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Mémoires Année : 2013

Ability of greens and supergreens to influence environmental regulations

Résumé

The goal of this paper is to explore the environmental policies introduced by the government that cares about the welfare of its citizens and the contributions from the lobby groups. Our addition to the topic of environmental lobbying is in modeling lobby groups, where we distinguish between local and global pollution. We showed that in some cases, the environmental lobbying might have a negative impact on the tax level, which is not true for the local lobbying. Even more interesting result shows that the presence of supergreens might increase the pollution level in the home country. Our results for the cooperative policies prove that the introduced tax will imply lower global emissions. We demonstrated that the asymmetries in some parameters will reinforce the tax levels in the case of national lobby and supergreens if the asymmetry parameter in the foreign country is larger.
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Dates et versions

dumas-00906165 , version 1 (19-11-2013)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : dumas-00906165 , version 1

Citer

Lenka Wildnerova. Ability of greens and supergreens to influence environmental regulations. Economics and Finance. 2013. ⟨dumas-00906165⟩
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