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Master Thesis

The structure of bank supervision and corruption in lending: a study for transition economies

Abstract : This paper try to examine the relation between the structure of bank supervision and corruption in lending based on the data from 21 transition economies in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. We support Beck, Kunt, and Levine (2006) that higher supervisory power will increase the degree of corruption in lending while supervisory policies which promote private monitoring by pushing banks to disclose accurate information and give incentives to private agents to monitor bank will reduce the degree of corruption in lending. As the main finding in this paper, we prove that the structure of bank supervision has significant effect to corruption in lending. More specifically, we found that the degree of corruption in lending will increase when the bank supervisor function is not in the central bank. We also have found that after we control our model with various country-level variables, the higher independency of bank supervisor will decrease the degree of corruption in lending.
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Master Thesis
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https://dumas.ccsd.cnrs.fr/dumas-00802139
Contributor : Centre de Documentation Du Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne <>
Submitted on : Tuesday, March 19, 2013 - 2:30:21 PM
Last modification on : Monday, February 22, 2021 - 3:26:02 PM
Long-term archiving on: : Thursday, June 20, 2013 - 4:25:17 PM

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  • HAL Id : dumas-00802139, version 1

Citation

Zenathan Hasannudin. The structure of bank supervision and corruption in lending: a study for transition economies. Economics and Finance. 2012. ⟨dumas-00802139⟩

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