Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation
Master Thesis

Ability of greens and supergreens to influence environmental regulations

Abstract : The goal of this paper is to explore the environmental policies introduced by the government that cares about the welfare of its citizens and the contributions from the lobby groups. Our addition to the topic of environmental lobbying is in modeling lobby groups, where we distinguish between local and global pollution. We showed that in some cases, the environmental lobbying might have a negative impact on the tax level, which is not true for the local lobbying. Even more interesting result shows that the presence of supergreens might increase the pollution level in the home country. Our results for the cooperative policies prove that the introduced tax will imply lower global emissions. We demonstrated that the asymmetries in some parameters will reinforce the tax levels in the case of national lobby and supergreens if the asymmetry parameter in the foreign country is larger.
Document type :
Master Thesis
Complete list of metadata

Cited literature [15 references]  Display  Hide  Download

https://dumas.ccsd.cnrs.fr/dumas-00906165
Contributor : Centre de Documentation Du Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne <>
Submitted on : Tuesday, November 19, 2013 - 12:41:29 PM
Last modification on : Monday, February 22, 2021 - 3:26:02 PM
Long-term archiving on: : Monday, March 3, 2014 - 2:25:53 PM

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : dumas-00906165, version 1

Citation

Lenka Wildnerova. Ability of greens and supergreens to influence environmental regulations. Economics and Finance. 2013. ⟨dumas-00906165⟩

Share

Metrics

Record views

244

Files downloads

240