outbreaks which follow seasonal patterns (Piarroux et al. 2009, 73). Hunt explained that, in reaction to these outbreaks, emergency practitioners would typically engage in a new response every season. “A few people would die, then there would be a response, and then the next year it would happen again” (PSR 10: Hunt). Rather than continuing with this continuous response cycle, Hunt and his team thought of a different solution to the cholera outbreaks. “We were

fortunate to get funding to build a gravity fed water system [in the area] that brought in clean drinking water to 12,000 people in three different villages” (PSR 10: Hunt). This type of action was significantly different than the typical humanitarian response, he noted, which would be to, “rush in to care for patients,... maybe do some sessions talking about hand washing, and maybe do a mass vaccination campaign to try and make up for low vaccination coverage” (PSR 10: Hunt). Yet it was a clear example of nexus programming, where long-term solutions can be incorporated to alleviate the need for emergency response. In fact, this pipeline solution has the potential of removing the burden of outbreak response from that community almost entirely. “We hope that there will be no more cholera epidemics in that area,” said Hunt, “as long as the system is functioning, it should be a permanent solution” (PSR 10: Hunt).

Unfortunately, these types of infrastructure installations are not always available. They can often be restricted by the donor or the context. Kilian Kleinschmidt shared multiple examples of UNICEF being simply uninterested in conceptualizing designs for electricity corridors or water mains to be installed in Za’atari refugee camp of Jordan. Instead, they pushed back on Kleinschmidt’s suggestions for such infrastructural improvements because they thought they could never finance such a system (PI 4: Kleinschmidt). Similarly, Hunt explained in an example already discussed, that USAID has clear restrictions around humanitarian installed latrines, such as requiring their decommission after one-year, which by definition would not be providing a long-term system. Likewise the context can restrict this type of programming as well, such as when continuous conflict results in abandoned or destroyed infrastructure as discussed in [Section 6.2](#). These complications, of which practitioners are very aware, present real barriers to long-term planning.

There is no doubt the humanitarians interviewed want to see long-term change in the communities they serve; hope for holistic improvements in health, education, livelihoods, and the like were expressed in almost every interview (PSR 10: Hunt, PSR 32: Sullivan, PSR 33: Wallace, PSR 15: Carter, PI 2: Bakunzi, PI 3: Liringa, PI 4: Kleinschmidt, PI 9: Scott). Yet, the complicated realities surrounding protracted crises have left many of them guarded against setting expectations for long lasting results.

7.4.2 Maintaining Realistic Expectations

Considering the complications of working in protracted crises, many respondents had to intentionally keep a level head about the positive impacts they may or may not have in a community. In situations where the working environment is constantly changing, sometimes practitioners simply cannot know what the impact of their programming is going to be. Returning to his list of fundamental requirements for stable programming, Bryan Wallace explains the diverse array of external factors that humanitarians must consider in their work. “You still need those primary drivers of good governance, economic stability, and social cohesion” he said, “and that can be an [entirely separate] political, philosophical, sociological debate topic... humanitarianism is so complicated, because we have to think about all of these things” (PSR 33: Wallace). Even if these factors are well considered, there will still be final program implications that cannot be predicted, “With anything you do in life, there's always going to be an externality that you cannot perceive whether positive or negative,” said Wallace, “Any decision I make, has an effect on my life, and the lives of others, regardless of how well I think it through... There are billions of possible externalities caused by your program that you cannot possibly foresee at both the macro and community level” (PSR 33: Wallace). He returned back to this idea multiple times: we cannot control for every external factor. This reality often leaves practitioners to wrestle through the questions of whether or not they do have a positive or negative long-term impact in their region.

After years of working in the DRC where so many see “life as extremely cheap,” Paul Hunt sometimes sees his work as simply holding back deterioration that is somehow inevitable. “One part of me tends towards fatalism,” he confessed, “and this idea of fighting the long defeat. We are not really believing we are going to jump in and save or improve for the long term, but actually, we are doing something small and worthwhile in a situation that may continue deteriorating. I think that is seeing our work in the context that is maybe more realistic” (PSR 10: Hunt). Scott also had a similar reflection, noting that the work she does for her small organization is “peanuts” compared to the larger aid programming, political relations, and financial exchanges that go on within the region (PI 9: Scott). After listing frustrations with rebel groups blocking off roadways, corrupt government officials collect illegal taxes, peace coordinators simplifying conflict to tribal disputes, and larger government institutions neglecting their responsibilities in general, Scott said “It's a very, very complicated situation; and for

somebody like me who has been here for a while... You just kind of put one foot in front of the other, do the next thing and hope that you can help some people” (PI 9: Scott). Recognizing the relative impact of individual actions is something Wallace mentioned as well, “As a humanitarian, I also know that you have such a marginal effect on the world, you're one person... even if you are President Biden, or Secretary General of the UN, Gutierrez... You still have an important role to play; there are still hungry people; there are still people that are crying out for help, but [you are only going to] move the needle” (PSR 33: Wallace). Clearly, the environment of protracted crises can produce pressures that lead to dissolution and fatigue for long-term change among practitioners. People working in spaces of extended suffering cannot always sustain a vision of prosperous long-term impacts because there are so many externalities preventing those long-term impacts from flourishing.

Still these actors are finding reason to engage with the situation, to work within their constraints, and provide their services where appropriate. Hunt explained his mindset towards approaching programming with unforeseeable outcomes. “During implementation, I’m always considering, ‘What's the most appropriate and effective response *now* as I'm seeing it in quite a narrow scope?’” He also asks himself the questions, “How can we prevent future harm through what we're doing?” and “How can we increase the likelihood that what we do now is well adapted to the need and has a good long-term impact?” always acknowledging that these hoped for impacts might not come as planned (PSR 10: Hunt). He also rests on rather mundane implication of the work he is doing, “I am conscious that normal day to day interactions between a given staff member and a given person in a place that we serve, can have a resounding impact... If people feel valued and listened to, and they feel that they've been served well, potentially, that's going to affect their career choice, in the future” (PSR 10: Hunt). In the same vein, Wallace warns against “over diagnosing” in lieu of responding, especially in complex crisis situations. “DRCs problems,” he explained, “are certainly related to geopolitical factors and countries like Uganda and Rwanda playing in their backyard. It's also related to the effects of colonialism and Belgium ransacking a country. It's also related to tribal differences, no doubt. But those problems are fundamental and have to be solved by the Congolese themselves. So [humanitarians and development programmers] shouldn't seek to do additional harm, and there are times where no program is better than ‘a’ program. But I worry we think too hard about it sometimes. If there is a need in front of you, simply meet it! That person needs your assistance” (PSR 33: Wallace).

Based on these reflections, the complications of the situation should call for more not less humanitarian and development efforts within Eastern DRC. Programming should not increase haphazardly, but if it is well adapted to the context of the region and actively reformed to meet the needs of the population it becomes invaluable.

The systematic concerns discussed in this chapter including donor reform, aligning strategies, and localization ought to be well considered in any program implementation. These are not new concerns; they are discussions that have been underway since before the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit and continue to this day. George Carter nearly summarized all of these issues in one sentence, “There is a lot of talk about change,” he said, “more flexible funding, more localization, less sector silos, more accountability to affected communities, improved humanitarian standards, cooperation, collaboration, the whole cluster system and pressures on that to work better” (PSR 15: Carter). These calls for change have not often been responded to, “The incentives are not in the right place, so [the system] does not change; but there is a lot of talk about change” (PSR 15: Carter). How that incentive shift can or is currently being done would be a topic for future research. Meanwhile, it is clear that humanitarian and development practitioners should engage with these suggested changes in the context of the Eastern DRC and work within their power to realize them at a higher systems level. Programming in light of the H-D nexus in a protracted crisis is complex, with incredible uncertainty surrounding long-term outcomes, but this complexity can be embraced, encouraging more research, advocacy, and innovation within the field so future populations are better served.

Chapter 8 | Conclusion

Protracted crises are complex by definition; they stem out of complex emergencies which are a result of failed governance structures, broken economic institutions, strained social relations, and environmental instability. Each respective failure exacerbates the others, stretching into longwinded disasters that threaten the lives and livelihoods of populations for years on end. Appreciating the complex dynamics of a crisis, including the diversity of actors responding, is therefore essential in protracted situations. This is where the H-D nexus can be a valuable tool for encouraging holistic responses that address immediate needs while taking long-term impact into account. While contextualizing the definition of the nexus to the specific case study location of Eastern DRC, this research identified important cautions to consider and specific implementation strategies to employ when working within the nexus.

First among the cautions is security. Violent action by political or radical actors within a protracted crisis can be volatile and unpredictable; such is the case in our study location of Eastern DRC. One cannot operate within a protracted crisis without recognizing security as a major threat to long-term development programming and even to immediate humanitarian services. While there is a desire to see improvements in failed systems as a result of H-D nexus programming, one must keep a realistic mindset and recognize that there are external factors out of humanitarian or development practitioners' control. Actors should be as aware as possible of these security threats and establish necessary safe guards against them in order to avoid being hindered by or tied up in dangerous situations.

Second among the cautions is against independent action. Wherever possible, one ought to involve existing governing structures into humanitarian and development interventions. This can be extremely difficult when the government is part of the security threat or when humanitarian principles of neutrality and impartiality are being compromised. Yet, when dealing with protracted crises, these local and national governing structures along with the people they represent are going to be the final agents for change in their communities. Supporting them should not be directly associated with a compromise of the humanitarian principles but carefully considered as an essential component to any response.

The final caution, relatively specific to this thesis, is that WASH programming deserves acute attention within the H-D nexus. Water is a necessity for human life and proper sanitation is the first preventative measure against life threatening disease. Engaging in a well-planned, well-equipped, and well-executed WASH program during a protracted crisis will be invaluable to the protection and dignity of human life, especially if it involves the installation of long-term infrastructure. There are many threats to these programs including security concerns, maintenance needs, and ownership conflicts. It is important that these factors be acknowledged without discouraging much needed WASH planning.

In relation to strategies, one of the first steps for working within the H-D nexus is to identify conflicting strategies between sectors. Humanitarians have intervention strategies applicable to their response type while development actors have other strategies applicable to development. Being aware of the differences in these approaches requires recognition that both are appropriate for different contexts. If both sectors are called upon to implement in the same location, compromises must be considered. Humanitarian actors should always be aware of the implications of their actions on the long-term programming, while development actors should be willing to engage and build upon the temporary infrastructure emergency responders put into place. Aligning these strategies can be a challenge, but it is one that should not be overlooked in protracted crises.

Localization is another important component of any response. As the size of the humanitarian system continues to grow and centralization becomes more and more common, remembering who is at the center of the implementation is nonnegotiable. There is a reason humanitarian and development organizations exist and it is not to indefinitely perpetuate their work. Ideally all programs would be locally initiated, locally driven, and locally maintained; however, limitations in local capacity cannot be ignored. International organizations exist to support, fill the gaps, and strengthen local systems, not to disrupt, dismantle, or replace them. Active steps must be taken to maintain such a mindset because protracted crisis will only ever end through the stabilization of such local systems. Unfortunately, during protracted crises in particular, many initiatives still lack true localization and are often designed towards donor preferences rather than local needs.

The power of the donor in a protracted crisis is one of the strongest points to emerge from this research. Whether or not practitioners, local populations, or even national governments care

about strategy alignment, localization, or long-term impact; deciding power is housed where money is found. A large portion of the responsibility for better programming within the H-D nexus rests squarely on donors' ability to adapt to prolonged crises. Entities or individuals giving funds towards programming within the nexus ought to find ways to trust their implementing partners, allowing for contextualized and a progressive adaptation of response as needed. There are many innovative strategies for donors to incorporate into their protracted crisis finance schemes including country pool funds, consortium funding, and community based cash grants and it is likely that an assortment of multiple strategies would be the most effective in a complex crisis. Whatever collection of funding strategies are chosen, it is clear that donor driven reform would go a long way towards better transitions between humanitarian and development initiatives and towards long-term impact in protracted crises.

This research is a culmination of practitioner insight into the H-D nexus, specifically as it relates to WASH programming for displaced persons in Eastern DRC. Though the study is context specific, it ultimately applies to any initiatives focused on appropriate transition from emergency response to long-term impact. As protracted crises become more prevalent around the world, this research serves as a contribution to the global effort to better engage with the complex and challenging work environment of the H-D nexus, to the ends of improving the lives of individuals for whom protracted crises are a daily reality.

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Appendix A – Personal Interview Details Expanded

Personal Interview #1	
<p>Name: Sarah Roseland*</p> <p>Title: Senior Director of Humanitarian Capacity</p> <p>Organization: Serve International*</p> <p>Main Topic: Humanitarian Aid</p>	<p>Code PI 1: Roseland</p> <p>Date: January 14, 2021</p> <p>Length: 50 minutes</p> <p>Medium: Video Call (Zoom)</p>
<p>Qualifications: Sarah Roseland worked in the sector of international development and humanitarian assistance since 1994 with long term programming in Africa, and South America and short-term disaster responses to Asia. Her career has including service with UNDP and International Rescue Committee and finally 20 years with Service International*.</p>	
<p>Description: This interview centered on community participation in disaster response and included discussion on the trends of humanitarian service since the start of Ms. Roseland's career in the 1990's, especially as it relates to community feedback mechanism and inter-organizational coordination.</p>	
<p>Other Notes: This interview was originally completed for a previous course on Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) taught during my first semester at UGA. Its contents became relevant to my final thesis and it is therefore incorporated as primary data in this research.</p>	
Personal Interview #2	
<p>Name: William Bakunzi</p> <p>Title: Peer researcher and resident refugee</p> <p>Organization: Nakivale Settlement in Uganda</p> <p>Main Topic: Displaced Persons</p>	<p>Code PI 2: Bakunzi</p> <p>Date: April 16, 2021</p> <p>Length: 32 minutes</p> <p>Medium: Voice Message (WhatsApp)</p>
<p>Qualifications: William Bakunzi is a peer researcher of the Nakivale refugee settlement for the University of Oxford Forced Migration Review. He is a Congolese refugee who has been living in the Nakivale settlement since 2006 and has served as former chairman of Refugee Welfare Committee 3.</p>	
<p>Description: This interview centered on refugee experience with development programs and the differences between settlements and camps. It also discussed the history of his travels between the DRC and Uganda.</p>	
<p>Other Notes: Due to technical difficulties and limited internet access, this interview was completed as an in time exchange of voice-notes. Therefore proper responsiveness and the execution of follow up questions were difficult.</p>	
Personal Interview #3	
<p>Name: Benjamin Liringa¹ and Mandy Goksu²</p> <p>Title: ¹Founder and Managing Director ²Sr. Director of Strategic Partnerships</p>	<p>Code PI 3: Liringa</p> <p>Date: April 19, 2021</p>

Appendix A – Personal Interview Details Expanded

Organization:	¹ AEDR (Access En Eau et Development) ² Water4	Length: 45 minutes
Main Topic:	WASH in Bunia, DRC - Development Focused	Medium: Voice Call (Zoom)
Qualifications:	Benjamin Liringa is the founder and managing director of AEDR (Access En Eau et Development), a well drilling organization based in Ituri, DRC. The interview was completed with Mandy Goksu from Water4, a US based nonprofit that supports water initiatives through local businesses and support for rural water programs.	
Description:	This interview focused on the challenges of operating a development organization in a space saturated by humanitarian services and also explored the dynamics of community engagement in WASH programming.	
Other Notes:	Though there were two interviewees during this call, most questions were directed towards Liringa who had more direct experience with the DRC and could therefore speak more information into the research.	

Personal Interview #4

Name:	Kilian Kleinschmidt	Code	PI 4: Kleinschmidt
Title:	Former Director of Za'atari Refugee Camp	Date:	April 22, 2021
Organization:	UNHCR	Length:	59 minutes
Main Topic:	Displaced Persons	Medium:	Video Call (Zoom)
Qualifications:	Kleinschmidt was the previous manager of the Za'atari Refugee camp in Northern Jordan. Currently a board member of the Sustainable Development Zones (SDZ) Alliance, he has 30 years of experience in international aid and humanitarian service. He is an outspoken advocate for sustainable solutions among migrant communities.		
Description:	This interview centered on Kleinschmidt's work in the Za'atari. He commented on the H-D nexus from the perspective of both a humanitarian and development worker and discussed his desires for long term solutions for displaced persons.		
Other Notes:	Though this interview was not specific to the DRC it contributed to an understanding of the global challenges for displaced persons, especially those who are living in camp settings.		

Personal Interview #5

Name:	Patrick Lamson-Hall	Code	PI 5: Lamson-Hall
Title:	Project Manager and Urban Planner	Date:	May 14, 2021
Organization:	NYU Marron Institute of Urban Management	Length:	41 minutes
Main Topic:	Displaced Persons – Development Programming	Medium:	Video Call (Skype)
Qualifications:	Also a board member of the SDZ Alliance, Lamson-Hall works in city planning for quickly expanding municipalities of the global south. He has consulted for cities in Colombia, Libya, Ethiopia, and Central African Republic.		
Description:	This interview focused on development programming within fast changing environment and planning for unexpected growth within cities. It discussed Lamson-Hall's experiences in anticipating future city growth and planning infrastructure it accordingly.		

Appendix A – Personal Interview Details Expanded

Personal Interview #6	
<p>Name: Jeremiah Kiraho*</p> <p>Title: WASH Field Technical Advisor for DRC</p> <p>Organization: IHN*</p> <p>Main Topic: WASH in Bunia, DRC</p> <p>Qualifications: Kiraho* has served 14 years as a WASH field technical advisor for IHN’s in DRC, South Sudan, and Kenya. Originally from Kenya, Jeremiah got his Master’s in Public Health from Great Lakes University in Kenya (GLUK) and spent 1 year working in Water and Sanitation Programing with Oxfam before transitioning into a career with IHN.</p> <p>Description: This conversation discussed the important WASH actors in Bunia, and shed light on the organizational structures surrounding water supply within the Ituri province.</p> <p>Other Notes: This interview took the form of an informal conversation. There were no questions sent beforehand. As it was not formally planned, the recording was started only half-way into the conversation. .</p>	<p>Code PI 6: Kiraho</p> <p>Date: May 17, 2021</p> <p>Length: 27 minutes</p> <p>Medium: Video Call (Skype)</p>
Personal Interview #7	
<p>Name: Émilie Bhanja Otuma</p> <p>Title: WASH Programmer</p> <p>Organization: MedAIR</p> <p>Main Topic: WASH and Displaced Persons</p> <p>Qualifications: Otuma, who is originally from Bunia, has worked for 11 years in the WASH sector with both MedAIR and Oxfam. Because of her location, much of her work has been focused on servicing displaced persons.</p> <p>Description: This interview focused on water supply in Eastern DRC and on Otuma’s experience as a WASH practitioner. Our discussion covered emergency programming in Bunia, Sphere standards among displaced persons, and the evolution of WASH services in Eastern DRC.</p> <p>Other Notes: This interview was completed in French with the assistance of a translator. Because of the medium selected, there were no recording possibilities, therefore notes were taken during the conversation to use as quotes within the research.</p>	<p>Code PI 7: Otuma</p> <p>Date: June 11, 2021</p> <p>Length: 45 minutes</p> <p>Medium: Video Call (WhatsApp) - French</p>
Personal Interview #8	
<p>Name: Erin Gilchrist</p> <p>Title: Previous Program Development Officer</p> <p>Organization: Warzone Initiatives</p> <p>Main Topic: Development in Complex Emergencies</p> <p>Qualifications: Gilchrist completed a masters of International Development at the University of Denver and then went on to serve with Warzone Initiatives an international organization focused on WASH development programming in conflict zones.</p>	<p>Code PI 8: Gilchrist</p> <p>Date: June 15, 2021</p> <p>Length: 47 minutes</p> <p>Medium: Voice Call (Zoom)</p>

Appendix A – Personal Interview Details Expanded

Description: This interview focused on Gilchrist’s experience with Warzone initiatives and her ideas concerning the applicability of development programming in complex-emergencies.	
Personal Interview #9	
Name: Carrie Scott*	Code PI 9: Scott
Title: Program Director	Date: July 15, 2021
Organization: WASH Organization* - Goma, DRC	Length: 48 minutes
Main Topic: H-D Nexus in Eastern DRC	Medium: Voice Call (Zoom)
Qualifications: Smith has lived for over 25 years in the DRC and has spent much of that time on staff with humanitarian nonprofits including World Vision, MedAIR and Tearfund.	
Description: Smith offered a clear overview of the history of aid work in Eastern DRC from the perspective of a practitioner. She discussed her opinions of the introduction of the H-D nexus as a concept in the area and how it has impacted the work of humanitarians and development workers.	
Other Notes: Smith was one of the Practitioner Survey Respondents (PSR 4) but because of her experience within the DRC I completed her interview using the open-ended question format of the personal interviews rather than following the structure of the follow-up interviews.	
Personal Interview #10	
Name: Griffon KAYUMBA FALAY	Code PI 10: FALAY
Title: WASH Technical Specialist	Date: July 16, 2021
Organization: ODCI** - Mambasa	Length: 36 minutes
Main Topic: WASH programming in DRC	Medium: Video Call (Zoom) - French
Qualifications: Has spent nearly 5 years working for multiple organizations in the WASH sector in Goma. He is a technical specialist in well drilling.	
Description: FALAY gave special insight into the biggest challenges facing the WASH sector within the DRC. He discussed the lack of education among WASH technical specialists and the lack of quality monitoring and evaluation done for the close out of WASH projects.	
Other Notes: This interview was completed in French with the assistance of a translator. Questions were asked in English, then translated into French and all answers were provided only in French, personal translation was used for final quotations of this interview.	

*Name of person and/or organization has been changed.

**Congolese Organization for Integrated Development.

Appendix B – WASH Among Displaced Persons Survey

The following survey is to inform research on Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene (WASH) infrastructure for displaced persons in Ituri, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). There are 15 questions in this survey after the introduction. You may respond to as many questions as you wish in either English or French. (see French version of the survey here: <https://forms.gle/QCiniSRq4aWUU9Us5>)

Thank you for your help with my research, I hope it also becomes a benefit to you!

Introduction

Do you wish to remain anonymous?

- Yes (skip to the asterisks***)
- No (skip to the next question)

Name

Organization

Role in organization

Email (if you would like to receive survey results)

*** Number of years in the field (please answer even if you are remaining anonymous)

Other introductory information you want to have associated with your response (qualifications, relevant work experience, etc.)

WASH - General

1. Describe the current WASH situation in the DRC and specifically in Ituri Province (or specify your area of residence).
2. Why are WASH services in their current state?
3. Which WASH services are provided by your organization? Describe.
4. Who are the relevant actors in the WASH sector in the DRC and specifically in Ituri Province (or specify your area of residence)?

WASH - Collaboration

5. Which other organizations, government ministries, or private institutions do you collaborate with in your work?
6. How would you describe the effectiveness of the WASH Cluster forum?
7. Do WASH services belong in the humanitarian emergency sector or the development sector? (4 indicating that WASH belongs equally in both)
 - Scale from 1 to 7
 - (1) WASH belongs only in the humanitarian/emergency sector.
 - (7) WASH belongs only in the development sector.
8. Explain your response to the previous question.

WASH – Opportunities and Challenges

9. Which mindsets do you wish would change in WASH service strategies? Include worst practices that you have observed.
10. Which mindsets do you think are improving in WASH service strategies? Include best practices and recent innovations you have observed.

Displaced Persons – General

11. How does the regular displacement of people affect your work in Ituri Province (or specify your area of residence)?
12. Do you have programming that specifically targets displaced people in the area? Describe.
13. Are displaced people uniquely vulnerable to WASH needs?
 - Scale from 1 to 5
 - (1) They are equally vulnerable as the local population..
 - (5) They are significantly more vulnerable than the local population.
14. Explain your response to the previous question.
15. What are the biggest challenges in providing services for displaced people?

Conclusion

Please share any relevant sources of information which could assist in my research, or use this space to provide feedback for the survey. - Thank You!

Appendix C – Practitioner Survey

Introduction

1. How many years did you / have you worked for your organization?
2. Describe your most recent position held including areas of expertise (select all that apply)
 - Part-time
 - Full-time
 - Working in the field
 - Working from HQ
 - Administration
 - Program Support
 - Low-level-management
 - Mid-level-management
 - Senior Management
 - Medical Services
 - Engineering Services
 - IT/Technical Services
 - Monitoring and Evaluation
 - Program Operations/Logistics
 - Marketing/Finance
 - Donor Relations/Fundraising
 - Other: _____

Humanitarian-Development Nexus

3. Do you know the term humanitarian-development nexus?
 - Scale from 1 to 5
 - (1) No, I have never heard it before.
 - (5) Yes, I use it regularly in my work.
4. What does the term humanitarian-development nexus mean to you? Include three key words you associate with the term.
5. Should there be a clear distinction between humanitarian and development work?
 - Scale of 1 to 5
 - (1) No, it is best to consider them one and the same.
 - (5) Yes, the distinction is very important.
6. Where do you draw the line between the two?

Comparison and Improvement

7. When a community is facing a protracted crisis (war, famine etc.) for longer than 5 years, which actors are more important in caring for the community?
 - Scale of 1 to 5
 - (1) In a protracted crisis, humanitarian actors are more important
 - (5) In a protracted crisis, development actors are more important.
8. Explain your answer to question #7 if desired.
9. List three changes you would you like to see adopted as general practice within your service sector? (Consider changes that are relevant to the humanitarian-development nexus)

Collaboration

Collaboration is defined as performing joint actions with another agency by sharing some (not necessarily all) of the following: programming responsibilities, resources, data, staff, materials, equipment, costs, liability, etc.

10. Does your organization collaborate well with humanitarian actors in the field? (see definition above)
 - Scale of 1 to 5
 - (1) No, we do not collaborate with humanitarian actors.
 - (5) Yes, we are constantly collaborating with humanitarian actors.
11. Does your organization collaborate well with development actors in the field?
 - Scale of 1 to 5
 - (1) No, we do not collaborate with humanitarian actors.
 - (5) Yes, we are constantly collaborating with humanitarian actors.
12. In your opinion, is the collaboration effective?
 - Scale of 1 to 5
 - (1) No, it is not effective.
 - (5) Yes, it is very effective.
13. Comment on response to questions 10, 11 and 12 if desired.
14. How important is collaboration in the field?
 - Scale of 1 to 5
 - (1) Minimally Important.
 - (5) Extremely Important.
15. Is collaboration difficult?
 - Scale of 1 to 5
 - (1) Minimally Challenging.
 - (5) Extremely Challenging.
16. Comment on response to questions 14 and 15 if desired.

Organization Demographics

17. What type of organization do you work for? (Select all that apply – considering only the most recent organization)
 - I work for a disaster relief organization
 - I work for a humanitarian aid organization
 - I work for an international development organization
 - I work for a non-profit organization
 - I work for an intergovernmental organization
 - I work for a bilateral aid organization
 - I work for an organization with strong religious affiliation
 - I work for an organization with some religious affiliation

Appendix C – Practitioner Survey

- I work for an organization with no religious affiliation
 - Other: _____
18. What is the size of your organization:
- 100 or less staff worldwide
 - 750 or less staff worldwide
 - 2,000 or less staff worldwide
 - 10,000 or less staff worldwide
 - Over 10,000 staff worldwide
19. How many permanent offices (including field offices) does your organization have?
20. What level of risk does your organization work within?
- Scale of 1 to 5
 - (1) My organization will not allow travel to high risk (orange) zones.
 - (5) My organization regularly does work in severe risk (red) zones.
21. Free space for comments! Please add any ideas or reflections sparked by this survey. Think about the things you love about your work and the things that make it exceptionally difficult. I appreciate the time you put into sharing your experience with me!
22. At your discretion, you may share your contact information which may be used for a follow up interview. Include the name of your organization if desired.

Appendix D – Practitioner Survey Follow-Up Interview

Interview Description

The following interview is intended to inform research on the practitioner perspective of the Humanitarian-Development Nexus.

Interviewee: Survey Respondent | **Interviewer:** Natalie Palmquist

Interview:

Further Questions on the Humanitarian-Development Nexus

1. Do you consider yourself a humanitarian or a development worker? What do you see as the difference between the two?
2. Have you noticed any recent changes in approaches to humanitarian or development work? Can you give a few examples?
3. As a result of the humanitarian-development nexus conversation, which of the two sectors are experiencing the most change? Can you give examples?

Recurring Themes from the Survey

4. **Partnering with local organizations and adapting to the local context:** Can you give specific examples of successfully partnering with local organizations or adapting to the local context?
5. **Frustrations with non-flexible funding:** Can you discuss experiences with non-flexible funding in your work and share practical ways that you would improve funding systems?
6. **Desire for long-term outcomes:** How do you establish programs with long-term results in a protracted-crisis situation? Can you give examples of successful programs?